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CHAPTER -1 
INTRODUCTION 
It is a universally acknowledged truth and Judicially endorsed 
view that Islamic Law of divorce in its pristine purity is an admirable 
system of modern jurisprudence providing many rational, revolut-
ionary and humanitarian gender concepts which could not be 
conceived by any other system of law then in force at that time as 
well as at present time. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in a felicitous 
manner in YusufRowthan v s SoMramma^ observed: 
"Since infallibility is not an attribute of judiciary, the 
view has been ventured by Muslim Jurists that the Indo-
Anglian Judicial exposition of Islamic law of divorce 
has not exactly been just to the Holy Prophet or the 
Holy Book. Indeed a deeper study of the subject 
discloses a surprisingly rational, realistic and modern 
law of divorce". 
The above observation of learned Judge present a correct, just, 
unbiased and authentic view of Islamic law of divorce. Islam 
provides a modern concept of divorce by mutual consent what is now 
known as the break-down theory of divorce. The modem concept of 
break-down theory of divorce does not want the court to go into the 
causes of break-down of marriage. The Islamic Jurists also did not 
authorise the Qazi or court to inquire into causes of antipathy and 
1. AJ.R. 1971, Ker. 271. 
hatred of a wife seeking dissolution of marriage. If it is established 
by the facts and circumstances of a case that marital relation between 
the spouses has poisoned to such an extent that it is impossible for 
them to pull on any longer, the policy of Islamic law of divorce 
desires the separation of disgruntled spouses as against the 
continuation of strained relation in the interest of couples as well as 
society at large. Islam also does not want the matter to be taken to 
the court at all unless it becomes unavoidable. Unequivocally 
declaring "divorce to be the worst of all permitted things", the Holy 
Prophet (PBUH) warned his people to keep away from it. And where 
this worst were to happen unavoidably, he wanted the husband or 
wife (who ever might be aggrieved) or both of them jointly, to act 
quietly and privately. He did think of Judicial intervention only in 
exceptional cases where either the husband or wife was at fault 
leading to such break down but insisted on the subsistence of 
marriage. 
The history of Arab civilization bears the live testimony of 
gender discrimination, exploitation and denial of basic rights which 
were essential to their dignified human survival in the society. The 
existence of a female baby in the pre-Islamic Arabian society was 
not like that of an independent human being who could decide and 
determine her future course of life. Her individual existence in her 
paternal home was being considered as a constant source of 
humiliation, shame and an undesirable economic burden even after 
being given in marriage because of her highly insecured future in 
matrimonial home. Immediately before the advent of Holy Prophet 
(PBUH), the consent and choice of woman in her most personal 
matter like marriage and divorce was of no avail. It was the domain 
of her father and guardian to give her in marriage and obtain the 
separation on her behalf. She could be driven out of her matrimonial 
home for any or no reason. The husband had absolute right to 
divorce and also could revoke the divorce and divorce again as many 
times as he preferred. He could, if he was so inclined, swear that he 
would not have sexual relation with his wife for any length of time 
keeping her in suspensory state. Sometimes, when as Arab wanted to 
desert his wife, he would say that she was like the back of his 
mother. This would have an effect of irrevocable divorce. No set 
procedure and formula was being observed. 
The women amongst the Arabian society did not had 
corresponding right of divorce to get herself released even from a 
most detestable undesirable and torturous union. Islam through its 
Holy Prophet (PBUH) took the cognizance of these deep rooted 
social and moral evils and gender injustices with extreme 
disapproval and established that women were no more inferior to 
men in any sense and possess equal rights. The Holy Qur'an at the 
top of its voice declared to this effect. 
'O' people be careful of your duty to your Lord 
Who created you from a single being and created 
its mate Of same (kind) and spread from these too 
many men and women. 
This is a declaration in plain terms that, in essence human 
dignity and fundamental rights, all human beings of whatever sex or 
race or nationality stand on equal footing because they all ultimately 
spring from a single source. 
Contradicting the notion that women have no right or have but 
inferior to men, the Holy Qur'an came out with plain and 
unambiguous declaration: 
"And women shall have rights; 
Similar to those against them (men) 
According to what is equitable."^ 
A simple reading of the instant Holy verse makes it clear 
beyond all doubt that rights of women against their men are similar 
to those which the men have against their women. It also follows 
from the Holy verse that spousal rights also stand on equal footing 
and subjecting them to different significance amounts implicit 
negation of supreme command expressed in the instant Holy verse. 
2. Holy Quran; IV:I 
3. Holy Qur'an; II: 228 
This revelation, must no doubt, have caused a stir in a society 
which never recognised any right for women. The divine declaration 
in this respect was really a revolutionizing one for Arabs who 
hitherto regarded women as their chattels. The women were now 
given position by the verse 11: 229 equal to men in all respect. 
The statement that the men are a degree above to women does 
not nullify the rights asserted in the Holy Qur'an. The words are 
added simply to show that superior authority to run the house must 
be given to either the husband or wife and it has been given to the 
husband. Therefore, as far as Islam is concerned, it promulgated the 
doctrine of human equality as well as sex equality in comprehensive 
sense which negates all kinds of inequalities, social and economic, 
based on gender.^ 
So far as the right to the dissolution of marriage is concerned, 
the permission to it has been given both to the husband and wife to 
release themselves from marital bond in case of absolute necessity 
when the spousal relations have poisoned to a degree which makes 
peaceful home life impossible. But Islamic legal system does not 
believe in unlimited opportunities for divorce even on genuine 
grounds and necessity because any undue increase in the facility of 
divorce would destroy the stability of family life. Therefore, while 
4- Maulana Muhammad Ali: The Holy Qur'an: Arabic Text. Translation and 
commentary. P.67,4* ed. (1951) Anjuman Ishaat-e-Islam Lahore. 
allowing divorce on just and reasonable cause, the divine law has 
taken great care to introduce checks and balances designed to limit 
the use of available facility. The Holy Qur'an enjoins to this effect: 
"Divorce is permissible only twice; 
After that parties should either hold together 
On equitable terms or separate with kindness"^ 
It necessarily follows from the above Holy verse that right to 
divorce is not an absolute and unilateral right vested in the husband. 
It can also not be exercised arbitrarily and capriciously. It is not the 
right for the husband to sever his relations with his wife without a 
great deal of thinking. It has, therefore, afforded all possible 
opportunities for reconciliation and provided ample time to reflect 
over pros and cons of the matter. Remedies are therefore suggested 
to avoid divorce as far as possible. 
The Holy Qur'an says: 
"Ify^f^o^ a breach between them (twain) 
Appoint an arbiter from his fold and an arbiter 
from her folk, If they wish peace, the God will 
cause their reconciliation".^ 
The above verse gives not only the principle of divorce which 
is Shiqaq or a disagreement to live together as husband and wife but 
also the process to be adopted when rupture of marital relation is 
feared. The two sexes are here placed on the level of perfect 
5. Holv Qur'an, n: 228 
6. Holy Qur'an; IV:35 
equality. The expression "A breach between two..." would imply 
that either the husband or the wife wants to break-off the marriage 
agreement and hence either may claim a divorce when parties can no 
longer pull on in agreement. In the process to be adopted, both 
husband and wife are to be represented on a status of equality; an 
arbiter has to be appointed from his people and another from her 
people. The arbiters are adivsed to find out differences and reconcile 
the parties to each other. If reconciliation cannot be brought about, a 
divorce must follow. In order to check the hasty action and leave the 
door open at many stages, the proper method of pronouncing divorce 
has been prescribed by the Holy Qur'an and traditions of the Holy 
Prophet (PBUH). 
As the husband has been given the right to secure release from 
the marriage bond similar rights have been accorded by Islam to the 
wife. There are two ways in which a woman is allowed to seek 
separation from her husband: First through mutual agreement 
between the husband and wife i.e., Khula and Mubara'at. Secondly, 
through a judicial decree by filing a suit against the husband in the 
court of law i.e., under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 
1939. 
Inspite of this glaring fact that a substantial reforms in the pre-
Islamic system of divorce was introduced by the Holy Prophet 
(PBUH) with a view to prevent the exploitation of women and give 
them a status equal to men as well as a moral social and economic 
security right from the childhood to motherhood. But this ceaseless 
effort of Holy Prophet, due to deplorable distortion made by, and 
unfortunate metamorphosis undergone at the hands of Indo-Anglian 
courts have failed to earn the admiration and appreciation. More than 
a century ago privy council in famous case Moonshee Buzloor 
Raheem v/s Shamsoonnissa Begum^ observed that "matrimonial law 
of the Muhammandan, like that of every ancient community, favours 
the stronger sex where the husband can dissolve the marital tie at his 
will". About the law of talaq, the Privy Council observed yet in 
another case* that a divorce by talaq is mere arbitrary act of the 
husband who may repudiate his wife with or without any cause". 
That law on the point has stood unchanged during all these 
hundred years and recent reference may be made to the celebrated 
decision of Supreme Court in Mohd Ahmad Khan v/s Shah Bano 
Begum wherein a five judges Bench has again observed that, 
"undoubtedly the Muslim husband enjoys the privilege of being able 
to discard his wife whenever he chooses to do so for reasons good 
bad or indifferent even for no reason at all". 
7. (1867) II MIA 551 (610) 
8. Moonshee Buzul-Ul-Rahim v/s Lateef-un-Nissa (1981) 8 MIA 397 (395) 
9. (1985) 2 s e c 556 
Besides it, the on going controversy regarding mode of 
pronouncement of triple divorce and its instantaneous effect on 
marital relation has added fuel to the fire and as a result a concerted 
effort is going on at global level to abrogate and replace Muslim 
Personal Law by common or uniform civil code. 
I got tempted to pick-up-the instant work in the wake of 
frequently subjecting Muslim personal law relating to status to 
unfounded and baseless criticism from bar to bench that under 
Shariah law a Muslim Wife's rights to the dissolution of her 
marriage are inferior to the rights of her counterpart male. The critics 
have gone to the extent of saying that under Muslim Personal Law 
right to dissolve the marital tie squarely rests with the husband only 
which is unilateral, arbitrary, capricious and is designed to 
undermine and degrade the position of women and fails to pass the 
constitutional test of gender equality. In order to nullify the baseless 
allegations and to find out the solution of the questions raised by the 
antagonists, 1 have made all concerted efforts to clarify the true law 
on the subject on the basis of authentic and authoritative source 
material. 
The present work is basically confined to study a Muslim 
woman's rights and limitations to the dissolution of her marital tie 
available under classical Islamic jurisprudence and thus covers in its 
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The present work is basically confined to study a Muslim 
woman's rights and limitations to the dissolution of her marital tie 
available under classical Islamic jurisprudence and thus covers in its 
ambit Khula, Mubara'at, Tafwid, 11a, Zihar, Lian etc. The grounds of 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 have discussed in detail. 
The relevant judicial pronouncementsof the representative character 
of pre and post partitioned India and Pakistan have been referred to 
and duly analysed. 
In view of the source materials relied upon and methodology 
adopted for, it may be placed in the category of doctrinal research. 
The entire thesis is divided into nine chapters excluding conclusion. 
Chapter First which deals with the 'Introduction' gives a brief 
idea of the aims and objectives of the study of the Dissolution of 
Marital Tie by a Muslim wife. It further points out the significance 
of the subject in appropriate perspective highlighting ambit and 
scope of the work. 
Chapter second deals with the 'Institution of Divorce: Origin 
and Development'. Divorce as an institution under various ancient 
civilizations has been studied at length. The concept, forms and 
procedure of divorce under the Shariah Law has been subjected to in-
depth study in the light of relevant verses of Holy Qur'an, Hadith 
11 
and juristic work. The Ahsan and Hasan forms of divorce have been 
dealt with in detail under the instant chapter. 
"Talaq-al-Biddat: Classical View and Judicial Trends", 
constitutes Chapter third of the thesis. The historical-background of 
the Talaq-al-Biddat has been traced out. An attempt has been made 
to analyse the effects of triple divorce in the light of Shariah law. 
Divergent views of four Imams and the Judicial pronouncements of 
representative character, the opinion of modern Islamic Jurists 
belonging to Deoband School of thoughts and Ahle-Hadith have also 
been put on record in detail as to the effect of triple simultaneous 
pronouncement of divorce in single Tuhr (period of purity). In order 
to put an end the practice of triple divorce, the preventive legislative 
measures enacted in Muslim countries, like Turkey, Tunisia, Algeria 
and Pakistan have been examined in brief. 
The fourth chapter is dedicated to "Divorce by Khula" and 
"Divorce by Mubara 'at". An in-depth study has been made to trace 
out the religious basis of Khula. The nature and quantum of 
compensation, the effect of non-payment of compensation on marital 
rights like, dower and maintenance, have been analysed at length in 
the light of Shariah. The power of the court to determine the amount 
of compensation in the cases of disagreement and circumstances 
disentitling the husband to claim the amount of compensation has 
12 
been deeply studied in the light of judicial interpretation of the 
superior courts of Pakistan. The legislative recognition of Khula in 
Muslim countries has also been briefly discussed. 
"Delegation of Divorce", forms Chapter Fifth of the thesis. 
The conceptual analysis, religious basis and classification of Talaq-
e-Tafwid constitutes the subject matter of discussion under the 
Chapter. The relevant of judicial pronouncements have also been 
referred to in the course of discussion. 
The Divorce by Ha, Zihar and Lian constitute chapter sixth, 
seventh and Eight respectively of the thesis. The concept, utility, 
legal effects and religious basis of these forms of divorce have been 
dealt with in detail. 
"The Muslim Women's Right to Dissolve Marriage under 
Statutory Law" has been discussed under chapter Ninth of the thesis. 
Various grounds of divorce under Section 2 clauses (I) to (IX) of the 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act 1939 have been analysed in the 
light of Shariah law and relevant judicial pronouncements in India. 
The concluding part of the thesis aptly summarises the entire 
discussion of the topic in the various chapters. An attempt has been made to 
provide certain suggestions which may go a long way for the amelioration 
of the deteriorating conditions of women in sub-continent. 
CHAPTER - II 
13 
THE INSTITUTION OF DIVORCE: ORIGIN AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
Divorce as an Institution: 
Divorce has been a controversial subject. On the one had it can 
not be denied that dissolution of marriage brings about the 
disintegration of family life with consequent uncertainty and 
unhappiness for the children bom of the marriage but on the other 
hand, it must be equally conceded that dissolution of marriage is 
evidently desirable when the spouses can no longer live in harmony 
and have lost all the mutual regard love and affection. The 
continuance of an unhappy marriage breeds hate and disgust and may 
ruin the lives of the parties involved or at least one of them.* 
Islam takes realistic and sympathetic view of human affairs 
and, therefore, it attaches great importance to the happiness of both 
the spouses. It provides that every attempt should be made to 
maintain a marriage but once it is established that a marriage has 
proved a failure and has become a mere hollow shell, Muslim law 
does not scruple to allow the parties to separate from each other. In 
Islam marriage in ordinary course is to last till one of the spouses 
dies but if a husband and wife can not live happily together and very 
objects of marriage are defeated and it becomes a mere farce, then its 
1. K.N. Ahmad: The Muslim Law of Divorce; P. 1 (1984) Kitab Bhawan New Delhi. 
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continuance is no longer considered desirable. Under such 
circumstances dissolution of marriage is allowed under Islamic Law. 
The Roman Catholic Church considered marriage merely 
sacrosanct, and therefore left no way open to its dissolution. 
Therefore the orthodox Hindu society permitted no divorce and 
regarded their marriage as an indissoluble and eternal union. 
Contrary to these approaches, Islam under certain unavoidable 
circumstances leaves a way open to its dissolution. This is however, 
permitted only in exceptional and unprecedented circumstances.*^ 
Inspite of this fact, the antagonists and critics of Islam under 
the grab of gender emancipation and empowerment allege the Islam 
to have originated the idea of divorce and go to the extent of saying 
that it has encouraged, facilitated and promoted the termination of 
marriage which is derogator>' to the dignity and status of woman in 
contemporary society. 
In order to know the truth behind the frivolous and unfounded 
allegation, it is necessary to look briefly into historical origin and 
development of the institution of divorce and reform effected in it by 
Islam. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Dr. Zeenat Shaukat Ali: Marriage and Divorce in Islam: An Appraisal, P. 165, 
(1987) Jaico Publishing Housing-Botnba>'. 
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Divorce Under ancient civilizations: 
The history of various human civilizations reveal that among 
all the ancient legal systems, the divorce has been regarded as a 
necessary corollary to the law of marriage and this capricious power 
of the husband to divorce his wife was regarded as unequivocal and 
as a natural suffix to his marital rights. This right was denied to the 
wife in all the circumstances.^ 
The ancient Hebraic law permitted a husband to divorce his 
wife for any or no cause. He was irrationally loaded with the power 
of desertion against the wife. There were few or no checks on the 
arbitrary and capricious use of such powers. Women were, however, 
not allowed to demand the divorce from their husbands even for a 
just cause. Various tribal systems were equally pro-male. Later the 
Shamaities exhibited a change in their divorce policy but Hillelites 
continued their traditional practices. The situation among the Jewish 
tribes and pagan Arab remained unchanged upto the appearance of 
the Holy Prophet (PBUH). Athenians and the Israelites were no 
exception to this trend.^ 
According to Roman Catholic doctrine, a consummated 
Christian marriage is a sacrament and must as such remain valid 
4. Ibid. 
5. Syed Ameer Ali: The Sprit of Islam: P.241 ed. (1987) Delhi. 
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forever. It represents the union between Christ and the Church, and 
is consequently as indissoluble as that union. It is also permanent 
according to the law of nature, because only a permanent marriage 
can fulfil this object and God made it so at the beginning of our race, 
when He decreed that a man shall leave his father and his mother and 
shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be one flesh. Inspite of this 
doctrine, which could never work in practice, the Roman Catholic 
Church allowed separation of married couple under the exceptional 
circumstances on the ground of invalidity of marriage. Lord Bryce 
has pointed out in his book, "Studies in History and Jurisprudence", 
that rules covering these exceptional cases were so numerous and so 
intricated that it was easy, given a sufficient motive, whether 
political or pecuniary, to discover some ground for declaring almost 
any marriage invalid. A man might secure a divorce by swearing that 
he was his wife's distant cousin or had loved her sister in his youth 
or had before his marriage stood godfather to one of her near 
spiritual kindred. Thus, among the Roman the legality of the practice 
of divorce was recognised from the earliest times. However, in Rome 
the frequency of divorce varied with the type of marriage.^ 
6. M. Mazheruddin Siddiqi; Women in Islam, P.60.Ist ed. (1987) Adam Publishers 
Delhi 
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The Protestant reformers never accepted the Roman Catholic 
doctrine of the indissolubility of marriage except by death. They all 
agreed that adultery should be recognised as a ground for divorce, 
and most of them regarded malicious desertion a second ground for 
the dissolution of marriage. The views of Protestant reformers 
influenced the course of legislation in various Protestant countries 
and the laws were passed permitting divorce for a number of reasons. 
Apart from adultery desertion, an attempt made by one of the couples 
on the life of the other is specified in the law of many countries as a 
legitimate ground for divorce. Ill-treatment of some kind has also 
been laid down in some countries as a sufficient reason for the 
dissolution of marriage. In United States, divorce is obtainable for 
cruelty. In United States a husband who is able to support his wife 
but for a certain time neglects to do so may be divorced. Similarly, 
in some states divorce may be obtained on proof of habitual in 
drunkenness of either party for varying terms. In England, 
impotency, physical incapacity, venereal and other diseases in the 
husband or wife, existing at the time of marriage and afterwards, but 
unknown to the other party, are recognised as a legitimate ground of 
divorce.' 
7. Ibid. P.61. 
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The Western Christian church made both marriage and divorce 
difficult because of its doctrine that sex is inherently sinful. 
Marriage was made a sacrament and under the influence of 
St. Augustine became indissoluble. But the impossibility of forcing 
the people to live together in the intimacy of marriage compelled the 
church to authorise the separation from bed to board. Moreover, 
numerous impediments to marriage enabled the church lawyers to 
find the grounds to declare any marriage invalid from the beginning 
provided plausible reasons whether personal, political or pecuniary 
could be brought forward. Catholicism has maintained this 
traditional attitude. Papal canon law which prevails in Italy, Spain, 
the Irish Free state and Austria for Catholics and among faithful 
Catholics everywhere, permits separation for adultery or unnatural 
offences, cruelty, impotency and consanguinity. Incontinence, before 
marriage discovered after marriage is one of the several grounds for 
the annulment of marriage. Recent studies indicate that numerous 
divorces in the United States are procured by the persons of Catholic 
affiliation.* 
The Protestant reformers held that the severity of the 
traditional doctrine fostered immorality among the masses while 
maintaining relatively easy divorce for the rich and powerful and 
they regarded marriage as a civil contract. However, all of them 
8. Encyclopaedia of the social Sciences: Vol. 5* , P. 178. New York. 
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admitted the rightfulness of divorce on the grounds of adultery and 
malicious desertion; some added excessive cruelty, insanity and 
incurable disease in the grounds for divorce. Contrary to the catholic 
precedent, they fully sanctioned the marriage of innocent party. In 
Protestant and catholic communities alike, however, marriage 
continued to be surrounded in popular esteem with religious 
sentiments, and divorce was viewed with dread attach to whatever is 
tabu. Secular views of marriage and divorce have won increasing 
acceptance since the French revolution and have steadily been 
reinforced by the intellectual and the industrial changes of the recent 
times. Apart from the Catholic countries above-mentioned European 
countries introduced considerable uniformity in both grounds and 
frequency of divorce. The orthodox Eastern Church, whose canon 
long prevailed in Russia and Hungry and are still influential in 
Serbia, Bulgaria and Rumania, permits absolute divorce but no 
Judicial separation'. 
Among western countries, France has made divorce much 
easier. The 1792 law of divorce says that marriage is merely a civil 
contract, and that the facility in obtaining the divorce is natural 
consequence of individual's right of freedom, which is lost if 
engagements are made indissoluble. Divorce is granted on various 
9. Ibid. P. 179. 
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grounds, among others, on the mutual desire of the two parties, and 
even at the wish of one party on the ground of incompatibility of 
temper, subject to only to a short period of delay and to the necessity 
of appearing before a family council who are to endeavor to bring 
about reconciliation. In the year of 1804, however, under the 
provisions of "Napoleon's code civil de Francis", divorce was made 
more difficult. Mere incompatibility of temper is no longer 
recognised as sufficient cause for divorce. Marriage may still be 
dissolved on the ground of mutual consent, but on certain conditions 
only i.e., the husband must be at least twenty-five year of age and the 
wife twenty-one; they must have been married at least for two years 
and not more than twenty-five years and the wife must not be over 
forty-five years of the age; the parents or other living ascendant of 
both the parties must give their approval; and the mutual and 
unwavering consent of the married couple must sufficiently prove 
that their common life is insupportable to them, and that there exists 
in reference to them a peremptory cause of divorce.'" 
Divorce amongst Arabs: 
The constitution of Arab society, when the laws of Islam came 
into force, was that of a people which had not yet, generally 
speaking, completely lost its nomadic habits and characteristics. The 
10. Supra note 6. P.62. 
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Arabs were divided into tribes and sub-tribes, and their sexual 
relations were, -mostly, governed by the local tribal customs and 
usage. However, the customs regulating the relations of sexes and 
the status of children, issue of such relations, were at the time of 
establishment of Islam uncertain and in the state of transition. Side 
by side with a regular form of marriages, which fixed the relative 
rights and obligations of the parties and determined the status of 
children, there flourished the types of sexual connection under the 
name of marriage, which are instructive as relics of the different 
stages through which the Arabian society must have passed. It is 
narrated that there were four kinds of marriages in vogue at the time 
when Islamic law came into force." 
First, a form of marriage which has been sanctioned by Islam, 
namely a man asks another for the hand of the latter's ward or 
daughter, and then marries her by giving her a dower." 
Second; a custom according to which a man would say to his 
wife, send for so and so (naming a famous man) and have intercourse 
with him. The husband would then keep away from society unless 
she had conceived by the man indicated, but after pregnancy became 
11. Abdur Rahim, M.A.: The Principles of Muhammad Jurisprudence, P.4, (1983) 
Allahabad. 
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apparent, he would return to her. This originated from the desire to 
secure noble seeds." 
Third, a number of men, less than ten, used to go to a woman 
and have sexual connection with her. If she conceived and was 
delivered of a child, she would send for them a call and they would 
be all bound to come. When they came and assembled, the women 
would address them saying, "you know what has happened. I have 
now brought forth a child. O, so and so? (naming whomsoever of 
them she choose) this is your son"'* 
Fourth, a number of men used to visit a woman who would not 
refuse any visitors. These women were prostitute and used to fix flag 
at the doors of their tents as a sign of their calling. If a woman of 
this class conceived, the men who frequented her house would be 
assembled and physignomists used to decide to whom child 
belonged. It simply means that Arabs used to contract what has been 
called a temporary marriage under the name of Muta.** 
Before the advent of Islam a women was not a free agent in 
contracting her marriage. It was the right of her father, brother or 
cousin or any other male guardian to give her in marriage, whether 
she was widow or old or young, or virgin to whomsoever he chooses. 
13. Ibid. 
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Her consent was of no avail. There was no restriction as to the 
number of wives an Arab could have. The only limit was that 
imposed by his means, opportunity and inclinations. Unrestricted 
polygamy was the order of the day.**' 
The power of divorce possessed by the husband was unlimited 
in pre-Islamic Arabia. They could divorce their wives at any time for 
any reason or without any reason. They could also revoke their 
divorce and divorce again as many times, as they preferred. They 
could moreover, if they were so inclined, swear that they would have 
no intercourse with their wives, though still living with them. They 
could arbitrarily accuse their wives of adultery dismiss them, and 
leave them with such notoriety as would deter other suitors, while 
they themselves would go exempt from any responsibility of 
maintenance or legal punishment.'^ 
As it has been pointed out that a nomadic Arab was at liberty 
to have as many wives as he could desire, he was likewise absolutely 
free to release himself from the marital tie. His power in this 
connection was absolute and was not required or expected to assign 
any reason for its exercise. He was not bound to observe any 
particular procedure. The word commonly used for this purpose was 
16 Ibrahim Abdel Hamid; Dissolution of Marriage in Islamic Law, P.765, (1956), The 
Islamic Sultural Center New Delhi. 
17 Ibid. 
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Talaq. It was upon his discretion whether he would dissolve the 
marriage absolutely and thus set woman free to marry again or not. 
He might if he so choose, revoke the divorce and resume marital 
connection. Some times an Arab would pronounce Talaq ten times 
and take his wife back and again divorce her and then take her back 
and so on. The wife in such a predicament was entirely at the mercy 
of the husband and would not know when she was free. Some times 
the husband would renounce his wife by means of what was called a 
suspensory divorce. This procedure did not dissolve the marriage, 
but it only enabled the husband to refuse to live with his wife, while 
the latter was not at liberty to marry again. Another form of divorce 
in use among the Arabs was "Ila" the husband swearing that he 
would have nothing to do with his wife. According to some, such an 
oath had the effect of causing an instant separation, but other say that 
it was regarded as suspensory divorce. Sometimes when an Arab 
wanted to divorce his wife, he would say that she was like the back 
of his mother. This would have the effect of an irrevocable divorce 
and was known as Zihar."* 
The wife among the Arabs had no corresponding right to 
release herself from the bond of marriage but her parents by a 
friendly arrangement with the husband could obtain a separation by 
18. Supra note 11, P.7. 
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returning the dower if it had been paid or by agreeing to forego it if 
not paid. Such an arrangement was called "Khula" and by it marriage 
tie would be absolutely dissolved. A woman if absolutely separated 
by Talaq, 'Zihar' 'ila' or Khula might remarry, but she could not do 
so until sometime called the period of 'Iddat' elapsed. This 
precaution was evidently observed in the interest of child that might 
be in the womb of mother. But an Arab before Islam would sometime 
divorce his pregnant wife, and she would under an agreement with 
him is taken over in marriage by another. On the death of the 
husband period of Iddat was one year.*' 
Thus, in pre-lslamic Arabia, no doubt, the institution of 
divorce existed but it was resorted to not for the purpose of repairing 
past mistakes and securing future marital happiness after putting an 
end to a loathsome hatred, torturous unhappy and disharmonious 
union, but it was aimed at degrading and degenerating the dignity 
and status of women and was used as an instrument of torture by 
leaving her in suspensory, vagrant and destitute state after 
pronouncing divorce. Men used to divorce their wives, generally, out 
of sudden capric or whim passion and frivolity providing pretexts for 
divorce. The husband could divorce his wife when she was in 
menstruation or even when she was pregnant or nursing a child 
19. Ibid, P.8. 
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without undertaking any obligation towards her maintenance. Most 
of the Arabs considering it a great dishonour to see their divorced 
wives marring others did not let them go even after their separation, 
but detain them in their own houses neglected and suspended. 
These social and moral ills and gender injustices drawned the 
attention of the Prophet (PBUH) of Islam. Fully conscious of evils, 
flowing from the divorce, he, under the divine inspiration framed the 
laws of marriage and divorce in order ta remove these evils. These 
laws ensured permanence of marriage without impairing individual 
freedom. 
Divorce under Shariah: 
The Arabic word for divorce is "Talaq" which literally means 
"freedom" or undoing of knot". When defined in terms of law it 
means snapping-off the nuptial tie once, with express or implied 
words, by husband personally or through agent or delegate making it 
effective instantaneously or consequentially.^" 
The word Talaq (divorce) in Shariah nieans terminating with 
explicit or implied words the bond created by marriage contract. 
Divorce has been generally classified into irrevocable and revocable. 
In irrevocable divorce the marriage contract does not dissolve till the 
20. The Durr-ul-Mukhtar, English Translation by B.M. Dayal, P. 117. (1992) Kitab 
Bhawan, New Delhi. 
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period of probation (Iddat) is over. Ibn Human in his famous book. 
Path al-Qadir calls divorce an act of terminating the bond created by 
marriage contract by express or implied words or by another means, 
for instance, by Qadi's decree. Divorce is described in Durr-ul-
Mukhtar as the act of terminating with the explicit words 
instantaneously through irrevocable divorce or consequentially 
through revocable divorce, the bond created by marriage contract. 
As it has been pointed out that before the advent of Islam, 
Talaq or divorce among the Arabs was very easy and was the order 
of the day. A husband was allowed to pronounce the divorce as often 
as he pleased. Whenever his relation with his wife were strained, he 
pronounced the divorce and then reunite as and when it suited him. 
As there was not limit to this, it was repeated over and over again. 
The wife could neither have conjugal relations with him nor was she 
free to marry any one else. However, the Islam and its Holy Prophet 
(PBUH) looked upon these serious social evil customs of divorce 
common in Arabian society with extreme disapproval and regarded 
their practice as calculated to undermine the foundation of the 
society." 
21. Dr. Taiml-ur-Rahman; A code of Muslim Personal Law, P.309, Vol.Ist (1978) 
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It was, however, not possible under the existing social 
condition to abolish the long standing customs of divorce suddenly 
overnight. Therefore Islam instead of abolishing them entirely 
retained some of them by effecting necessary reforms. Accordingly, 
Islam recognising their necessity allows the couples to separate in 
the cases of extreme necessity when the marital relations have been 
poisoned to a degree which makes a peaceful home life impossible. 
But Islam does not believe in unlimited opportunities for divorce on 
frivolous and trivial grounds, because any undue increase in the 
facilities of divorce would destroy the stability of family life. 
Therefore, while allowing divorce on genuine grounds, Islam has 
taken great care to introduce checks and balances designed to limit 
use of available facilities in the following words of Holy Qur'an. 
"A divorce is only permissible twice; 
After that the parties should hold together 
On equitable terms or separate with kindness^^ " 
Thus, the divorce under Shariah is a means to untie the 
subsisting bond of marriage between husband and wife, the right of 
which has been given to man and woman both to obtain a release 
from the marriage bond in cases of absolute necessity. Therefore, the 
husband and wife are absolutely free in the use of this right and no 
23. Holy Qur'an; D: 229 
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authority has any power to take it away from them unless they are 
unjust and unfair. Apart from the above Qur'anic injunction the Holy 
Prophet (PBUH) has made it clear that Islam does not regard divorce 
desirable. 
Muharib reported the Apostle of Allah saying; 
"Allah did not make anything lawful more 
abominable to Him than divorce^* 
Hazrat Ibn Umar reported the Prophet (PBUH) as saying: 
"Of all the lawful acts the most detestable 
to Allah is divorce^^ ". 
The Holy Prophet (PBUH) again said: 
"If any woman asks her husband 
for a divorce without some strong 
reason, even the smell of Parodies 
will be forbidden to her ^^ 
Thus, although absolute right to divorce has been granted to 
man but he is allowed to have a resort to it when all the avenues of 
reconciliation are closed. Therefore Holy Qur'an enjoins a man to 
keep his wife even if he does not like her. The Holy Qur'an to this 
effect says: 
24. Sunan Abu Dawud; English Translation with explanatory notes by Prof. Ahmad 
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"And retain them (the wives) kindly; 
Then if you hate them, 
It may be that you dislike a thing while 
God has put abundant good in it^^ 
The family relations play an important part in the social life of 
a community and their preservation and maintenance is essential. 
Therefore, Islam has done everything possible to maintain the family 
and in case of dispute between husband and wife it recommends 
reconciliation through their representatives. This is last effort to 
keep them together. The Holy Qur'an says: 
"If ye fear a breach between them twain, 
Appoint (two) arbiters, one from his family, 
And other from hers; if they wish peace 
God will cause, their reconciliation^^". 
Through the instant Holy verse, Islam tries to appeal to the 
conscience of its followers by exhorting, 'You should live with them 
(wives) in an honourable manner even if you dislike them it is 
possible that Allah may bring much good to you through that very 
thing which you dislike. Islam, therefore, permits divorce as a last 
resort, when all efforts of peaceful living between the couples 
miserably fails. Islam exhorts both husband and wife to think a 
hundred and one times before making final decision of separation 
27. Holv Qur'an II: 19. 
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and it has, therefore, afforded all the possible opportunities for 
reconciliation and provided ample time to reflect calmly over the 
pros and cons of the matter. Here it may be pointed out that Islam 
teaches great respect for this relationship and encourages the parties 
to keep this relationship alive under every difficult circumstances. 
Though it gives them the right to separate when it becomes 
physically impossible to live together, it tries its best to keep them 
together in the ties of marriage upto the last moment. In fact 
marriage is not a thing to give away whenever one likes in order to 
contract another marriage. People who marry whenever they like and 
divorce are not linked by Allah and His Messenger.^^ 
Abu Hurayrah reports that Prophet (PBUH) said, 
"Marry do not divorce, 
for God does not like men 
and women who relish 
variety in sex matters^^"". 
Thus, the divorce is permitted only when the husband and wife 
cannot live together in peace and harmony and are determined to 
separate. This rule is based on a Qur'anic text wherein the husbands 
have been enjoined "to keep the wife with kindness". Although, it is 
true that relation between husband and wife do not always remain 
29. Encyclopaedia ofSeerah\ Vol. II, P.663, (1986) Seerah Foundation London. 
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co-ordial, yet Allah's law does not insist that strained relation should 
continue indefinitely. But even in such cases an attempt is first to be 
made for reconciliation by referring the matter to the arbitration. 
According to the spirit of divine law, it is only when disagreement 
continues and efforts to bring about a reconciliation prove unavailing 
that the parties may dissolve the marriage. 
Judicial separation in which the aggrieved spouse is allowed to 
live separate from other without the marriage being dissolved is an 
institution not recognised by Muslim law. The reason for this is that 
the objects of marriage are not restored by judicial separation, 
because it may result in immorality which in Islam is an evil far 
greater than divorce. The Muslim law, while it permits divorce 
insists that there shall be some guarantee that the husband or wife are 
not acting from caprice or frivolity or on the impulse of a momentary 
provocation. For this purpose certain restrictions are imposed by law 
upon the spouses as to the right to dissolved their marriage. First, as 
regards the dower they have bestowed on their wives, they are not 
permitted to withholds it or take back anything from it, if they decide 
upon the divorce. Secondly, a divorce pronounced at a single sitting 
does not have the effect of final separation. It is laid down as a 
condition that a divorce, to take legal effect, must be pronounced 
three times at intervals of one month each. Another condition laid 
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down for husband intending to divorce their wives is that they should 
not pronounce the divorce during the period of their wives 
menstruation. The object of these restrictions is to ensure that 
spouses should not act in haste, such as, under the influence of wine, 
anger, excitement, and like, and that an opportunities provided to the 
parties for rapprochement. This cautious attitude towards divorce 
from the basis of the Talaq al-sunnah under which marriage is 
terminated only after a minimum period of three terms of wife's 
menstrual courses from the time of the pronouncement of divorce. 
During this period, husband has option to take the wife back'''. 
The above discussion makes it clear that a Muslim husband 
cannot justly divorce his wife in the absence of reasonable grounds 
and without having recourse to an attempt at reconciliation. It is 
unfortunate that this basic principle regarding divorce has been lost 
sight of an divorce given capriciously and without any justification, 
whatsoever, is considered good in law, though it is strongly 
discouraged in Islam. This conception of law ignores the strong 
condemnation and disapproval of divorce in Islam and has led many 
a husband to make an unscrupulous use of his power to divorce. This 
often results in great misery and unhappiness for the wife and has 
made marriage insecure and wife's position very precarious. 
31. n)idP.664. 
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Procedure of Divorce in Shariali: 
Marriage is an agreement to live together as husband and wife 
and when either of the party finds it impossible to live with the 
other, divorce may follow. It is not, of course, meant that every 
disagreement between them would lead to divorce, it is only the 
expression of disagreement of the parties to live any more as 
husband and wife. In the Holy Qur'an such disagreement is called 
shiqaq which means breaking into two. Even Shiqaq does not entitle 
either party to a divorce, unless all possibilities of reconciliation 
have been exhausted. The principle of divorce is, therefore, 
described in Holy Qur'an thus: 
"If ye fear a breach between them twain; 
Appoint two arbiters: one from his 
family and other from hers; If they wish 
peace, God will cause. Their reconciliation: 
For God hathful knowledge, 
And is acquainted with all the things^^. 
In this verse, a plan has been put forward for settling dispute 
between husband and wife. The divine law recommends that a 
sincere effort should be made to effect a reconciliation before 
resorting to a court of law or making final breach. The plan is to 
appoint one arbiter from the family of each spouse for the purpose. 
32. Holy Qur'an; IV:35. 
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The two should probe into the real cause of the dispute between the 
parties and then try to find a suitable way out of it. Of course, the 
relatives are best qualified person, as they know the true conditions 
of the spouses'* .^ 
The above verse of the Holy Qur'an provides not only the 
cause of divorce, which is shiqaq or a disagreement to live together 
as husband and wife but also the process to be adopted when a 
rupture of marital relation is feared. The expression, "a breach 
between the two...." imply that either the husband or wife wants to 
break off the marriage agreement, and hence either may claim a 
divorce when the parties can no longer pull on in agreement. In the 
process to be adopted, both husband and wife are to be represented 
on a status of equality, an arbiter has to be appointed from his people 
and another from her people. The two are told to try to remove the 
differences and reconcile the parties to each other. If agreement 
cannot be brought about, a divorce will follow"**. 
There is a difference of opinion regarding the powers of 
arbiters. According to Imam Abu Hanifa and his disciples as well as 
Imam Shafai, and Imam Ahmad b. Hanbal, the arbiters are not 
authorised to pass any final decree but may recommend measures for 
33. Mohd. Iqbal Siddiqui; TTie Family Laws of Islam, P.216,1st ed., (1988) Delhi. 
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reconciliation which may be accepted or rejected by the spouses. 
They base their opinions on the ground that divorce lies in the hands 
of the husband hence the marriage can be dissolved only if he gives 
this power to the arbitrators. If he does not invest the arbitrator or 
arbitrators with this power then he or they can not wield it and 
cannot dissolve the marriage. This is also opinion expressed in 
Bayan al-Qur'an by Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi^'. 
According to Ibn Abbas, Sayeed bin Jubair, Ibrahim Nakhai, 
Muhammad bin Sirin and some other Jurists, arbiters have full 
authority to enforce their decision about reconciliation or separation 
whichever they consider to be proper. Ibrahim Nakhai has gone to 
the extent to hold that arbiters can even pronounce a irrevocable 
(Mughalazah) divorce. Imam Malik is reported to have held same 
opinion. The Jurists who are in favour of the proposition that 
arbitrators have authority to separate or not to separate the parties 
base their views on the reasoning that God Almighty has called the 
arbitrators as Hakam (Judge) and such persons namely. Judges have 
absolute authority in all matters and here it includes the power to 
separate the spouses'*^ 
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Hazrat Uthman and Hazrat Ali (Allah be pleased with them) 
used to authorise the arbiters appointed by them with full powers to 
effect reconciliation or separation as required by the circumstances. 
For instance, when the case of Aqil son of Abu Talib, and his wife 
Fatima, daughter of Utba bin Rabia, was brought before Hazrat 
Uthman as to the undesirable behaviour of her husband, The Caliph 
Uthman appointed Ibn-Abbas as an arbiter from the family of the 
husband and Muawiyah bin Abu Sufiyan from the family of wife to 
decide the case. It is also reported by Ibn Abbas that Uthman, the 
third caliph had directed the arbitrators that they could maintain the 
marriage or dissolve it as they thought best under the circumstances. 
They proceeded to the house of spouses and Ibn Abbas remarked that 
he would separate her (from her husband) but Muawiyah said," I am not 
such as to cause separation between two descendants of Abd Manaf, 
that is, he would not separate the two members of his won tribe '^. 
There is still a much more weighty and clear authority 
regarding the instant matter. It is reported that a husband and his 
wife and some other persons approached Hazrat Ali, the fourth 
Caliph, who enquired of them what mater was. He was informed that 
there was a quarrel between the spouses. Caliph Ali quoted the verse 
of Qur'an about the appointment of arbitrators and asked them if 
37. Ibid. 
38 
they would abide by verdict of the arbitrators. The wife said that she 
would abide by injunction in the Holy Qur'an but the husband said 
that he would not agree to separation if so decided by arbitrators. 
Caliph Ali thereupon said, "Thou art a liar (that is, at fault in not 
accepting the injunction of Holy Qur'an), thou can not leave this 
place until and unless thou also agree to abide by decision of 
arbitrators as has been done by the woman. 
This shows that arbiters as such do not possess judicial 
powers, but if at the time of their appointment, the authority 
concerned empowers them with Judicial powers their decision shall 
be binding and enforced like other Judicial decisions. 
The breach of marriage agreement may arise from many causes 
or from the conduct of either party; for instance, if either of them 
misconducts himself or herself or either of them is consistently cruel 
to the other or; as may sometime happen, there is incompatibility of 
temperament to such an extent that they cannot live together in 
marital agreement. At first sight it may look like giving too much 
latitude to the parties to allow them to end the marriage contract, 
even if there is no reason other than incompatibility of temperament, 
but this much is certain that if there is such disagreement that the 
husband and wife cannot pull on together, it is better for themselves. 
38. Supra note 24, P.589. 
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for their offspring and for society in general that they should be 
separated rather than they should be compelled to live together. 
Therfore, when the marriage of two persons has broken down beyond 
any repair and they have finally decided to separate for good from 
each other, even under such circumstances, they cannot just say 
goodbye and leave each other. There is a prescribed procedure for 
divorce which must be followed by them . 
The Holy Qur'an explains this in the following words: 
"When ye divorce women; 
Divorce them at their prescribed periods; 
And count (accurately) their prescribed periods; 
And fear Allah, your Lord 
And turn them not out of their houses; 
Nor shall they (themselves) leave, 
Except in case they are guilty 
of some open lewdness. Those are 
limits set by God;And any who 
transgresses the limits of God, 
Does verily wrong his (own) soul thou 
Knowest Not if perchance god will 
bring about there after Some new situation*^ ". 
Again the Holy Qur'an says: 
39 The Glorious Qur 'an; The Translation and commentary by Abdullah Yusuf 
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"Then, when they fulfil their term appointed, 
Either take them hack on equitable terms or part 
With them on equitable terms, and take for 
Witnesses two persons from among you, endued with 
Justice, and establish evidence (as) before Godr ". 
According to the above verse, the first point is that the divorce 
should be pronounced in the period of purity when menses are over. 
It has two important reasons. Firstly, during menstruation women 
becomes irritable and tense due to physiological changes. It is 
forbidden to divorce a wife in consequence of a marital rift arising 
during her menstruation. Secondly, during the period of 
menstruation, the marriage partners are cut-off from that physical 
intimacy which is the main source of their mutual attraction and 
adhesion. When the difficult and disturbed period is over, it is 
possible that with the resumption of sexual relations tender emotions 
will prevail and resentment which inclined the husband to divorce 
will melt away.**^  
The second point is that the pronouncement of divorce should 
be spread over three periods (three monthly courses) and then the 
final decision should be made whether one is prepared to take her 
back or one has decided to bid her good-by forever. It also appears 
41. HolyQur an LXV:2 
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from the above mentioned verse of the Holy Qur'an that if a divorce 
takes place, it becomes irrevocable only after prescribed time and 
that no divorce is valid if not made revocable within the prescribed 
time. In other words, a wife can be taken back for sexual embrace 
within prescribed time but not beyond it. It is also clear that before 
the expiration of the fixed time, no divorce is irrevocable. Now what 
is the time prescribed for making a divorce irrevocable, it is three 
courses in case of menstruating and consummated women'*"'. 
Further, the procedure for pronouncing divorce and at the 
same time giving sufficient time an opportunity to the two parties to 
seek reconciliation and avoid any hasty action, is laid down in detail 
in the Surah Al-Baqarah of the Holy Qur'an as follows: 
"Divorced women shall wait concerning themselves 
for three monthly periods; and it is not lawful for 
them to hide what god hath created in their wombs; 
If they have faith in god and the last day. And 
Their husbands have better right to take them back 
In that period, if they wish for reconciliation 
And women shall have the rights similar to the 
Rights against them, according to what is equitable; 
But men have a degree of advantage over them** ". 
During this period of waiting, the husbands are enjoined to 
keep their wives in their houses so that the state of pregnancy 
43. Ibid. 
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becomes clear and no doubt is left in regard to the fatherhood of the 
likely bom child. Secondly, both the parties are given a time limit to 
reconsider the consequences of the permanent separation within this 
time of three monthly courses and ponder hundred and one time 
before taking the hard final step. It may be Allah might create a 
healthy situation for their reconciliation in this way. 
So far as the meaning of the expression the prescribed time of 
waiting is concerned it is merely a period of temporary separation 
during which conjugal relationship may be re-established. Thus, the 
period of waiting is only a chance given to the couple for reunion 
and to make divorce revocable before prescribed time is reached. 
Here it has been distinctly stated that divorce is revocable within 
prescribed time. It has been corroborated by the following verse of 
the Holy Qur'an: 
"A divorce is only permissible twice^ 
After that the parties should either hold 
Together on equitable terms or separate 
With kindness. It is not lawful for you 
To take back Any of your gift {from your wives) 
Except when both parties fear that they 
Would be Unable to keep limits 
Ordained by Goct^". 
It means that husband must make his decision final after the 
completion of two divorces and before the completion of third 
divorce within which he should take back his wife. That is only 
45. Holy Qur'an; H; 229 
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possible in case there is time of two courses or two months to 
consider. This verse was meant to reform a serious social evil 
common in Arabia before advent of Islam. 
Urwah b. Zubair said that formerly the custom was that a man 
divorced his wife and when iddat should be at the point of ending, he 
took her back and so repeated the process over and over again, even 
though he had to pronounce the divorce a thousand times. A man 
behaved so with his wife. He divorced her and when period of Iddat 
was drawing to an end, he took her back, divorced her again and 
said; By the lord, 1 shall neither unite with you nor let you unite with 
anybody else. The Lord then revealed this verse: (II 229 of Surah al-
Baqarah) "divorce is twice". At its end either the woman should be 
taken back according to the custom or sent away according to 
custom. From that time onwards people started divorce in new way, 
those who had divorced and those who had not. As a result, this 
verse of the Holy Qur'an also shuts the door to cruelty. Accordingly, 
during his whole married life, a husband may use the right of divorce 
and reunion with one wife only twice. After that, whenever, he 
pronounces divorce for third time, wife shall be separated from him 
permanently^'. 
46. Imam Malik Muwatta: Translated with Exhaustive notes by Prof. Muhammad 
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The Holy Prophet (PBUH) explained the procedure of divorce 
in very clear words: 
"If and when it becomes inevitable, it should be pronounced 
only when she is just free of the menstruation and there has not been 
sexual intercourse with her since, and there should be two witness 
for the divorce. However, if a dispute arises during the period of the 
menstruation, it is not lawful to pronounce divorce during that 
period, but the husband should wait for her to cleanse herself and 
then may pronounce a single divorce, if he so wishes. Then he should 
wait for the next monthly course and pronounce the second divorce 
after she is cleansed, if he so wishes. Then he should wait for next 
monthly course to pronounce the third and final divorce after she is 
cleaned. It is however, better to wait and reconsider the matter after 
the first and second pronouncement for, in the case of two 
pronouncement the husband retains the right to take her back as his 
wife after their expiry. But if divorce is pronounced third time, the 
husband forfeits the right to take her back"^' 
Therefore, during the period of first two pronouncements of 
divorce, the Muslim husbands are commanded in verse quoted above 
(65:1-2) to keep their wives in their house during the waiting periods 
and not to turn them away. They are required to live together as 
47. Supra note 29, P.664. 
45 
formerly. It is just possible that living together may bring them 
closer and help in their reconciliation if the husband has acted 
hurriedly and in a fit of passion. Then they are also forbidden to 
divorce when their wives are in the state of menstruation but must 
wait, and when they are purified then if they intend to carryout their 
heart's desire, pronounce a first divorce, and then a second divorce 
when she is purified after her second month's menstruation. And a 
final divorce can be pronounced after the purification of the third 
month's menstruation. This long procedure is laid down for divorce 
by the Islamic law to give the two parties sufficient time to think and 
resolve their differences and try to reach some agreement, because 
after the third pronouncement they will have no chance for 
reconciliation*'. 
Abdullah Ibn Umar reported that he had divorced his wife 
while she was in the state of menstruation during the life time of 
Allah's Messenger. Umar bin al-Khatab asked Allah's Messenger 
about that. Allah's Messenger said, "order him (your son) to take her 
back and keep her till she is clean and then to wait till she gets her 
next period and becomes clean again, whereupon, if he wishes to 
keep her he can do so and if he wishes to divorce her, he can divorce 
before having sexual intercourse with her; and that is prescribed 
48. Ibid.. P.665. 
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period which Allah has fixed for woman meant to be divorced. ** 
Another tradition states that Prophet told Ibn Umar to observe 
following procedure in divorcing his wife: 
"Ibn Umar, "said the Prophet, 'you adopted a wrong 
method. The right one is that you should wait for tuhr 
(period of cleanliness), then pronounce a divorce during 
one and another during the second. During the third you 
should decide finally either to retain your wife or to 
divorce her. Ibn Umar said, O' Messenger of Allah, If I 
had given three divorces at one and same sitting, had I 
right to take her back"? No, she would have separated 
from you, but it would have been a sin^^. 
Mahmud Ibn tabid reported that when Allah's 
Messenger was informed about a man who had divorced 
his wife by declaring it three times without any interval 
between them, he arose in anger and said, "Is sport 
being made of the book of Allah who is great and 
glorious while I am among you "^^. 
The above quoted traditions make it clear that simultaneous 
pronouncement of three divorces is a sin because it is against the 
wisdom of the law of shariah and it also exceeds the limits of Allah 
which the believers are told to honour and respect. 
49. Sahih Al-Bukhari; Translated bv Muhammad Mohsin Khan: Vol. VII; P. 129; 
(1984) Kitab bhawan New Delhi. 
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Concluding the discussion it may be said that every possible 
attempt must first be made for reconciliation between the married 
couples before the completion of the prescribed period. In order to 
check hasty action and leave the door open for reconciliation of 
many stages, the right method of pronouncing divorce is as laid 
down in the Holy Qur'an and the traditions, i.e. if and when it 
becomes inevitable, it should be pronounced only when she is 
completely free from her menstruation and is in clean state and even 
if a dispute arise during monthly period, it is not lawful to pronounce 
divorce during that period. He should wait for her to cleanse herself 
and then should pronounce a single divorce, if he so likes. Then the 
wife should be left to observe Iddat. 
Professor Tahir Mahmood has summarised the Qur'anic 
procedure of divorce in the following words: 
The law of Islam says to the husband": 
a) Talaq is "worst of all permitted things" (Abghad ul-Mubahat); 
better avoid it; but if you find it necessary to have recourse to Talaq, 
then; 
Wait till the wife enters the period of tuhr, i.e. when she is not in her 
menstrual period (this will assure that you are not acting in a haste); 
52. Tahir Mahmood: The Muslim law of India; P. 115 (1980) Central Law Agency 
Allahabad. 
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During that period pronounce Talaq and do not make it irrevocable 
(bain) by your words; 
1. Revoke the Talaq, if possible, before the expiry of wife's Iddat; 
2. If you have exercised your power of Talaq in this way, your 
behaviour has been the best. 
3. If you do not revoke it by that time at the expiry of Iddat the 
marriage shall stand dissolved. 
4. Now you can not revoke the Talaq at your pleasure; but after the 
expiry of her Iddat you can remark the same woman with her 
consent. 
b) If you have revoked the Talaq pronounced by you for the first 
time, never pronounce it again since it is same "worst of all the 
permitted things". However, in case you find it necessary to 
pronounce Talaq once again, then; 
1. Avoid it until once again wife is free from her menstrual period; 
2. Pronounce Talaq in her tuhr; 
3. Do not by your words, make also this second Talaq irrevocable; 
4. Try to revoke this second Talaq before the expiry of wife's Iddat; 
5. If you do not revoke it by then, at the expiry of wife's Iddat the 
marriage will, once again, stand dissolved; 
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As before, now you can not revoke the Talaq at your pleasure, 
but after the expiry of her Iddat you can remarry the same woman 
with her consent. 
If you have succeeded in preparing yourself to revoke the 
Talaq (which you pronounced for a second time), never pronounce a 
Talaq again "since it is worst of all the permitted things"; but again 
if you really find it unavoidable to pronounce a Talaq, then; 
1. Wait for wife being once more free from her menstrual period 
(this will give you a last chance for a cool consideration); 
2. Know that if you now pronounce a Talaq (for third time) you 
cannot revoke it any more, also you will not be able even to 
remarry your divorced wife right way; if you so wish you will 
have to pay a penalty which, due to human nature, you will never 
like the penalty of finding your wife in somebody else's bed and 
remarrying her only if and when she is lawfully free of marital 
bond; the penalty is known as 'Halala', 
3. The moment you do so the marriage will stand dissolved. 
4. If you have exercised your power of Talaq in this way, your 
behaviour is still good (Hasan); 
You can not, however, contract a fresh marriage, right way, 
with your divorced wife. If you so desire, pay penalty of Halala and 
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fulfil your desire; but this you can not do by collusion with your 
divorced wife and the man she remarries after Iddat, any such 
collusion will make penalty wholly ineffective; only if third person 
marries your divorced wife without any pre-conditions, consummates 
the marriage, and then divorces her willingly and not with intention 
of making her available to you, with her consent you can take her 
back by a fresh marriage. 
This is the simple procedure of divorce in Islam which is 
unfortunately misunderstood by the majority of Muslims themselves 
due to their ignorance. 
Recognised Forms of Divorce: 
Before entering into a general discussion on Talaq with its 
various forms, it would be pertinent at the outset to summarise a few 
cardinal aspects regarding it. Legally speaking the concept of Talaq 
as evolved by jurists differs from the western dissolution of marriage 
known as divorce, since it is essentially a procedure that can only be 
initiated by the husband, no consent of the wife is required. Besides, 
the exercise of Talaq is extra-judicial and in no way subject to 
external check. Technically, therefore, power of the husband to 
divorce is considered absolute. 
In view of the injunctions of Holy Qur'an and traditions Talaq 
may be pronounced either in Ahsan or the Hasan, from, known as the 
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Talaq-us-Sunnah which offer opportunities for revocation or re-
establishing the status of marriage and are, therefore 'Rajai' 
(revocable). On the other hand, 'Bidat' or irregular form can be 
implemented by a triple pronouncement, clearly indicating fmality 
by the use of some expression, thus terminating the relationship 
totally, and is technically called Bidat (irrevocable). Hence, once 
such a pronouncement is made the status of marriage cannot be 
restablished except by resorting to the doctrine of Halala". 
However, the Talaq or divorce by a Sunni husband may 
conveniently be discussed under the following heads; 
1. Talaq-al-sunnat; and 
2. Talaq al-BIddat. 
Talaq al-Sunnat: 
Divorce according to the rules of tradition (Talaq al sunnat) is 
that divorce which is pronounced in the manner and in the time 
frame prescribed by the Holy Prophet (PBUH). Pronouncing such a 
divorce however does not mean that it is an act of piety that it shall 
entitle one to the reward of a virtuous act. Divorce in itself is not an 
act of devotion that reward of a virtuous act may be expected out of 
it. Talaq al sunnat only means that a divorce pronounced by that 
53. The term Halala means that a man who has given a final divorce to a woman 
cannot remarry her until she has entered into a marriz^e with sectmd man and 
that second man having enjoyed sexual intercourse with her and divorce her 
willingly. 
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procedure has the approval of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and his 
companions and the pronouncing of divorce contrary to that manner 
is procedurally disapproved and is sinful. 
According to Hanafi Jurists, there are two modes of 
pronouncing Talaq al sunnat, which is of two kinds: 
a) Talaq-e-Ahsan (most approved form of divorce) 
b) Talaq-e-Hasan (Proper form of divorce) 
Talaq-e-Ahsan (Most approved form of divorce): 
Talaq-e-Ahsan is the most approved form of divorce. The 
words "most approved" do not denote any intrinsic merit of this kind 
of divorce. What is meant is that kind of divorce is least disapproved 
of its various forms. The reason for the preference of this form of 
divorce over others is that it does not immediately sever the marital 
relationship but allows an opportunity to the spouses to continue the 
marriage if they so choose and in pursuing this method, the husband 
can still exercise his right without the necessity of an intermediary 
marriage to retain his wife by a reversal of the divorce during the 
period of her Iddat, if he be so inclined '^*. 
This rule is based on an injunction in the Holy Qur'an which 
states: 
54. Supra Note 2, P. 198. 
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"A divorce is only permissible twice; 
After that, the parties should either hold, 
On equitable terms, or separate with kindness ". 
It is laid down at another place in the Holy Qur'an; 
"So if the husband divorces his wife third time 
(irrevocably), he can not after that, remarry her 
until after she has married another husband and 
he has divorced her. In that case there is no 
blame on either of them if they reunite, provided 
they feel that can keep limits ordained by God. 
Such are the limits ordained by God, which he 
makes plain to those who understands^ 
This form of repudiation is also referred to as a sughra form, 
being technically 'Rajai' or revocable and its legal after-effect is that 
the man has the capacity to remarry his wife after the period of Iddat 
has expired and repudiation complete, without her having to contract 
and consummate another marriage with a different man. It should be 
noted that this is the only form of repudiation which invokes 
reconsideration on the part of both parties. Such a divorce is not 
pronounced when the husband is prevented from having intercourse 
with his wife only due to her courses. It is a positive abstinence of 
conjugal relations on his part. During the period of Iddat, the parties 
have the time to reconsider their decision so that if the 
pronouncement is not revoked there is sufficient reasonable 
55. Holy Qur'an; II, 229. 
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indication that it was not made in haste. Besides, remarriage between 
the parties is possible, and in case of death of either parties, during 
Iddat, the other is in a position to inherit. Also wife's menstruation 
after which there has been no sexual intercourse, assures the husband 
of her not being pregnant. Finally, such a divorce can be effected 
three times during a person's life time. All the Sunni as well as Shia 
Schools accept this form of divorce as being most laudable or the 
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least dis-approved . 
By this pattern of divorce, a man gives his wife a single 
reversible divorce within a Tuhr, a period of purity, the period which 
intervenes between menstrual course, during which he has not had 
physical relations with her. The divorced wife is left to observe the 
period of Iddat unles revoked in the meantime. The repudiation 
becomes final on the expiry of the prescribed period of Iddat, which 
in the case of divorce is three menstrual periods or if it cannot be 
ascertained, then on the expiry of three months and in case of 
pregnancy, until the delivery of her pregnancy. The Iddat period for 
a widow is four months and ten days while there is no Iddat for a 
woman who get divorced before consummation of her marriage. 
During the Iddat period, the husband is free to revert to his wife. 
57 Supra note 3, P.199. 
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Even on the expiry of Iddat period, he has option of taking her back 
by marriage, an option that is not available in triple divorce or three 
divorces in one sitting.'' 
It has been recommended by the Holy Qur'an in Surah Talaq 
Ayat four (LXV: 4) that the husband while divorcing his wife or 
while reverting to her during the Iddat period or while marrying her a 
new after Iddat period should keep two virtuous witnesses to these 
acts. Such a procedure of divorce being Ahsan keeps the option of 
reunion open to the couples. It is unfortunate that Muslims have 
abandoned this mode of divorce which is safest and also holds a sea 
of benefits and it has been recommended as the best way of divorce 
by the Holy Prophet (PBUH). The long three months of Iddat period 
in this form of divorce affords high chances of reconciliation 
between couples that is why this type of divorce is most laudable.*' 
The companions of Holy Prophet (PBUH) too favoured this 
mode and held in high esteem those who gave no more than one 
divorce until the end of Iddat, as they held this to be a better pattern 
than Talaq-e-Hasan. The self respect of couple is also maintained in 
this type of divorce. Even a cursory examination of this mq4e-^ of 
divorce reveals that the system of divorce has been ^gxAsi^d to 
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safeguard the interest of woman, discarding all possibilities of 
divorce being given in haste or anger by the husband . 
Talaq-e-Hasan: 
The Talaq-e-Hasan or laudable divorce, the second form of 
Talaq, is also approved though it is the second best mode, the most 
preferable being the Talaq-e-Ahsan. The Talaq-e-Hasan is effected 
when the husband pronounces three separate sentences of divorce in 
three successive period of tuhr or purity. This implies that he 
pronounces a single sentence of divorce to his wife in a period of 
purity or tuhr, then a second sentence of divorce after a month in a 
second tuhr, and the third sentence of divorce again after a month in 
third tuhr or purity. When the last repudiation is pronounced, the 
divorce becomes irrevocable, or the status of marriage is 
permanently dissolved. In other words, if husband pronounces one 
divorce at the beginning of one tuhr, pronounces a second divorce at 
the next tuhr after her second monthly period, and, subsequently, 
pronounces a third divorce at third tuhr, the divorce becomes 
irrevocable or the status, of the marriage is dissolved permanently*'. 
The legal effect after a third pronouncement is that the 
marriage stands dissolved and husband can not revoke his decision to 
retain his wife since divorce now operates as Talaq-e-Mughallaza, or 
60. Ibid. 
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thick divorce creating Baynuna-e-Kubra or a big gulf. Therefore, in 
case he wishes to remarry her after the final pronouncement, he can 
only do so if she subsequently goes through another marriage with a 
different man which is consummated and subsequently validly 
dissolved. This process of undergoing another marriage is legally 
known as Halala. Talaq Hasan is accepted by all Sunni schools as 
well as Shia school." 
An important observation regarding Talaq-e-Hasan as gener-
ally interpreted is herewith brought to the notice by Dr. Tahir 
Mahmood. He says, generally, Talaq-e-Hasan is commonly 
misunderstood. It is believed that in this mode of divorce three Talaq 
must be given in three successive or consecutive tuhr periods when 
the wife is not in her menses. This, we submit, is wrong. He then 
describes the correct legal procedure, in the words of Maulana 
Ashraf Ali Thanvi from his well known book Bahesti Zewar." A 
person pronounces a revocable divorce. He then reconciles and 
resumes cohabitation. Two or four years later, under provocation, he 
once again pronounces a revocable Talaq. On recovering from 
provocation, he again resumes cohabitation. Now two Talaq are over. 
Hereafter, whenever, he pronounces a Talaq, it will be counted as 
third Talaq which will dissolve the marriage forthwith, and a 
remarriage if desired by parties, necessities Halala. Nevertheless, he 
62. Ibid. 
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concedes that though husband has pronounced Talaq once, which he 
should do in tuhr but he can do so still later at any time during the 
subsistence of marriage, and whenever he does so, the Talaq will be 
counted as a second Talaq. Similarly with other two pronouncement. 
The point of time when Talaq becomes irrevocable is the time when 
the right of inheritance also cease. Thus in Hasan form it ceases with 
third pronouncement.' 
The Islamic records bear out that both Talaq-e-Ahsan and 
Talaq-e-Hasan are approved form of divorce. However, there is no 
disagreement about Talaq-e-Ahsan being a divorce in accordance 
with the rules laid down in tradition of the Holy Prophet (PBUH). 
The Hanafi Jurists base their opinion on the following verse of the 
Holy Qur'an: 
"O'Prophet, when ye do divorce women, 
divorce them at their prescribed periods 
And count (accurately) their prescribed periods, 
And fear god your Lord 
And turn them not out of their houses. 
Nor shall they themselves leave, 
Except in case they are guilty of some 
Open lewdness. Those are limits set by God. ^ '* 
Again, the Hanafi Jurists in support of their interpretation of 
the instant Holy verse cite the incident of Abdullah Ibn Umar. He 
63. Ibid. P.200. 
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divorced his wife in the state of her menstruation. Hazrat Umar 
consulted the Holy Prophet about this act of his son. The Holy 
Prophet (PBUH) expressing his anger said," Abdullah has 
contravened sunnat (method, mode) ordained by Allah and added 
that proper mode of divorce is that which you pronounce in each 
period of purity."'' 
All Sunni Imams other than Imam Malik hold that Talaq al-
Ahsan and Talaq-Hasan are both Talaq al-Sunnat i.e. divorce 
according to the tradition. According to Imam Malik, to pronounce 
one divorce in each of the terms of purity, (i.e. the Hasan procedure) 
is also an innovation. Pronouncement of one divorce by the husband 
is the only divorce according to the Prophet's tradition, because 
divorce, in fact is prohibited. It is permissible only in case of 
necessity of getting rid of the wife and purpose is served by 
pronouncement of one divorce only. Hence, divorce according to the 
tradition in the opinion of Imam Malik, is that which is pronouned 
revocably once by the husband to his wife in the term of her purity in 
which he has not cohibited with her, and she is left alone during her 
term of probation of three menstruations, and during these periods no 
further divorce need be pronounced. According to Imam Malik it is 
essential for Talaq al-Sunnat that no further divorce during the term 
6 5 . Supra note 49, P. 129. 
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of probation be pronounced. The basis of his assertion is that the 
divorce, according to the tradition (Talaq al-Sunnat), is that which is 
pronounced for carrying out a set purpose. The purpose is carried out 
by the pronouncement of one divorce. Hence, the pronouncements of 
second and third divorce in second and third terms of purity being 
unnecessary are abominable. Likewise, the pronouncement of all the 
divorces at a time, according to Imam Malik, are abominable, in as 
much as the first divorce having taken effect the second and third 
divorces are superfluous being unnecessary.'' 
Thus, both these forms of divorce, namely Ahsan and Hasan, 
provide safeguard against the effect of hasty action by the husband 
and allow him an opportunity to undo the harm caused by his act of 
divorcing the wife by cancelling the same and to continue his 
marriage. 
Concluding Remarks: 
The brief historical facts as to the evolution of institution of 
divorce discussed above establish adequately that Islam is not 
breeder of the institution of divorce. It has existed in all the ancient 
human civilization. The Hebraic law, the Authenians, the Romans, 
the Shammites and others upheld this doctrine in various forms. But 
in all social system, the husband was the predominant authority with 
66. Supranote21,P.315. 
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no efficient check on his power. The Christian and Jews also 
recognised this institution. Islam simply tolerated it in the larger 
interest of the society but only after effecting necessary reforms. It 
gave woman certain rights of the divorce which were not given by 
any legislature. At the same time, it puts a check on divorce by 
saying; "Of all the things allowed, the most abominable to Allah is 
divorce". 
The institution of Divorce in Islam is a means of dissolving 
the contract of marriage in abnormal circumstances. This dissolution 
is possible only in a contractual form of marriage but not in its 
sacramental form as in Hinduism. According to latter, marriage is the 
sacred union of two souls for life, whether there is agreement or 
disagreement between the couple or whether the husband oppresses 
the wife or not. Divorce becomes a necessity when the husband and 
wife are not pulling on well for a length of time. It is sheer 
foolishness to keep them tied up in matrimonial bond when it is 
unpleasant to both. It rather enhances the suffering of couples and 
their children rather than increases their happiness. Therefore, it is a 
natural law that dissatisfied couple should be separated from the 
marriage tie for the welfare of the house-hold, children and society. 
In instituting this doctrine of divorce, Islam did more good to women 
as men may take several wives in case of disagreement with the first 
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wife but a woman can not do so. If a husband is impotent, or if a 
wife or husband generally resorts to adultery, it is a nuisance to keep 
them tied up in marriage bond specially when all efforts to bring 
about a compromise prove unavailing. If the husband or wife 
becomes permanently diseased or unfit for sexual intercourse, Justice 
demands a divorce. 
Therefore, the idea underlying the institution of dissolution of 
marriage seems to be that parties should be allowed to separate from 
each other when marriage fails in its objects and the parties cease to 
fulfil their mutual obligations. To compel them to live together in 
pursuance of the requirements of law would indeed be unfair, and it 
might sometimes, lead to appalling consequences. 
Allah and His Prophet (PBUH) in fact, do not like the 
dissolution of marital tie but permit it as a remedy of social and 
moral evils in genuine and Justifiable circumstances. A careful study 
of Holy Quran and Ahadith clearly demonstrates that Islam stands 
for reconciliation between spouses rather than severance of their 
matrimonial relations. 
Instead of encouraging termination even in extremely genuine 
cases, Islam recommends a continuation of marriage and enjoins the 
spouses to make adjustments and to tolerate each other inspite of 
shortcomings and defects in each other, for the sake of family and 
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society. But Islam does not regard marriage bond indissoluble. In 
this regard, the attitude of Islam has been realistic right from the 
very outset, and not like the unrealistic approach of other religious 
and socio-legal systems which had to come to terms with reality 
subsequently by not only recognising divorce but also by facilitating 
it. Islam taking into consideration the frailties and fluctuation of 
human nature, recognises divorce. The permission is, however, given 
with reluctance. 
In permitting dissolution of marriage Islam has provided 
realistic solution to the problem of an incompatible marriage 
resulting in interminable quarrels and general happiness which 
defeats the very object of this sacred institution i.e. marriage. 
While permitting termination of marriage Islam does not believe in 
unlimited opportunity for divorce on frivolous and flimsy grounds because 
undue increase in facilities of divorce would destroy the stability of family 
life. Therefore, while allowing divorce on genuine grounds, Islam has taken 
great care to introduce check and balances by prescribing procedure of 
divorce, obligation of dower and maintenance, provision of "Tahlil" 
contract designed to limit the use of available facility. 
CHAPTER - III 
64 
TALAQ-AL-BIDDAT: CLASSICAL VIEWS AND 
JUDICIAL TRENDS 
It is that form of divorce which is considered from the rehgious 
point of view a Biddat. It is so called because it does not command the 
sanction of Shariah as well of the Muslim Jurists and is considered 
undesirable innovation. Any divorce, which does not conform to Talaq al-
Sunnah is deemed to be an innovation or Biddat and is, therefore, called 
Talaq al-Biddat. It is highly condemned, disapproved and even declared 
sinful but nevertheless it is considered legally effective. The practice of 
Talaq-al-Biddat is traceable even in the time of the Holy Prophet (PBUH). 
There is a well-known case of Abdullah Ibn Umar who had divorced his 
wife during the period of menstruation. The Holy Prophet (PBUH) on being 
informed of this told his that he had acted wrongly and advised him to 
cancel the divorce and then to proceed in the proper manner if he still 
persisted in his desire to divorce his wife. The fact is that Holy Prophet 
(PBUH) strongly condemned Biddat form of divorce and did not sanction it 
even tacitly at any point of time in either form. But in the course of time, it 
came to be considered a valid and legal form of divorce. Moreover, it 
assumed many other forms in second century and came to be recognised as 
an effective divorce'. 
1. K.N. Ahmad; The Muslim Law of Divorce: P. 67, (1984), Kitab Bhawan, New 
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The most prevalent method of exercising Talaq al-Biddat under the 
Sunni law now-a-days is to pronounce three irrevocable Talaq at the same 
time in the same period of Tuhr and is commonly called "Triple Talaq". As 
its name suggests, it is an irregular or heretical form of divorce and is not 
approved by the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah and is considered an innovation 
within the fold of Islam. It is most disapproved form of divorce. It is highly 
disliked and condemned being declared to be sinful even though its 
prevalence is tolerated and same is considered legally effective in practice^. 
Hidaya defmes it as a divorce where husband repudiates his wife by 
three divorces in one sentence or where he repeats the sentence separately 
thrice within tuhr. Thus he may pronounce, I divorce you, I divorce you, I 
divorce you or he may say, I divorce you thrice^. 
It is, however, not necessary that the husband should repeat the 
pronouncement three times in order to constitute triple divorce. The triple 
repetition is only one of the many forms by which a divorce can be effected 
and the same result can be obtained by other method recognised for the 
purpose. A husband can effect such a Talaq by only one pronouncement if 
he makes it clear that he was pronouncing a Talaq al-Bain, that is, a 
irrevocable divorce. Thus, to effect such a Talaq the husband may say you 
are repudiated Arice. He can only convey his intention of pronouncing 
2- Dr. Zeenat Shaukat Ali: Marriage and Divorce in Islam; An Appraisal, P. 200, 
(1987); Jaico Publishing House, Bomba>. 
3- The Hedaya; Translated by Charles Hamilton; Vol. 1, P. 73 (1985) Kitab 
Bhawan, New Delhi. 
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three divorces by saying, "You are divorced so many times and by showing 
three fmgers at the same time which will result in Talaq al-Biddat. In this 
form of Talaq after pronouncement, if parties wish to reunite, they cannot 
do so till the wife undergoes Halala i.e. wife goes through another marriage 
which is consummated and subsequently dissolved. This condemned form 
is considered heretical because of its irrevocability. It is considered good in 
law, though bad in theology and is most commonly practiced in India . 
This has been a customary form of divorce in pre-Islamic Arabia. 
Neither does the Holy Qur'an mention this form nor does it seems to have 
been recognised or sanctioned by the Holy Prophet (PBUH) who, on 
contrary strictly disapproved it. 
According to Ameer Ali, "Talaq-al-Biddat or triple divorce, as its 
name signifies, is heretical or irregular mode of divorce which was 
introduced in die second century of the Islamic Hijri era. It was then that 
the Ommeyyad monarchs, finding checks imposed by the Holy Prophet 
(PBUH) on the facility of repudiation interfered with the indulgence of 
their caprice, endeavoured to find an escape fi-om the strictaess of law and 
found in the pliability of the jurists a loophole to effect their purpose *. 
According to Asghar Ali Engineer, the Islamic Shariah which was 
formulated more than hundred years after the death of Holy Prophet 
4. Ibid. 
5. Syed Ameer Ali: Muhammedan Law; Vol. II p. 435, (1986), Kitab Bhawan, New 
Delhi. 
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(PBUH) and have evolved under the complex influence of various 
civilization took away what was given to the women by the Holy Prophet 
(PBUH) and Holy Qur'an. The issue of triple divorce in one sitting 
illustrates this very well. It was practiced during tiie Jahilliyah (time of 
ignorance) before the advent of Islam. The usual practice then was to 
pronounce talaq two times and withhold third pronouncement making the 
wife's live in constant fear of the third utterance *. 
Triple divorce was not allowed during Prophet's (PBUH) lifetime, 
during the first Caliph Abu Bakar's reign and also for more dian two years 
during the second Caliph Hazrat Umar's time. Later on Hazrat Umar 
permitted it on account of a peculiar situation. When the Arabs conquered 
Syria, Egypt, Persia etc. they found women there much more beautiful than 
their own women and hence were tempted to marry them. But those women 
who were not knowing about Islam's disapproval of triple divorce in one 
sitting, would insist that before marrying them they should pronounce 
divorce thrice to their existing wives which they would readily accept to do 
(as they new Islam had abolished triple divorce and that it would not be 
effective) and marry the Syrian or Egyptian women and would also retain 
their earlier wives. When the Egyptian and Syrian women discovered that 
6. Asghar Ali Engineer: Islam and Women; The Indian Express. 5* August (1993) 
New Delhi. 
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fliey had been cheated, they complained to second Caliph Hazrat Umar. The 
Caliph then enforced triple divorce again in order to prevent its misuse by 
tile Arabs. He had done so to meet an emergency situation and not to 
enforce it permanently and to contravene express provisions of Holy 
Qur'an and saying of Holy Prophet (PBUH). But later Jurists declared this 
form of divorce valid and gave religious sanction to it7 
The reason for legitimizing this form of divorce by Caliph Hazrat 
Umar seems to be restrictive rather than permissive. He held it permissible 
to impose certain restriction on loose tendencies to divorce which had crept 
in during his regime. Hazrat Umar's object in making effective three 
divorces pronounced on one occasion was to warn the people that they 
would have to take evil consequences of following an un-lslamic practice 
but the result was contrary to what he intended. Henceforth, it became a 
general practice to pronounce divorce thrice on a single occasion dissolving 
the marriage immediately and irrevocably. It is this aspect of divorce which 
has created misconception regarding the pronouncement of divorce, along 
with the legal effect of it becoming irrevocable, either by three 
pronouncements at a single sitting or three pronouncements at three tuhrs of 
single Iddat seems to have crept into Islamic Jurisprudence, and is a matter 
grave enough to require serious study at length. 
7. Syed Khalid Rashid: Muslim La\i-: P.22: 3rd ed., (1996), Eastern book Co. 
Lucknow. 
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Effect of Triple pronouncement: 
There is a great controversy regarding the effect of triple 
pronouncement of divorce at one and same time. The difference in the 
opinions of Islamic scholars is due to difference in their interpretation and 
application of the law. One set of the Jurists are of the opinion that no 
leniency should be shown in application of the law so that people should 
not take undue advantage on that account. The Hanafi Jurists, therefore, hold 
three repetitions of divorce to be final and effective with immediate effect." 
The other set of Jurists are of the view that Allah wants not to create 
hardship and people should be dealt with leniently and every possible effort 
should be made to minimise the chance of separation. So Aey are of the 
view that three pronouncements of one time should be counted as one 
divorce. Ibn Rushd is also of the same view as Islam approves the golden 
means. Thus, he has not allowed the husband to revoke his divorce on 
indefinite occasions. Had it done so, the husband could harass his wife by 
every time revoking divorce before the expiry of period of Iddat. Similarly, 
if every divorce amounted to an irrevocable divorce then it would have 
involved hardship to the husband as he would get no opportunity of 
revoking the divorce. He then concludes that to hold three repetitions of 
divorce at one and the same time to amount three divorces is to lose sight of 
8 Ibn Rushd; Bidayat al-Mujtahid; Vol. 11; P .61, cited by K.N. Ahmad; The Muslim 
Law of Divorce, P.85 (1984). New Delhi. 
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the policy of Muslim law. Another category of the Jurists are of the view 
that if second and fliird pronouncement were made merely to emphasise the 
first pronouncement, tiien only a Ghair Mughallazah or revocable divorce 
shall be effected. They apply the same rule when tiie second or even fliird 
pronouncement was made under a momentary excitement without the 
intention to pronounce a Mughallaza divorce. However, oflier category of 
the Jurists are of the view that Mughallaza, a final divorce shall be effected 
as soon as the third pronouncement is made irrespective of the fact whether 
it was made intentionally or unintentionally or merely to emphasise the first 
pronouncement.' 
In view of tfie vexed controversy, it is necessary to look into the 
original sources of Islamic Jurisprudence Qur'an, Ahadith, Ijma scholastic 
thoughts as well as Judicial stand point to resolve the controversy as to the 
effectiveness and validity of triple pronouncement in one and same sitting. 
Holy Qur'an: 
Holy Qur'an, the paramount source of Islamic Jurisprudence, has not 
ordained that the three divorces pronounced in a single breath would have 
the effect of three separate divorces. To this effect the relevant verse of the 
Qur'an can be relied upon: 
Ibid. 
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"y4 divorce is only permissible twice; 
After that, the parties should either hold 
Together on equitable terms or separate with 
Kindness. "*" 
The use of Ae Arabic term "Marratane" in this verse does not mean 
repeating it but effecting the divorce on two separate occasions. As it is 
explicit by die apparent meaning of the verse that even after two 
pronouncement of divorce on two different occasions, the chances for 
retaining the wife is very much open before the pronouncement of the third 
divorce on separate occasions. Virtually this third pronouncement of 
divorce makes divorce irrevocable and the chance for retention comes to an 
end. While some jurists are of the view that word Marratane means mere 
repetition of word talaq thrice or uttering three number of talaq to indicate 
the purpose of effecting divorce." 
Therefore, the instant verse (11:229) establishes that three divorces 
pronounced at one time does not amount to irrevocable divorce. In Qur'an 
there is no trace that the "three divorce" pronounced at one occasion would be 
treated as three divorce on irrevocable footing. Scholars have gone to the 
extent that the verse relating to the matter of three divorce is a definite and 
express enjoinment on the subject that Mughallaza divorce will happen only 
when three divorces are pronounced one after another on different occasions. 
10. Holy Qur'an; n.229 
11. Dr. Mohd. Shabbir: Muslim Personal Law and Judiciary; P. 198; (1988), Law Book 
Co. Allahabad. 
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Hence on the basis of Qur'anic materials as analysed above, it may 
be concluded tiiat only one divorce in effect results firom the three 
pronouncements at one occasion. 
Ahadith: 
The view that mere repetition of divorces without an intention to 
give a Mughallaza or final divorce or simply by way of emphasis or in 
momentary excitement does not amount to a Mughallaza or final divorce 
finds full support fi-om the following traditions. 
"Mahmud bin Labeed reports that the Messenger of 
Allah was informed about a man who gave three 
divorces at a time to his wife. Then he got up enraged 
and said; Are you playing with the Book of Allah who 
is great and glorious while I am still amongst you? 
So much so that a man got up and said; shall I 
not kill him.^^ 
If the repetition were permissible having the effect of final divorce, 
then it is not clear as to why Prophet (PBUH) should have been so angry. 
The reaction of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) bears the testimony of what 
Allah has ordained in His Book, 'Divorce is permissible only twice before 
third and final divorce'. 
There is another tradition reported by Rokanah-b. Abu Yazid that he 
gave his wife Salmah an irrevocable divorce and he conveyed it to the 
12. Mishkat-ul-Masabih: An English Translation & commentary by Al-Haj Maulana 
Fazlul Karim: P.693 (1981). Islamic Book Service, New Delhi. 
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Messenger of Allah and Said; by Allah, 1 have not intended but one 
divorce. Then Messenger of Allah asked have you not intended but one 
(Divorce)? Rokana said; by Allah, 1 did not intend but one divorce. The 
Messenger of Allah then returned her back to him. Afterwards he divorced 
her for second time at the time of Hazrat Omar and third time at the time of 
Hazrat Osman"." 
The instant tradition leaves no doubt that if a person pronounces one 
divorce upon his wife and then repeats the divorce a second or even third 
time simply to emphasis the first pronouncement and not with a view to 
effect Mughallazah or final divorce, it shall be open to him to explain his 
intention and to take back his wife; otherwise how could the wife have been 
asked by Prophet (PBUH) to return to her husband. 
It is, thus, clear from the above discussion that during the Prophet's 
(PBUH) time and for a period after him, such cases of triple divorce 
wherein pronouncing divorce husband swore to his intention of divorcing 
only once, were termed as cases of single divorce and couples were 
reunited. During Caliph Omar's time when people started misusing this 
facility and indulged in widespread triple divorce, reverting back to the 
wife after swearing to their intention of giving a single divorce. Caliph, 
Hazrat Umar decreed that triple divorce would become effective, refiising 
to allow the couples to revert to each other since the facility of oath taking 
13. Ibid., P.690. 
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had been turned into a meaningless game by many. The object of Caliph 
Umar in treating it as a Mughallazah divorce was clearly to stop people 
from wanton repetitions of divorce and from treating the matter of divorce 
in a light and non-serious way. It must have suited the needs of his own 
time, but practice in the modem times has resulted in a great deal of harm. 
People in the excitement of moment give three divorces to the wife at one 
and same time without least intention to pronounce a Mughallazah divorce 
but simply to emphasise the first pronouncement, a step which they grievously 
repent afterwards when they find that mischief cannot be undone." 
Juristic View: 
Imam Abu Hanifa holds that three pronouncements shall amount to 
three separate divorces and they shall result in a Mughallazah or final 
divorce. The explanation that the husband had used the three 
pronouncements simply for the sake of emphasis cannot change the nature 
of divorce and a Mughallazah divorce would be effected. This is also the 
view held by majority of the Hanafi Jurists who hold that in such a case 
Mughallazah divorce would be effected and would be good in law and bad 
in religion. The expression "good in law" means that it will be given effect 
by a Qazi or Court. Ibn Taymiah holds that if a husband does not repeat the 
divorce three times, but says "I divorce you three times or thrice" or uses 
14 Safia Iqbal: Women and Islamic Law; P.187; 1" ed. (1991). Adam Publishers, New 
Delhi Delhi. 
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some similar expression then the pronouncement shall amount to only one 
pronouncement of divorce and so shall be a non-Mughallazah divorce. Ibn 
Ishaq, Tawus, Akramah and Ibn Abbas hold that three pronouncement of 
divorce at one and same time constitute only one divorce. 
Imam Muslim, the author of Sahih Muslim recorded a tradition from 
Ibn Abbas which reads: 
"The divorce by three pronouncements at a time was 
considered a single divorce during the time of Apostle 
of Allah (PBVH), and of Abu Bakar, and in first tM'o 
years of the caliphate of Hazrat Vmar. Hazrat i/mar 
said; The people make haste in the matter in which 
they were given time to consider would that we made 
them operative. So he made them operative i.e. he 
made three pronouncements of divorce as three 
divorce ".^^ 
This tradition indicates that a divorce by three pronouncements at a 
time is considered a single divorce. However, Hazrat Ibn Abbas later on 
withdrew his opinion and held that three pronouncements make three 
divorce and not one. As his opinion is contradictory, it will not be taken 
into consideration only the tiadition narrated by him on this subject shall be 
considered. 
15. Fatawa; Ibn Taymiah: vol. Ill, P. 141. cited by K.N.Ahmad: The Muslim Lcm of 
Divorce P.86 (1984). Kitab Bhavan. New Delhi. 
16. Sahih Mushm: Translated by Abdul Hamid Siddiqui. Vol. II, P.759, (1978), Kitab 
Bhawan, New Delhi. 
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It is also reported that Hazrat Umar used to punish people who 
pronounce three divorces at the same time. This also supports the view that 
he wanted to discourage people from this course of action. The Sunni 
Jurists who consider three pronouncement to amount three or final divorce 
have explained that in those days people did not actually mean three 
divorces but meant only one divorce and other two pronouncements were 
meant merely to emphasis the first pronouncement. But in contemporary 
era three pronouncements are made with the intention to effect three 
separate and distinct divorces, hence it can not be counted as one divorce. 
But this interpretation of the Hanafi Jurists is generally not acceptable as it 
goes against the very spirit of procedure of divorce as laid down in the Holy 
Qur'an as well as Ahadith which enjoin that in case of breach between 
husband and wife it should be referred to the arbitration and failing an 
amicable settlement, a divorce is allowed subject to a period of waiting or 
Iddat during which a reconciliation is possible and husband can take back 
his wife. The main idea in the procedure for divorce, as laid down by Islam, 
is to give the parties an opportunity for reconciliation. If three 
pronouncements are treated as a Mughallazah divorce, then no opportunity 
is given to the spouses or the husband to retrieve a hasty divorce. This rule 
was introduced long after the time of Prophet (PBUH) and it renders 
ineffective the measures provided m the Holy Qur'an against the hasty 
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action thereby depriving people of a chance to change their minds, retrieve 
their mistakes and retain their wives 
Imam Malik regarding effectiveness of triple divorce makes a 
distinction between various expressions used in the pronouncement of 
divorce. A husband in the process of pronouncement of divorce may use 
the word as when he ways, I divorce you and divorce you and divorce you". 
He may, on the other hand, not use it as when he says. "1 divorce you, 
divorce you, divorce you". The pronouncement in the former case shall 
amount to three divorces or Mughallazah or irrevocable fmal divorce. But 
in the latter case the matter can, according to Imam Malik, be considered 
from the following three aspects"*: 
(a) When the husband merely repeats the words "you are divorced" 
three times or as when he says" you are divorced, divorced, 
divorced". In such a case if husband explains that he had repeated 
the words three times merely to emphasise the divorce then his 
explanation that he had repeated the divorce to make it more 
emphatic would not be accepted. 
(b) If the husband did not repeat the words to lay emphasis but intended 
three divorces or repeated the words without any intention at all then 
three divorces shall be effected. If the husband pronounces three 
17. Supra note 1, P.89. / r -^ 
'8- n'.d,p.9o. ^ j ^ .^^ : 
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divorces on different occasions but in the same tuhr, then same result 
shall follow. 
(c) In case of conditional divorce, the explanation regarding the 
intention of the husband is acceptable. However, triple divorce shall 
be effected on the fulfillment of the condition. 
Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanabal lays down the following rules regarding 
the effectiveness of triple divorce. 
If the husband does not use the word "and" in the process of 
repetition as when he says, "you are divorced, divorced, or 1 divorce you 
divorce you and second and third pronouncements are used simply for 
emphasis then only one divorce shall be effected if the marriage has not 
been consummated. If the marriage has been consunmiated then three 
divorce shall be effected.'^  
If the conjunctive word "and" is used by the husband in the process 
of pronouncements of divorce, i.e. you are divorced and divorced and 
divorced in such a situation if second and third pronouncement are used 
only to emphasis the first pronouncement only single divorce would be 
effected irrespective of fact whether marriage has or has not been 
consummated. However, if triple divorce is used without intention to 
19. Ibid.,P.91. 
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emphasise first pronouncement, one Mughallazah divorce or fmal 
irrevocable divorce shall be effected 
According to Imam Shafi'i if a marriage has been consunmiated and 
the husband repeats three pronouncements of divorce against his wife 
whether using or without using a conjunctive word like "and" but without 
intending three divorces and merely to lay emphasis on the first 
pronouncement a single divorce shall be effected. If he pronounces three 
divorces intending or without any defmite intention, diree divorces shall be 
effected. If the marriage has not been consummated then only one divorce 
shall be effected under such circumstances. 
According to Shia law, there is general consensus that triple divorce 
at one time will be counted only one divorce though it is pronounced in 
several numbers and Imamia sect of Shia has faith that such divorce 
is no divorce. '^ 
The well known Islamic Jurist, Maulana Abdul Hayy of Lucknow 
opines that triple divorce would be counted as a single and revocable 
divorce ^^  
Allama Aieni expressed his view m favor of triple divorce 
pronounced at one occasion to be counted as single one m effect.^ Allama 
20 Ibid 
21 Ibid 
22 Abdul Hayy, Umdat-ur-Reaya, Vol II. P71, cited by Dr Mohammad Shabbir, 
supra Note, P 205 
23 Al-Aieni Badniddin Mahmood, Unidatul Qan Sharah Bukhan cited by 
Dr Mohammad Shabbir, supra note 11, P 205 
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Aloosi in his commentary Roohul Maani^ ^ describes that in this matter 
(Triple divorce) Imamia and some individuals of Ahl-i-Sunnat Wal Jamat 
like Allama Ibn Tyymiah and his followers are opposed to the followers of 
Imam Abu Hanifa. 
Noted tiieologian, Shaikh Mohammad Thanvi opines that the 
Qur'anic words "At talaq Marratan", means that one divorce should be 
followed by the other (second divorce). Therefore, the legal divorce is that 
which is pronounced at different occasions in different tuhr and not at a 
time in a single sitting.^ * 
Recently, in an unparallel decree the Jamiat-Ahle-Hadith, an apex 
non-political religious body of Muslim religious scholars, has declared the 
pronouncement of "three talaqs" at one sitting as invalid and in effective. 
Sounding a death-knell on the triple divorce concept, the historic fatwa 
issued by three Muftis of the Jamiat, Sheikh Ataur Rehman Madani, Sheikh 
Ubaid-ur-Rehman and Sheikh Jamil Ahmad Madani have decreed that if a 
Muslim husband pronounces "Talaq, Talaq, Talaq, Talaq" to his wife at a 
single sitting, it will not be considered a divorce under Shariah and will not 
in any manner affect the rights and obligations of both husband and wife. 
The Muftis, quoting extensively from Holy Qur'an, Hadith and Sunna ruled 
that if the husband pronounced three talaqs in a row, they would be De-Jure 
considered as a single talaq which was revocable under shariah. The 
24. RoohulMaani, Vol. 11, P. 137, cited by supra note 11, P.206. 
25. Marginal note of Nasaai, Vol. II. P.29. 
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remaining two other talaqs will be null and void and will amount to 
"making a mockery of the Qur'an and sunna. The legal consequence of such 
talaq, treated as one, was only that spouses had to abstain from sexual 
intercourse but if the husband resumed cohabitation, the talaq would be treated 
as revoked and couple would be entitled to stay together, the Muftis said. 
Mufti Mohammad Mukharram Ahmad, the Shahi Imam of the 
Fatehpuri Mosque of Delhi, too believes tfiat Muslims must follow the 
Islamic pattern in divorce cases than what has been the trend and says that 
the Ahle-Hadis people have done something that ought to have been done 
much earlier. 
Commenting on the pronouncement of three talaqs at one sitting by 
the Muslim husbands, an eminent scholar of Islamic law. Prof. Tahir 
Mahmood said it was playing havoc with the lives of the thousands of 
women in India, due to its purported irrevocability. He said though triple 
talaq at one sitting was treated as valid by Hanafi Jurists, it needed change 
in keeping pace with the modem times and the scope could be found in 
other schools^ * 
It has been pointed out that many Hanafi Jurists hold that a divorce 
takes effect if it is pronounced three times even at a single sitting. To 
buttress their stand points, the following Ahadith are cited. 
26. The Hindustan Times. (Sunday Magazine), July 18, (1993) New Delhi 
27 Ibid. 
28 The Hindustan Times; PTI report, July 9 (1993) (New Delhi). 
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"It reached Malik thai a person told Ibn Abbas, I gave 
my wife a hundred divorces. What is your opinion 
about me? Ibn Abbas said; three divorces made her 
absolutely bain to you and by remaining ninety seven 
divorces, you have made fun of verses ofAllah".^ 
Another Hadith to this effect is that it reached Malik that a person 
went to Abdullah bin Umar and said 1 have divorced my wife two hundred 
times. Ibn Masud asked; what did people tell you? He replied: 
"They told me that my wife stands absolutely divorced. 
Ibn Masud said: It is true. The man who divorces as 
the Lord ordains, the Lord hath pointed out the ways, 
and for him who makes a mess, he will have to bear the 
evil consequences. Do not conjuse things so that trouble 
may ensue. Your wife has become cut-off from you.^^ 
But noted Islamic Jurists, Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanabal, Imam Taymia 
and other like minded scholars reject this opinion and regard as one 
pronouncement to three declarations of divorce delivered at a single sitting; 
so that separation does not come-off at the end of three such declaration, but 
only when they are separated each by an interval of one month. There are 
strong grounds supporting the stand taken by Imam Ahmad bin Hanabal and 
Ibn Taymia. In the first place it is obvious that intention of law in 
prescribing three pronouncements of divorce, separated by fixed intervals of 
time precedent to final parting, was to leave open room for reconciliation. 
29. Muwatta Imam Malik, Translated with exhaustive note by Prof. M. Rahimuddin, 
P.425. (1981) Kitab Bhawan. New Delhi. 
30. Ibid. 
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This intention is defeated by recognizing three pronouncements delivered at 
a single sitting, of having effect of final separation. Secondly, there is 
sufficient evidence to show that the companions of Prophet (PBUH) 
regarded this form of divorce in one sitting as being morally reprehensible 
and involving the person in great religious sin. '^ 
Writing in 1943 the Jamat-e-lslamic chief Maulana Abul A'Ala 
Maududi said; 
Separating a woman instantly by simultaneous pronouncements of 
three divorce is a sinful act on the basis of explicit Qur'anic mandates. 
There exists some difference of opinion among Jurists as to whether three 
instantaneous divorces amounts to a single reversible divorce. But all agree 
that act amounts to an irmovation and is a sinful. All declare that this mode 
of divorce run contrary to the mode prescribed by Allah and His Messenger 
(PBUH). He suggests that to put an end these evil practices, it seems 
necessary that effective restrictions must be placed on the three 
simultaneous divorces so that people may fmd themselves restrained from 
this hasty act. He furttier opines that the act is not only sinful but also 
punishable."*^ 
It is crystal clear from the above that firstly, triple divorce is not a 
proper divorce and even not based on Qur'anic injunctions. Secondly, 
31. The Hindustan times (Sunday Magazine) July 18, (1993), New Delhi. 
32. Maulana Abul A'Ala Maududi, The Laws of Marriage and Divorce w Islam. 
pp. 105-106, (1989), Markazi Maktaba, Delhi. 
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Hazrat Umar made it a bain talaq on the basis of conditions prevailing at 
tiiat time. It is noteworthy that Hazrat Umar made it a penal crime and used 
to flog such persons. He said Aat a person who commits such a bain talaq 
commits a sin. This showed that he had never encouraged triple divorce. It 
is submitted that now the time has changed and in present condition it is 
better to follow the ruling laid down in the Holy Qur'an and traditions 
reported from Holy Prophet (PBUH).^ ^ 
Now the question arises what should be done if a person happens to 
pronounce three divorce in single sitting? What is the remedy for such a 
situation. Here is the following solution to this distortion of true Islamic law 
of divorce. It has now come in the form of a refreshing Fatwa (Juristic 
verdict) from some Indian theologians which provides: 
If a man who has pronounced triple talaq, says he did it either in 
ignorance of law or merely to put emphasis on his words, his marriage 
remains intact until the expiry of his wife's Iddat. During this period he can 
unilaterally revoke the Talaq. If he has not done so within that time, later he 
can remarry her with her consent. This interpretation of the law in fact 
restores the reforms effected by the Holy Prophet (PBUH). 
Maulana Mujahidul Islam Qasimi of Bihar was first to adopt it. Now 
33. Dr. Saleem Akhtar; Shah Bano Judgement in Islamic perspective (A socio-legal 
study) P. 103, red. (1994). Kitab Bhawan New Delhi. 
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it has been accepted by Mufti Zafeeruddin of Darul Uloom of Deoband. '^' 
Moreover, following is the text of the resolution adopted in a 
seminar held in Ahmadabad from 4 to 6 November, 1973 under the 
Presidentship of Mufti Ateequr Rehman in which following, among others, 
persons were present. 
Maulana Saeed Ahmad Akbarabadi, Maulana Mukhtar Ahmad 
Nadvi, Maulana Syed Urooj Qadri, Maulana Syed Hamid Ali, Maulana 
Abdul Rehman bin UbaiduUah Saheb Rehmani, and shams Peerzada. 
After prolonged discussion and deliberation, following resolution 
was adopted unanimously which was later published. 
i) Three pronouncements of divorce in one and same sitting resulting 
in Mughallazah divorce is not based on Ijma (consensus) and 
therefore is not final. It has been controversial since very beginning. 
ii) If a person says to his wife talaq, talaq, talaq and thereafter says that 
his intention was to pronounce only one talaq and he says that he had 
used the word talaq three times for merely emphasising it, then this 
will not be taken Mughallazah, (irrevocable) divorce. 
iii) If any person says to his wife, 1 divorce you thrice' but he states on 
oath that his intention' was not to pronounce three divorce, he 
34. Tahir Mahmood; No more Talaq. Talaq. Talaq, Juristic Restoration of The True 
Islamic Law on Divorce. XIII. C.L.R.,P. II. 1992. New Delhi. 
35. Ibid. 
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thought that without three pronouncement divorce will not be 
effective, so he made three pronouncements. In such a situation, tiiis 
statement will be accepted and the divorce will not be considered as 
Mughallazah. 
The resolution further stated that there is an urgent need to educate 
the Muslim masses about correct procedure of divorce and tell them that 
three pronouncements in one sitting is an innovation (Biddat) and oppression 
against women. Muslim should avoid wrong procedure of divorce. 
Judicial Recognition : 
As far as judiciary in India is concerned it has so far, barring few 
exception, tolerate the triple divorce. In British India as well as in 
Independent Indian all the courts are declaring triple pronouncement of 
divorce in one sitting as lawful and effective. The common phrase used by 
court is that the Talaq-e-Biddat or tiiple pronouncement of divorce is good 
in law though bad in theology. The triple divorce is recognised and 
endorsed by the Indian Judiciary. 
The Bombay High Court in Sara Bai v/s Rabia Bai^ ^ recognised 
triple divorce on irrevocable footing. In the stance case one Haji Adam 
Siddiqui with two witoesses approached Qazi and before him he 
pronounced talaq in absence of his wife. Talaqnama was prepared by Qazi 
36. ILR (1905)30 Bombay 537. 
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and it was duly signed by all concerned and step was taken to hand over her 
Iddat allowance with the communication of talaq. But she managed to make 
the same. Haji Adam died very soon. His divorced wife filed a suit 
assuming herself wife of Haji Adam for maintenance and residence, but the 
Bombay High Court refused to accept her contention and held above 
referred talaq on irrevocable footing. It was held that talaq being absolute it 
was effective as soon as words were written even without wife's receiving 
the writing. Justices Bachelor held that it (divorce) was good in law, though 
bad in theology. After quoting Ameer Ali, he further observed; 
The author of Multeka (Ibrahim Halebi) is more concise. He says, 
the law gives to tfie man the primarily the power of dissolving marriage if 
the wife by her indocility or her bad character renders the marriage life un-
happy, but in the absence of serious reasons no Musalman can justify a 
divorce either in the eyes of religion or the law. If he abandons his wife or 
puts her away for simple caprice, he draw upon himself the divine anger, 
for, the curse of God, said Prophet (PBUH) rest of his who repudiates his 
wife capriciously. 
Using separate sentence: 
Allahabad High Court in Ameer Uddin v/s Khatoon Bibi^"^ held that 
if husband pronounced divorce by using three separate sentence at once 
37. A I R 1917, Allahabad343. 
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occasion, same fall in the category of the Talaq-ul-Biddat and becomes 
irrevocable. In this case Mst. Khatoon Bibi filed a suit for the recovery of 
dower, maintenance and movable properties in possession of her husband. 
She was lawfully married to Ameeruddin and lived as wife upto 18* 
September, 1913. It was pleaded that Ameeruddin divorced his wife at 
Railway Station at Allahabad when she was going to Mahoba to her parents 
against the wishes of her husband. But the husband rebutted the advocacy 
of the wife and the words used to utter divorce at railway station did not 
amount to irrevocable divorce in the eye of Islamic Law of divorce and he 
had option to revoke the same and he had exercised within the prescribed 
time. But this plea of the husband was not acceptable to the court of law. 
On the authority of Ameer Ali the court observed: 
"The Talaq-ul-Biddat, as its name signifies, is the heretical or 
irregular mode of divorce, which was introduced in the second century at 
the Ommoyyad era. It was then that the Ommoyyad monarchs finding 
the check imposed by the Prophet (PBUH) on the facility of repudiation 
looked about for some escape from the strictness of the law and found in a 
loophole to effect their purpose. As a matter of fact the capricious and 
irregular exercise of the power of divorce which was in the beginning left to 
the husband was strongly disapproved by the Holy Prophet (PBUH). It is 
reported that when once news was brought to him that one of his disciples 
89 
had divorced his wife pronouncing the three talaq at one and same time, the 
Holy Prophet (PBUH) stood up in anger on his carpet and declared that the 
man was making the plaything of the words of God and made to take back 
his wife". 
Opinion of the Privy Council: 
In Saiyida Rashid Ahmad v/s Mst. Aneesa Khatoon^ the court 
recognised triple divorce pronounced at one time as validly and effective. 
On the law at divorce under Islam, the judicial committee at the Privy 
council has made the following observation. 
"The divorce called talaq ma>' be either irrevocable (bain) or 
revocable (rajie). A talaq bain always operates as an immediate and 
complete dissolution of marriage bond, differ as to one of its ulterior effect 
according to the form in which it is pronounced. A talaq bain may be 
effected by words addressed to the wife clearly indicating an intention to 
dissolve the marriage either (a) once followed by abstinence from sexual 
intercourse for a period called the Iddat, or (b) three times at shorter 
intervals or even a immediate succession or (c) once, by words showing a 
clear intention that the divorce shall immediately become irrevocable. The 
first named of the above method is called Ahsan (best), the second Hasan 
(good), the third and fourth are said to be Biddat (sinful), but are 
38. AIR 1932, PC. 25 
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nevertheless regarded by Sunni lawyers as legally valid and effective". 
In the instance case Ghiyasuddin divorced his wife Aneesa Khatoon 
by the formula of "triple divorce" in the absence of her but in presence of 
witnesses. After four days, he executed Talaqnama stating that he had 
divorce his wife in abominable form. Later on they started living as 
husband and wife and there was no proof for the compliance of doctrine of 
Halala. Five children were bom to the couple and Ghiyasuddin treated them 
as legitimate. The Privy Council agreed with the observation of the lower 
court that by pronouncement of triple divorce at one occasion become 
effective in breaking the marriage tie then and there. 
Presence of Wife on declaration: 
Whether the presence of the wife is essential at the time of divorce 
was answered by the Madras High Court in Aisha Bibi v/s Qazi Ibrahim"*' . 
The court held to this effect that where the words of divorce addressed to 
the wife, though she was not present, were repeated three times as I divorce 
for ever and render Haram for me which clearly showed an intention to 
dissolve the marriage, and followed it by executing a deed for divorce 
which stated that three divorces were given in the abominable from i.e., 
Biddat, the talaq being addressed to the wife by the name and in the Biddat 
from, the presence of wife is unnecessary. 
39. (1910)3, Madras 22 
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The Calcutta High Court in Fulchand v/s Namal AH ** held that 
presence or absence of wife makes no difference so far as effectiveness of 
triple divorce is concerned. The court speaking through Justice Subba Rao 
observed: 
"We, therefore, hold that it is not necessary for the vnfe to be present 
when the talaq is pronounced. Triple divorce to be effective, it is imperative 
that it should be addressed to the wife in particular sense". 
Innovative Opinion: 
In Ahmad Giri v/s Mst. Megha **' the court observed that the Talaq-
ul-Biddat is most prevalent form of obtaining divorce in India. Any change 
in this respect can not be brought about by judicial interpretation. If there is 
a general desire among the Muslims to revert to the pristine of Islam, how 
such changes in the present state on Muslim Law can be brought out, in the 
words of Syed Amir Ali, "whether by general synod of Muslim doctors or 
by the direct action of the legislatures, it is impossible to say. 
In Yusuf v/s Sowramma justice Krishna lyar made a significant 
observation regarding divorce. He observed that it is popular fallacy that a 
Muslim male enjoys under Qur'anic law unbridled authority to liquidate the 
marriage. The Holy Qur'an expressly forbids a man to seek pretext for 
divorcing his wife so long as she remains faithfiiUy and obedient. He 
40. (1911)36 Calcutta 184. 
41. AIR 1955 J & K l . 
42. AIR 1955 J & K l . 
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further observed about the state of affairs in hidia, that Mushm law as 
applied in India has taken a course country to the spirit of what the Holy 
Prophet (PBUH) or the Holy Qur'an laid down and the same misconception 
vitiates the law dealing with the wife's right to divorce. 
Ziauddin case: 
In Ziauddin vs Anwary Begum^ the Guahati High court delivered a 
revolutionary judgment in which justice Baharul Islam, after a threadbare 
consideration of several previous privy council and high courts judgement 
on triple divorce, laid down a correct law by extensively quoting the 
injunction of Holy Qur'an and relevant Hadith. He held that other decisions 
were neither correct nor in consonance of Islamic Shariah. Despite of 
judicial limitations and binding force of decisions of privy Council he 
endeavored to present a correct approach of Muslim law of divorce in 
accordance of with the sprit of Shariah and removed the distortion 
committed by earlier judges in this area He further observed that there has 
been a good deal of misconception of institution of divorce under Muslim 
Law. Both from Holy Qur'an and Hadith it appears that the divorce was 
permitted, yet the right could be exercised under exceptional circumstances. 
Rahmatullah Case: 
In Rahmatullah v/s State of UP and others ^ Justice, H.N. Tilhari of 
43. 1978 (Unreported) Criminal No. 1999, of 1977, Quoted by Dr. Saleem Akhtar: 
Shah Bono Judgement in Islamic Perspective, P. 114, 1st ed. (1994), Kitab Bhawan 
New Delhi. 
44. 1994 (12) Lucknow Civil decision, p. 463 
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Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) observed: 
"Talaq-ul-Biddat or Talaq-i-Bidai, that is, giving an irrevocable 
divorce at once or at one sitting or by pronouncing it in the tuhr once in an 
irrevocable manner without allowing the period of waiting for 
reconciliation or without allowing the will of Allah to bring about reunion 
by removing difference or cause of difference and helping the two in 
solving their differences, runs counter to the mandate of Holy Qur'an and 
has been regarded, by all under Islam, as sinful. The learned Judge further 
observed that the mode of talaq giving unbridled power to the husband 
cannot be deemed operative as same has the effect of perpetuating 
discrimination on the ground of sex, that is, male authoritarianism. The 
need of the time is that codified law on Muslim marriage and divorce 
should be enacted keeping pace with the aspiration of the constitution. 
Justice Tilhari cited with approval the following passage of 
honorable Justice Krishna Iyer. 
"Reform of law of marriage and divorce for Muslims as for others 
must be guided by right principles. In any matter of family law reform, I 
think there are three clear competing issue all of which have to be 
weighted. First and foremost, there is strong interest of the society 
generally that every thing should be done to encourage and maintain 
stability and performance of family Unit not only for the sake of couples 
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but also for the sake of children. Secondly, there is public interest in 
allowing marriage which have hopelessly broken down to be decently and 
rationally dissolved. Thirdly, there is a public interest that in any 
matrimonial dispute, justice should be seen to be done so that clearly guilty 
party should not be permitted to profit from situation which he and he alone 
had been instrumental in creating. *^ 
Although the instant case does not deal with the question of divorce 
directly as the case related to the UP imposition of ceiling of land holding 
Act. It was a case relating to land property where husband and wife claimed 
that there union had come to an end by triple pronouncement. It is an 
'obiter dicta' of the judgement and it helps in mobilising public opinion and 
if it is for a public purpose it must be given some weight. 
Recently, the Allahabad High Court upheld divorce by a Muslim 
husband by citing talaq thrice and that too when his wife was not present 
there. The husband had arranged for witnesses and communicated to his 
wife through a letter that she had been divorced after he cited talaq, talaq, 
talaq for her'^. 
From the above discussion it is clear that although judiciary in 
British India as well as Independent India has declared triple divorce as 
effective and valid but they have held it on the basis of binding precedent 
45. Ibid., p. 465. 
46. The Times of India, August 24, (1998), New Delhi. 
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because of the privy council Judgement in Aga Mohmmad v,s Koolsoom 
Bee^^ where in the court held that it would be wrong for the courts on a 
point of this kind to put their own construction on the Qur'an in opposition 
to express ruling of commentators of such great antiquity and high 
authority. But as we have seen that in majority of the cases the court has 
either regretted its action or found itself helpless to pronounce verdict in 
opposition to flie earlier rulings. In some cases tiie court felt the need to 
reform but did not give verdict against the established judicial dictum that 
triple divorce is good in law but bad in theology. 
Conclusion : 
A deep and dispassionate study of the instant topic brings out clearly 
that separating a woman instantaneously by simultaneous pronouncements 
of three divorce is not only a sinful act but a flagrant violation of Quranic 
mandates. There exists difference of opinion among the jurists as to 
whether three instantaneous divorces amount to a single reversible divorce 
or three irreversible divorce but all agree that this act amount to an 
innovation and is a sin. Hazrat Ali declared that this mode of divorce runs 
contrary to the mode prescribed by Allah and His Holy Prophet (PBUH). 
This practice strikes at the root of social welfare which the Shariah seeks to 
promote. The reported Ahadith also clearly establish that this act is not only 
sinful but also punishable. At present time three instantaneous divorces, 
47. 1897,24IA. 1%. 
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under the stress of an emotion, have become a wide-spread practice. As 
emotion subsides, shame and regret grip the guilty conscious of the man 
and a search start for some excuse to undo what has been done. Some one 
takes cover behind false oaths to deny having divorced; another one 
arranges a spurious second marriage of the wife, followed by divorce and 
remarriage with himself To put an end to these evil practices, preventive 
legislative measures of various kinds have been resorted to by the Muslim 
countries of the world. In all such countries some pressure has been exerted 
to introduce reforms whereby attempts at reconciliation are first to be tried, 
failing which divorce would be effected, safeguarding wife's right. A major 
reform was introduced in the Turkey where unilateral divorce is not held 
permissible, only a court can dissolve a maniage, on application of either 
party to marriage on any ground specified in civil code 1926 and the 
Turkish Family Maniage and Divorce Law of 1951 respectively. These 
grounds are adulter)', attempt on life or gra\ e injury, infamous crime, or 
dishonourable conduct, malicious abandonment of marriage, desertion, 
incurable or long lasting mental disease and intolerable stranged conjugal 
relations.^ ** 
In Tunisia, where a unilateral divorce is no more possible and in 
Algeria where unilateral divorce is possible, the court intervenes and is 
permitted to dissolve a marriage, either on the ground specified by law or in 
pursuance of a mutual agreement between the spouses. Over and above. 
48. Supra note 2, p.207 
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under the Tunisian law, court may also grant a divorce when insisted upon 
by either party In Algeria the court may dissolve a marriage also when 
unilateral talaq has already been pronounced by husband and is notified to 
court by him or by the wife '*" 
In other states where unilateral divoice is still held valid, certain 
imposition are placed in its pronouncement In the states of Malaysia and in 
Singapore intervention of court is essential in divorce proceeding, although 
the family law does not specify on what ground it might do so. Similarly, in 
Sn Lanka, a husband may effect a divorce on any ground yet the court 
intervenes at ever>' stage, insisting on his piesence in accordance with its 
procedure in order to make it effective ^ ^ 
The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 of Pakistan renders 
compulsor>' a notice to be given by husband who has pronounced unilateral 
divorce on the wife, to a local civil official who m turn will constitute an 
arbitration council The Arbitration council will try to bring about a 
reconciliation, and if none is possible, the divorce will be effective only 
ninety days after said notice of divorce had been given In case of pregnant 
wife the divorce will not be effective until the date of delivery '^ 
In India, authors of several books on Muslim law, as also some 
others, have misundei stood the permissiveness of extra Judicial divorce in 
49 Ibid 
50 Ibid 
51 Ibid, p 208 
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Islam and have failed to distinguish between general guidelines for the 
spouses in matter of divorce and legal requirements for divorce. This has 
complicated and to a certain extent distorted tlie Muslim law of divorce. It 
is this complicated rather partly distorted law which, unfortunately, is 
Judicially recognised law in many non-Arab countries, including those in 
Indian sub-continent. 
CHAPTER - IV 
Part-A 
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(A) DIVORCE BY KHULA: A PRIVILEGE AND 
POWER OF MUSLIM WIFE 
Conceptual Analysis: 
The solemn and sacred divinely ordained covenant of 
marriage, with the exception of a Muta or temporary marriage 
permissible under shia law, is envisaged to last for the life time of 
the husband and wife and the couples are enjoined to make every 
possible effort to keep their union intact. However, when the 
relations between the spouses becomes strained and are poisoned to a 
degree which render their peaceful home life impossible and there is 
apprehension of being violated the limits (Hudud) of Allah, Allah's 
law does not allow that the strained relation should continue 
indefinitely and the spouses are allowed to terminate it in kindness*. 
Therefore, principles of Islamic law relating to the 
matrimonial relationship is that if the husband and wife live together, 
they must live with peace, love. Kindness unity, and mutual fidelity 
from the depth of their hearts, fulfil each other's rights and 
obligations and treat each other with generosity and liberality. But if 
this spirit is absent, then their separation is recommended better than 
the continuance of their union because after the end of love and 
mercy between them, their marital relationship is like a dead body 
1 Encyclopaedia ofSeerah. Vol II, p. 90. (1986) Seerah Foundation London. 
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which if not buried in earth will endanger their health with its awful 
smell and poison, as well as. the whole atmosphere of family life that 
is why whenever the Holy Qur'an explains the matrimonial 
relationship, invariably it insists on the decent and the Kind 
behaviour, especially on the part of the husband . 
Islam does not insist on keeping the unwilling partners tied 
together despite their mutual hatred and disgust. In such a situation it 
in their interest as well as in the interest of society that separation be 
permitted. In this matter Islamic law has maintained a balance 
between its concern for the demands of human nature and its regard 
for the preservation of the social good. This balance of right has no 
parallel in any other law of the world. Islam seeks to make marital 
tie stronger but unlike Hindu and Christian law, it does not make it 
unbreakable even if there is fear that upholding the continuance and 
sanctity of marriage contract will create a danger to the morals, 
chastity and the married life of the spouses may have degenerated 
into loath-some intolerable misery. So Islam keeps the emergency 
doors of separation open for the partners and are allowed to use it in 
the extreme necessity and emergency. But the doors of separation are 
not so wide open as it is in present day Russia, U.S.A. and other 
western countries where marital tie is free from all moral and social 
restraints^. 
2 Ibid P 92 
3 Syed Abul A'Ala Maududi The LOMS of Marriage and Divorce in Islam 
P.36, I'' ed (1989), Markazi Maktaba Islamia, New Delhi 
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Therefore, just as the man, inspite of the well-known tradition 
of Holy Prophet (PBUH) (PBUH) "divorce is most hateful-thing of 
all the lawful things", has been given the right to divorce his wife 
with whom he cannot pull on, likewise, the woman has also been 
given the right of Khula for the purpose of upholding the objectives 
of matrimony enshrined in the Shariah law. Letting a woman to live 
with a man with whom she is not happy or from whom she does not 
get satisfaction or is likely to put her in the circumstances in which 
there is danger of her exceeding limits of Allah is unconscionable and 
unjust. Therefore, a woman is also given by the Holy Qur'an the right 
to free herself from the fortress of marriage by giving back some 
portion or whole of her wealth (Mahr) she received from her husband**. 
This right has been given to her by way of doctrine of 'Khula' and is 
expressly stated in the divine book. Holy Qur'an*. 
The Holy Qur'an clearly lays down that under the Shariah law both 
man and woman enjoy equal rights and privileges in all walks of life and 
is accorded equal status and position in society by Islam. The Holy 
Qur'an says: 
"And women shall have rights, 
Similar to the rights against them (Men), 
According to what is equitable. "* 
The necessary implication of this verse is that in a given 
Islamic society both men and women are parallel partners and the 
4- Supra note 1, p. 91 
5- See: Infra note 17 
6- Holy Qur'an; II: 228. 
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natural components of a society having the similar rights, social 
economic, matrimonial and political against one another. A fact often 
misunderstood is the degree of superiority-Qawwamiat given to men 
over women in Islam. But this superiority is not due to any increased 
or exhaulted status of men but is due to their additional maintenance 
responsibilities towards women. The term Qawwamiat does not in 
any way suggest that men as compared to women are morally or 
spiritually on higher plan . 
It is, therefore, wrongly thought that Islamic matrimonial law 
has made gender inequality by giving the husband unilateral power of 
divorce. Whereas the fact is that under the provisions of Muslim law 
right to dissolve the marriage is not unilateral and vested in husband 
but this right is bilateral and wife is also given the right to dissolve it in 
same circumstances and on similar grounds by means of Khula. 
Thus, the fortress of marriage can be dismantled either by 
husband on his own initiative or at the instance of wife or by mutual 
agreement. In the first two cases there is breach of the implied 
contract that the marriage will subsist during the lifetime of the 
parties. If it is husband who is guilty of this breach, he is penalized 
by becoming liable for the immediate payment of his wife's deferred 
dower, whereas if it is the wife who wants the termination of 
7- Safia Iqbal: Wometi and Islamic Law, p. 157 l" ed. (1991). Adam Publishers 
New Delhi 
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marriage, she has, as a rule, to compensate the husband. This 
termination of marriage at the instance of wife is called Khula. It is 
one of the ways of the dissolution of marriage and has been well 
recognized from the early period of Islam . 
It is worth mentioning here that it was Islam that for the first 
time, vindicated the wife's right to dissolve the marriage and thereby 
enunciated the theory of gender equality, a right unknown and 
unthought even to this day in other parallel religious and human 
civilizations. 
Definition of Khula: 
The word Khula literally means, "to put off as a man is said 
to Khala'a his garment when,he puts it off. In law it is demission or 
laying down by husband of his rights and authority over his wife at 
her instance on acceptance of compensation by means of word 
'Khula'. The release so secured by the wife from the husband from 
the marriage-tie at her instance, on paying or consenting to pay 
compensation to him, is called 'Khula''*. 
The word Khula is derived from the Arabic term Khal'un 
which literally means extracting out one thing from another. 
Technically, the word "Khula on the line of a vaze means "taking 
8. K.N. Ahmad The Muslim Icru' of Divorce, p.219, 1st ed. (1984) Kitab 
Bhawan, New Delhi. 
9- Ibid p. 220 
104 
out" or taking off for instance, "Khala al-Thoub" means "he took off 
the clothes". Khula in Shariah means that husband after accepting 
compensation from his wife renounce over his rights and authority 
under marriage contract". 
According to Fatawa-i-Qazi Khan", "Khula means" to take 
off e.g. you take-off your clothes, or take-off your boots and its 
secondary meaning is to take off clothes. The spouses are garment to 
each other and when they make Khula, each of them takes-off his 
and her clothes. Therefore, in Shariah it signifies a relinquishment of 
rights and authority over his wife by husband dissolving the marital 
relationship at the desire of the wife in lieu of compensation paid by 
her to the husband out of her property. 
In the famous case Moonshee Buzloor Rehman v/s Lateefun 
Nisa*^ their lordship of privy council have stated, "a divorce by 
Khula is a divorce with the consent and at the instance of wife in 
which she gives or agrees to give consideration to the husband for her 
release from the marriage-tie. In case of tenns of agreement are matters of 
arrangement between husband and wife the wife may, as a consideration, 
give up her dower and other rights or make any other agreement for the 
10. Tanzil-ur-Rahman; A Code of Muslim Personal Law, Vol. l"* P. 513 (1978) 
Karachi, Pakistan. 
11- Fatawa-i-Qazi Khan: Vol. I^ P. 513. Translated and Edited by Mauivi 
Muhammad YusoofKhan (1986), New Delhi. 
12- M.I.A. 379, PC. 
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benefit of the husband. 
Though the Khula without compensation means divorce with 
its implications. It has attained special meaning in sub-continent of 
Pakistan and India. The common practice here is that wives 
renouncing their amount of dower secure separation from their 
husbands. In other words, Khula in Pakistan and India, amount to 
obtaining divorce for consideration. In Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, 
however, even in case of Khula with compensation the word 'divorce' is 
used. That is to say, the husband instead of saying that he effects Khula 
(release his wife so and so from his bondage of marriage) says that he 
divorces her though he ought to use the word Khula instead of word 
divorce. It is, therefore, essential that the word 'Khula' should be 
used instead the word 'divorce' in case of release with compensation". 
Hence, the courts keeping in view the difference between 
'Khula' and 'divorce' with consideration should, at the time of 
dissolution of marriage contract, make the husband to use the word 
Khula not the word divorce as Khula here means that the husband, on 
getting compensation from wife and by using the word Khula 
extinguishes his rights under the marriage contract''*. 
In Ghulam Sakina vs. Umar Bitkhsh^^ it was held that in Khula 
13 Supra note 10; p. 515. 
14. Ibid. 
15. P.L.D., 1964, S.C. 456. 
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the marriage is dissolved by an arrangement between the parties for a 
consideration paid or to be paid by the wife to the husband, it being 
also a necessary condition that the desire for separation should come 
from the wife. Where the desire for separation is mutual the divorce 
is Mubara'at. 
When the wife, owing to her aversion to the husband or her 
un-willingness to fulfil the conjugal duties, is desirous of obtaining a 
divorce, she may obtain a release from marital contract by giving up 
either her settled dower or some other property and such a divorce is 
consequently called Khula. When a divorce is effected by mutual 
consent of mutual aversion it is called Mubara'at'^. 
Thus, Khula is a dissolution of marriage by an agreement 
made between the parties to the marriage on giving some 
consideration to the husband for the release of the wife from the 
marriage tie. The grantor of the release is called Khali and the 
woman obtaining release the Mukhtalia. 
Difference between Khula and Talaq: 
The Talaq and Khula, in their nature stand parallel so much 
that the aim of the both is to end the bond of marriage. Inspite of this 
fact, there is a difference between the Talaq and Khula in the 
16. Syed Ameer Ali; Muhammad Law, Vol. 11, p. 467,(1986), Kitab Bhawan, 
New Delhi. 
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following respects. 
(a) A Talaq is pronounced by husband at his own initiative. A 
Khula is, however, given at the instance of the wife when she has an 
invincible aversion for her husband and cannot maintain the limits 
set by Allah. 
(b) In divorce the husband becomes liable for the immediate 
payment of the wife's dower, if deferred and still unpaid, but in 
Khula it is wife who makes payment to husband in order to persuade 
him to release her from the marriage-tie and consideration may 
consists of dower itself. 
(c) A divorce can be given only under certain specified 
conditions. Thus, a husband cannot divorce his wife when she is 
having her menstrual course nor in the course of purity in which he 
has been intimated with her. But a Khula can validly be given in 
such circumstances. 
Religious Basis of Khula: 
Holy Quran: 
Needless to emphasise, the verses of the Holy Qur'an and the 
Ahadith reported from the Apostle of Allah (PBUH) make it 
abundantly clear beyond all the doubts and dispute that Islam at first 
instance tries its best to discourage the dissolution of marriage, 
especially, on the frivolous and unjust grounds in an arbitrary 
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has expressed the opinion that the above stated verse II: 229 of the 
Holy Qur'an means that Allah has made it unlawful for the husband 
to take back any of the gift given by him to his wife on the solemn 
occasion of their marriage or at any time after the marriage except 
the amount of the compensation given voluntary by the wife in lieu 
of her release from the marriage bond. The ground of effecting Khula 
is stated to be only apprehension that the spouses shall not be able to 
maintain the limits ordained by Allah. The verse 229 of the Sura al-
Baqar commands that each of the spouse should ponder and search 
their hearts whether they shall be able to fulfil their reciprocal 
obligations which are incumbent upon them through the marriage 
contract. If the wife thinks she cannot do so, there is nothing wrong 
for her in paying the compensation to her husband; neither there is 
anything wrong for the husband in accepting compensation for Khula 
from the wife. The instant Holy verse addresses the couple. The pronoun 
'ye' stands for both of them. It has further been said that the word 
'Khawf means knowledge. That is to say that the couple must be 
understanding that they would not be able to maintain the limits 
ordained by Allah. This gives them the fear of the occurrence of the 
unpleasant events. This word fear carries with it the sense of 
presumption. It has further been argued that in phrase "fa in Khiftum" 
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(then if ye fear) its subject has not been named. They are rulers . 
This interpretation has been adopted by Abu Ubaydah who 
maintains that the word of Allah "Khiftum" implies more then two 
but besides the couple, it also refers to rulers. If it was intended only 
for couple, i.e. fear exclusively for the couple, then Allah must have 
as well used in the earlier expression of the verse 'Khiftuma' implies 
two and this proves the fact that effecting Khula is the jurisdiction of 
Sultan or state through its judiciary, if the spouses do not agree 
between themselves*'*. 
In the above Quranic verses maintaining amicability of the 
association by both the couples has been made incumbent impliedly. 
The verse is addressed to officials and arbitrators who, both being 
officials, are engaged in such affairs. A woman's not maintaining the 
limits ordained by Allah is her neglecting or avoiding of the 
performance of duties towards her husband as well as not obeying 
him at all. This has been stated by Ibn Abbas, Malik bin Anas and 
generality of the Jurists. Abu Al Hasan and a group along with him 
are of the view that, "when the wife tells her husband that she would 
not obey any of his orders or she shall not carry-out any of his 
biddings, Khula shall become valid. Imam Shafi'i said that the 
18. Abu Abdullah Muhammad Al Ansari Al-Qurtubi; Al-Jami Al-Akhmal 
Qur'an, p. 137, quoted by Tanzil-ur-Rahman; A code of Muslim personal 
law, P. 526. 
19. Ibid. 
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expression" (not being maintained by the spouses of the limits of 
God", implies malice enmity, and disobedience on their part. Atab 
Abi Rabah has said that Khula shall be valid when the wife tells her 
husband, "I hate you, I do not love you and so on". It shall not be 
committing sin if the wife pays her husband any compensation for 
his effecting Khula^". 
Commenting on this verse (11: 229) of the Holy Qur'an, 
Abdullah Yusuf Ali says that if separation is inevitable the parties 
should not indulge themselves in throwing mud at each other, but 
recognize what is right and honourable on the consideration of all the 
circumstances. In any case a man is not to allowed to ask back for 
any gift or property he may have given to his wife. This is for the 
protection of the economically weaker sex, lest that protective 
provision itself work against woman's freedom, a exception is made 
out to the general rule. Therefore as a general rule it is not lawful 
and proper for the man to take back any of the gift presented by him 
to his wife on the solemnization of their marriage. However when 
both of them fear that it is not possible for them to maintain limits 
ordained by Allah and also the mediator from the both side fear that 
couples would be failing to observe the limits of Allah, the wife may 
seek her release from the marriage giving the compensation to the 
20. Ibid. P. 527 
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husband and it is also not unlawful for the husband to accept the 
compensation given in lieu of the divorce 
Therefore, all the prohibitions and limits prescribed here are in 
the interest of good and honourable lives for both side and in the 
interests of clean and honourable social life without public and 
private scandals. If there is any fear that in safeguarding her 
economic rights, her very freedom of person may suffer, the husband 
refusing the dissolution of marriage and treating her with cruelty, 
then in sexual exceptional cases, it is permissible to give some 
materiel consideration to the husband but the need and equity of this 
should be submitted to the judgement of impartial judge i.e. properly 
constituted court. Divorce of this kind is called Khula". 
Maulana Syed Abul A'Ala Maududi has rightly formulated 
that the husband has no right to demand back any thing of the dower 
given to the wife in consideration for marriage or ornaments, clothes 
etc. given to her as gifts. It is utterly against the moral principles of 
Islam to ask for the return of any thing given to another as a present 
of gift. The Holy Prophet (PBUH) (PBUH) likens this disgraceful 
behaviour to the licking up his own vomit by the dog. It is indeed 
very shameful on the part of the husband to take back or demand 
what he himself gave to his wife. As a matter of fact Islam exhorts 
21. Abdullah Yusuf Ali.The Glorious Qur'an Translation and commentary, P. 
90 2'^ ed. (1977) American Trust Publication. 
22- Ibid P. 91. 
113 
the husband to give her something at her departure . 
However, there is an exception to this general rule. When 
divorce is obtained by the wife from her husband and if the husband 
and wife agree between themselves on some terms regarding this that 
shall be enforced. But if the case goes to the court, it will first try to 
ascertain whether the wife really dislike her husband so much so that 
she can not live with him any longer. Then if the court is satisfied 
that they cannot live together happily, it shall fix as compensation 
anything that is considered proper and the husband shall have to 
accept that and divorce his wife. The jurists are generally of the 
opinion that the compensation should not exceed the dower given by 
the husband '^*. 
Maulana Syed Abul A'Ala Maudidi explaining meaning of 
Holy verse 229 of Sura Al- Baqar holds following points: 
(1) Khula demands a situation in which there is a fear that the 
limits set by Allah may be violated. The expression "There is no 
blame on the two of them suggests that though Khula is undesirable 
like a divorce, yet when there is a fear that the limits of Allah might 
be violated, there is no harm in obtaining a Khula^^. 
23- The Meaning of the Quran : Vol. 1st P. 160, Enghsh Translation of Maulana 
Syed Abul A'Ala Mauduidi's "Tanfheeh-ul-Quran" (Urdu) 
24. Ibid P. 161. 
25. SupranoteS, P. 48. 
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(2) When a woman wants repudiation of the marriage-tie, she must 
also scarify some wealth just as man has to scarify some wealth 
when he divorces his wife on his own accord. When he gives divorce 
himself, he cannot take any thing back from the wealth he has given 
to his wife. Likewise, if the wife desires separation, she has to parts 
with the whole or part of that wealth she received from the 
husband^^. 
(3) The mere wish of wife to repudiate the marriage-tie by 
returning what she was given is not enough for obtaining a Khula. 
The husband too, should be willing to accept payment and let the 
wife go. In another word woman cannot hand over the man a sum of 
money and be off. Separation will be legally effective only when the 
husband accept the money she offers and divorces her^'. 
(4) For Khula it is sufficient that the wife should give a part or 
whole of her Mahr (dowry) to seek divorce and the husband should 
accept it and give her divorce. The words of Quranic verse "There is 
no harm if both agree mutually", show that the wife may obtain 
divorce by giving something as compensation to the husband and that 
the Khula needs the mutual agreement of the spouses. The instant 
verse of Holy Qur'an contradicts the opinion of those people who 
regard a court decree as a pre-condition for the completion of Khula. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Ibid. 
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Islam, Infact, does not command taking family matter to court, if it 
can be decided at home honourably and mutually^'. 
If the wife offers the compensation for her release from the 
marriage bond but the husband turns down the offer, then she has 
right to knock the door of court, as is obvious from the words of 
Holy Qur'an Sura Al-Bakar Ayat 229, "If you fear that they might 
not be able to keep within the limits imposed by Allah". In this Holy 
verse the words "if you fear" are addressed to the authority (Ulil-
Amr) amongst the Muslim, for it is their primary duty to keep a 
vigilant watch on limits set by Allah and of their being observed in 
letter and spirit. So, whenever there is a fear of breach of limits of 
Allah, the authority should intervene and restore her that right which 
Allah has given her for protection of these limits . 
These are, in brief, the injunctions of the Holy Qur'an which 
lay down the situation which necessitate and legally justify wife's 
claim for Khula but they do not in detail account of circumstances 
which amount to the fear of over-stepping Allah's limits. Nor is there 
any hint as to what should be the standard in determining the rate of 
recompense amount to be offered by the wife. It has also not been 
explicitly laid down as to what course should the Qazi (Judge) follow 
if the husband does not agree to the demand of Khula by the woman. 
28. Ibid. P. 49. 
29. Ibid. 
116 
In order to know the answer of these questions it is necessary 
to make the in-depth study of the decisions of Messenger of Allah 
(PBUS) and rightly guided Caliphs. These decisions would exhibit 
the principles, which the law courts should apply to the case brought 
by women against their husbands. 
Ahadith (Traditions) regarding Khula: 
In connection with the validity of Khula, the case of Jamila the 
wife of Thabit B. Qays b. Shams forms the basis of legislation. This 
incident, as the basis of the validity of Khula, has been referred to by 
most of the traditionalists. Hazrat Iman Bukhari has reported through 
Hazrat Ibn Abbas that one day the wife of Thabit b. Qays appeared 
before the Prophet (PBUH) (PBUH) and presented her complaint in 
the following words: 
"O" Messenger of Allah Nothing can never unite 
his (Thabit) head with mine (Jameela). When I 
raised my veil I saw him coming in the company 
of a few men. I saM- that he was blackest, the 
shortest and the worst appearance of them all. By 
Allah I do not dislike him because of defects in his 
faith or morality. I just hate his ugly looks. By 
God if I did not fear Allah, I would have spit on 
his face when he came near me". O' Messenger of 
Allah "you can see how beautiful I am while 
Thabit is an ugly man". I do not blame him for 
any depravity in his religious practice or 
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morality, but I fear that I may be guilty of 
transgression of injunctions of Islam . 
The messenger of Allah heard her complaint and observed: 
"Will she return him the garden which Thabit had 
given to her". She replied; "O yes, Messenger of 
Allah. I shall give him even more if he demands more. 
The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) observed: "No, not 
more. Just return him his garden. He (Holy Prophet 
(PBUH)) then ordered: "Thabit take back the garden 
and divorce her which he did'"^^. 
Once a case of a husband and a wife was brought before 
Hazrat Umar. He admonished the women and advised her to stay 
with her husband but she refused. Thereupon, he shut her in a room 
full of rubbish. She was taken out after three days and Hazrat Umar 
asked her how she was. She replied. By Allah, "she had real comfort 
in these nights". "Hearing this, Umar ordered her husband to give her 
Khula even though it might be in the exchange of her ear-rings"^^. 
Rabia bint Mauwwiz Ibn Afra tried to get Khula from her 
husband in exchange for all properties but he refused. The case was 
brought before Hazrat Usman who ordered her husband to take all 
even the hair of her head but to give her Khula^^. 
30. Sahih-Al-Bukhari: Vol, VII P. 150, Translated by Dr. Muhammad. Muhsin 
Khan, 1984 Kitab Bhawan New Delhi 
31. Ibid. 
32. Supra note 1, p. 63. 
33. Ibid. 
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Thus, a study of these traditions make it clear that mere fact of 
a woman becoming disgusted with her husband is sufficient ground 
for legal separation between them. In the case of Jamila v/s Thabit b. 
Qais, the Prophet (PBUH) showed by his action that a woman's 
disapproval of her husband on physical grounds is a legitimate 
ground for a decree of separation in her favour. It is, therefore, 
enough for the court to satisfy itself that one of the partners has 
developed sufficient antipathy against the other to make the 
reconciliation impossible. The court need not inquire into the detail 
reasons of this antipathy, because a woman may dislike her husband 
on many grounds some of which she may not like to state openly. 
There may also be reasons for disgust which may not seem valid to 
the court or any other arbiter, but which may be sufficient to spoil 
the marital relations of the husband and wife. The court has no right 
to give its verdict on the point whether the reasons for dissatisfaction 
as expressed by the wife are valid. All it can do is to satisfy itself on 
the point whether the dissatisfaction is genuine or faked, whether it 
arises from causes which are temporary and may disappear or it is so 
deep rooted as to preclude the possibility of happier relations being 
restored'*'*. 
34. M. Mazher-Uddin Siddiqui: Women in Islam: P. 68, l" ed (1980) New 
Delhi. 
119 
It is also inadvisable for the court to inquire into whether a 
wife seeking Khula is doing so because she is sexually erotic and 
desires a variety of sexual pleasures or her aversion to her husband 
springs from genuine causes. The right of a man to divorce is not 
limited by condition that he should not use it for satisfying his 
anarchic sexual desire. If this is in the case of a man, it applies 
equally well to women who have got equal rights. Moreover, if a 
woman is really disposed to be sexually anarchic, the mere fact of 
being unable to obtain a divorce from a law-court will not prevent 
her from forming illicit unions, and in such a case the court, by 
refusing a decree of separation, will be supplying an incentive to 
illegitimate sexual activity, which is morally and socially more 
reprehensible than a frequency of divorces. The effect of a court 
decree in favour of separation is the same as that of final divorce 
pronounced by the husband which dissolves the marriage finally and 
irrevocably. The couple cannot be remarried unless the woman 
marries another husband and gets divorce^^. 
Principles of Khula: 
The reported decisions of Prophet (PBUH) (PBUP) and his 
companions are most significant as they set the precedent of law of 
Khula. In view of the verse 229 of Sura Baqra and decision of Holy 
35. Ibid. 
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Prophet (PBUH) in the case of Jameela v/s Thabit b. Qais lay down 
following guidelines: 
(a) The decision of Holy Prophet (PBUH) in the case of Jamila set 
a precedent that for the purpose of granting a decree of Khula all that 
is needed is to prove the woman's degree of antipathy against her 
husband and her persistent refusal to pull on with him. Once it is 
established beyond any doubt that the woman totally hates her 
husband and is not able to live with him in accordance with the 
Shariah law, the decree of Khula should be carried out. No further 
inquiry is required to be made by the court as to the cause of the 
antipathy or dislikness of wife against her husband'^. 
(b) The action of Hazrat Umar shows that the Qazi (i.e. Judge) can 
adopt suitable measures to find out the extent of the hatred of woman 
for her husband in order to establish beyond the doubt that two 
cannot, possibly, live together. The action of Hazrat Umar also 
establishes that it is not necessary for the Qazi O'udge) to inquire into 
the cause of hatred. There can be many reasons for the cause of her 
hatred for her husband which cannot be disclosed publicly before 
other people. Then there can be such cause of hatred as may not be 
considered sufficiently valid by the court or any other arbiter but 
36. Mohd. Imran, Ideal Women in Islam, p. 36 2"** ed. (1986) Markazi Maktaba 
Islamia, New Delhi 
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enough to create hatred in the heart of one who has to live with him 
day and night. Therefore, Qazi (judge) has no right to give his 
verdict on the point whether reasons for dissatisfaction as expressed 
by wife are valid. The duty of the Qazi (judge) is only to satisfy 
himself on the point whether there is hatred in the heart of wife 
against her husband and whether it arises from the cause which are 
temporary and may disappear or it is so deep rooted as to preclude 
possibility of happier relations being resrtored^'. 
(c) In considering the cause of Khula the question whether the 
women's demand of Khula is based on the genuine need or merely 
for self gratification is not justifiable at all and was completely 
ignored by Holy Prophet (PBUH) and his rightly guided Caliph while 
deciding the Khula suits. As a matter of fact a thorough prove into 
this problem is beyond the power of a judge. First it is practically 
impossible for any judge to decide such question. Secondly, Khula is 
right of the woman given to her by Allah and is parallel to the man's 
right of divorce. The sexual pleasure and variety of lust may be the 
motivating force for Khula and divorce. When the man's right of 
divorce is not limited by a condition in law that its use should be for 
gratifying sexual lust and pleasure. Therefore, in purely legal sense, 
the woman's right of Khula cannot be subjected to any moral 
37- Murtada Mutahhari: The Right of Women in Islam, p. 301, 1st ed., (1981), 
Tehran. 
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restriction. Third, one of the two possibilities may be true. Either she 
has a real and lawful need for Khula or she is mere seeker of 
pleasure. If it is first reason, then it would be an aggression against 
her to reject her request. And if it is the second reason, then refusal 
to grant her Khula may endanger the most important object of 
Shariah, for, if a woman is a pleasure seeking by nature, then she will 
design some plan for the satisfaction of her lust. If you do not allow her 
to get it by lawful means, she will endeavour to satisfy her desire by 
unlawful means and it will have much worse result than Khula^*. 
(d) In Khula also, like divorce, the intervention of the Qazi or 
court is, generally, undesirable. If the husband and wife have settled 
their terms by mutual agreement i.e. the woman is agreed to pay back 
dower and man accepting the same, the Khula automatically comes 
into force without any formal court decree acknowledging the 
declaration of Khula. However, if a woman seeks Khula and the 
husband disagrees, then the intervention of Qazi or court becomes 
necessary. The Qazi or court can probe into the causes of 
disagreement. If the findings of the Qazi establish that the wife 
cannot live with her husband for some genuine reasons, then the Qazi 
shall order the husband to divorce the wife. In all such instances, the 
Holy Prophet (PBUH) and his rightly guided caliphs accepted the 
compensation from the wife and ordered the husband to divorce her. 
38. Ibid, P. 302 
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The order of the judge is to be obeyed by the husband, so much so 
that if he does not obey, he can be sent to prison for this 
disobedience'*. 
(e) The separation resulting from Khula as explained by the Holy 
Prophet (PBUH) amounts equivalent to one irrevocable divorce and 
after this, the husband will have no right to compromise during the 
waiting period (Iddat) because this right would completely nullify 
the object of Khula. Moreover, the recompense money paid by 
women to the man is a price paid for freedom from the bond of 
marriage. If the husband accepts the recompense wealth but does not 
free her, it will be a deceit and cheating on the part of husband which 
is unlawful in Islamic Shariah. If the woman wants to remarry the 
same man, she can do so because Khula is not a divorce mughallaz 
(final) after which the remarriage is lawful only when women 
marries another man and he divorces her after the consummation of 
marriage of his own accord i.e. Halala. Halala means that if the 
woman wants to remarry with the same man she can do so but she 
can do so only after she has had marital relations with other man and 
has been divorced by him^". 
39- Supra note 1 P. 64. 
40- Mohammad Iqbal Siddiqi; The Family laws of Islam, P. 237, 1"^  ed. (1986) 
New Delhi. 
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(f) No limit has been placed on the determination of amount of 
compensation for Khula. Whatever amount of compensation is 
agreed upon between the parties mutually, Khula can be given. 
However Holy Prophet (PBUH) did not approve a man taking more 
than what he has given her in dower^'. 
Limitations of Khula: 
The law determines people's right. Just as man has right to 
divorce so has woman the right to Khula. So both have equal rights 
to separate when it becomes impossible for them to live together as 
husband and wife. Law will intervene only when any of the parties to 
the marriage uses one's rights unjustly against the other party. The 
law will try to make amendment and rectify the situation and restore 
proper rights to the aggrieved party as far as possible within the 
limits of law. But the use of one's rights properly depends entirely on 
person himself or herself depending on his or her sense of justice and 
fear of Allah. No one can decide but the person himself or herself 
whether he or she is really using this right justly or merely for self-
gratification. The law after giving this natural right can only place 
certain restriction to check its unjust and unlawful use against other 
party. It is explained in the Holy Qur'an and the authentic Ahadith at 
length that a man is given the right of divorce but subject to certain 
specific terms. For example, the divorce should not be pronounced 
41- Ibid. 
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during the period of menstruation and each divorce should be given 
in three separate period of purification (Tuhr) followed by abstinence 
from cohabitation during the period of Iddat and the divorcee should be 
retained in the matrimonial home and should be maintained by the 
former husband till the expiry of iddat period in the same fashion and 
style as she was maintained during the continuance of her marriage*^. 
As the man's right of divorce is not absolute and is subject to 
just, fair and reasonable restrictions, like-wise woman is given the 
right to Khula with certain restriction as is clear from the 
commentar}-^ on verse II : 229 of Holy Qur'an. However, in view of 
Sura Al-Baqar Ayat 228 and 229 of the Holy Quran the wife's right 
to seek dissolution of her marital tie under the doctrine of Khula is 
not absolute but is subject to the following limitations. 
1. The first limitation on the exercise of right of Khula is that 
wife is not a liberty like the husband to get herself released by 
making an outright declaration of divorce. A man can divorce his 
wife by making the pronouncement of divorce at his end and he is 
not required to seek the intervention of any third party or arbiter to 
effect the divorce. But in the case of Khula if at the women's request, 
the man agrees to divorce, then there is end of the marriage. But in 
case the husband refuses to release his wife from the marriage bond, 
she has to seek help of court of law and obtain a decree in her 
42 - Supra note 1, p. 61 
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favour. In all the cases decided by the Prophet (PBUH) (PBUH) or 
Caliphs, there is not a single case in which the wife divorced her self 
under the doctrine of Khula and then merely informed the Holy 
Prophet (PBUH) or the Caliphs of what she had done. In all the cases 
the wife sought the intervention of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) or the 
Caliphs. This establishes the law that wife cannot dissolve her 
marriage under Khula by making outright declaration of the divorce. 
But she has to get it effected through a decree of court . 
2. The second limitation is returning of dower. In case of 
divorce, the husband is under mandatory obligation to pay unpaid 
amount of the dower and this makes husband to think time and again 
before taking the final decision of divorce as he has to pay the 
dower. Like-wise in case of Khula, the wife is required to pay 
compensation to the husband for releasing her from the bond of 
marriage. This go a long way to check the hasty action of the wife 
with regard to Khula, for, she will have to relinquish the whole or 
part of her dower^ "*. 
3. The third limitation on Khula is that it is permissible if it is 
prima facie made out that the spouses are not living or cannot live 
within the limits set by Allah i.e. that they cannot perform the duties 
and fulfil the obligations incumbent on them on account of their 
43. Supra Note 40, p. 68 
44. Malik Ram Baveja; Women in Islam, P. Ill , 1st. ed. (1988), Delhi 
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marriage. It has been seen that the second Caliph Hazrat Umar kept a 
woman under confinement for three days and nights. The question 
arise as to why he did so when she had not committed any sin. The 
only explanation can be that the Caliph wanted to gauge the true 
feelings of the woman, that is, whether she was seeking a divorce 
under the passing whim or if she was earnest in her desire for 
separation from her husband. A marriage is a serious thing and 
cannot be dissolved lightly and its dissolution is ordinarily 
undesirable except under special circumstances. It can be terminated 
only if the need for its dissolution is greater than to maintain it. 
Therefore, the termination of marriage under Khula is permissible 
only when the court is satisfied that marriage has completely, been 
broken down and has become devoid of its solemn objectives. The 
case of Jamila fully establishes this view^^. 
Nature and Effect of Khula: 
The union of marriage stands dissolved as soon as Khula is granted or 
the proposal is accepted by the other spouse. As soon as a release has been 
granted to by the husband, the wife is completely separated from him even 
though no compensation has been paid by her. Therefore, the Khula, in effect, 
amounts to one irrevocable divorce. The parties may however, remarry, if they 
45- Supra note 8 P. 229. 
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SO choose, even during the term of probation (Iddat) of the woman 
Is the Khula a dissolution of the marriage (Faskh) or a divorce. 
There is difference of opinion among the Jurists on this point. 
According to Imam Abu Hanifa, the dissolution of the marriage by 
the use of the word Khula or its equivalents word amount to an irrevocable 
divorce. Burhan Al-Din Marghinani, the author of Hedaya, has said that 
granting of Khula shall take effect as one irrevocable divorce and the wife 
shall have to compensate the husband'* .^ 
Under the Maliki Law dissolution of marriage by Khula constitute 
an irrevocable divorce. There are two reports about the law laid down by 
Imam Shafai'i'i. According to an earlier opinion of Imam Shafai'i, Khula 
effect a separation between husband and wife. In other words it result in 
"Faskh" or cancellation of the marriage. It does not take effect as a divorce. 
But according to his later and final opinion Khula amounts an irrevocable 
divorce which is usually regarded a correct view^. 
According to Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, if the marriage is dissolved 
by the use of the word Khula, it shall amount to an irrevocable divorce. If it 
is, however, dissolved by the use of the word Talaq, there are two opinion 
expressed by him. According to one, it shall amount to a faskh or 
46. Ibn Abdin al Shaybani, Radd-ul-Mukhtar, vol. II P. 575. 
47. FatawaAlamgiriyyah, vol II. P. 118 
48. SupranotelO,?. 548. 
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cancellation of the marriage but according to other it shall be deemed as 
irrevocable divorce. 
Thus, by holding Khula as faskh (dissolution of marriage) the point 
of view about reconstructing marriage with one's own wife who was earUer 
pronounced two divorces and then separated by Khula without an 
intervening consummated marriage appears to be misconceived. The jurists 
who do not consider Khula as divorce but consider it as fask take it out 
from the category of divorces. It shall thus amount to an addition over and 
above three divorces which is not established either by Qur'an or Sunnah. 
Khula being effective as an irrevocable divorce, the parties may, however, 
remarry without any intervening marriage provided the wife, at the time of 
Khula was not undergoing the period of iddat of two revocable divorces. In 
such an event, the two divorces earlier pronounced to the wife who was 
then separated by Khula make it unlawful for her to remarry the same 
husband without an intervening consummated marriage, as the Khula being 
in the order of the divorce, the maximum number of three divorces stood 
exhausted. According to some theologians a revocable divorce takes effect 
by pronouncement of Khula. The husband according to them, after 
effecting Khula to his wife, may have recourse to her during her observance 
of the term of the probation. Indeed in the event of his having recourse to 
her, he shall have to give back to her what he received from his wife as 
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compensation for effecting Khula. But the view of holding the Khula as 
49 
revocable divorce is not correct . 
The correct viewpoint appears to be that Khula is an irrevocable 
divorce in its effect though not in its nature. The contract of marriage in a 
revocable divorce subsists till the term of the probation terminates and the 
husband may have recourse to her during the continuance of the term of her 
probation, whereas in Khula in lieu of compensation, the intention is to 
secure complete separation from the husband which, in effect, is an 
irrevocable divorce. In khula the wife pays compensation so that she may 
have complete mastery over herself. This can happen only when she obtains 
irrevocable divorce^. 
It is clear from foregoing discussion that where a marriage is 
dissolved by means of Khula, it takes effect as an irrevocable divorce. 
According to Shia law, a Talaq resulting from Khula continues to be 
irrevocable so long as she does not claim the consideration during iddat but 
if she claims, the husband may revoke the Talaq. Moreover, the effect of 
Khula is that whatever rights are created between husband and wife on 
account of marriage contract comes to an end and the couple are exonerated 
from obligation owing to each other. It is said in Khulasatul Fatawa that 
they are not liable to be so exonerated if divorce is effected for 
49. Supra note 10 P. 550, 
50. Maulana Syed Amir AH; Ayn Al-Hidayah: Vol. II, 270 (1938) New Delhi. 
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consideration. Al-Kasani is of the opinion that Khula effected for 
compensation resemble divorce effected for consideration and it is an 
established rule that the rights of a person do not laps unless tiiey are made 
to laps by him. Hence only those rights shall laps in Khula that are 
mentioned in Ike agreement of Khula but all those debts which are not due 
on account of marriage contract shall not laps . 
Effect of Khula on Dower: 
Any lawful object can form the consideration of Khula. Hence, 
it is open to the spouses to agree to Khula on the condition that the 
wife surrenders her dower as consideration for Khula. In such a case 
the marriage shall be dissolved while the wife shall lose her right to 
the dower. It can, however, be made an express condition of Khula 
that wife's dower or a portion thereof shall remain payable by the 
husband. There is a difference of opinion amongst Hanafi jurists 
about the husband's liability for the payment of wife's dower and 
wife's liability for its return if it has already been paid to her. 
If the marriage has not been consummated and the dower has not 
been paid to her, then according to Imam Abu Hanifa, no amount of dower 
be due to her. She shall not be entitled to get her dower or any portion 
thereof from her husband. She shall pay to him the consideration agreed 
upon. According to Abu Yusuf and Muhammad, the wife shall be entitled 
51 Shaikh Nizami; Fatawa Alamgiriyyah ; Vol. II; P. 119. 
132 
to the half of the dower from the husband. The consideration agreed upon 
has, of course, to be paid by the wife to the husband in each case. However, 
if the husband divorces his wife by Khula in consideration of her dower and 
in case the marriage has been consummated and the whole dower has been 
paid to the wife, then the husband shall be entitled to its return by the wife. 
If it has not yet been paid to her, there are two opinions expressed by 
Hanafi jurists in this respect. According to one, the same rule shall apply as 
held by Abu Hanifa regarding dower in Khula. But according to second 
opinion, which is generally believed to be correct, the same rule shall apply 
as laid down by Muhammad and Abu Yusui*^. 
According to Maliki law if the marriage has not been consummated 
and parties settle Khula for a specific consideration, the wife shall have to 
pay the specified consideration and her right to the dower shall be 
extinguished. She shall not get whole or any portion of it***. 
According to Shafai'i law, if the spouses agree to a Khula for a 
particular consideration and the marriage has not been consummated, the 
wife shall be entitled to the half of the dower. If the whole dower has been 
paid to her, she shall have to return half of it. If it has not been paid to her, the 
husband has to pay half the dower to her. Imam Ahmad b. Hanbal holds that 
right to dower is not lost in consequence of Khula and husband remaining 
liable for its payment if same has not already been paid to the wife* .^ 
52. Supra note 10, p. 560. 
53. Ibid. 
54. Ibid. 
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On examining the various aspects of law of Khula it appears that 
opinion of Imam Abu Yusuf and Imam Muhammad regarding Khula seems 
to be more weighty and acceptable and opinion of Abu Hanifa and Abu 
Yusuf on the question of Mubara'at appears to be more correct. In other 
words, only the non-financial commitments that are established on account 
of marriage contract shall automatically laps on Khula but husband shall 
not be exonerated of the liability of the financial rights, such as dower and 
maintenance, except when the wife agrees to it at the time of Khula being 
effected. 
Effects of Khula on Maintenance: 
The wife's right to maintenance and residence during the period of 
probation (Iddat) is the independent right of divorcee and it is not lost on 
the pronouncement of Khula because it arises only on the actual 
pronouncement of Khula and it is not claimable before. If a woman obtains 
Khula fi-om her husband in consideration of all rights which she has against 
him even then she does not lose her right to maintenance during the period 
of iddat on the ground that the right does not accrue to her before the 
Khula. In the absence of the agreement to contrary the wife shall be entitled 
to maintenance during her period of iddah. But it is open to the parties to 
make it a condition of Khula that the wife will give up her right to 
maintenance during the period of her iddat. In same way the wife's right for 
claiming maintenance of her minor children shall not be lost unless she gives 
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up her right under an express agreement. The right to maintenance for her 
minor children can, therefore, be surrendered only under an express agreement 
to that effect. This is subject to the condition that at the time during which the 
wife gives up her right to the maintenance of the children should be specified. 
If it is not specified, the right to maintenance shall not be lost^ .^ 
Indeed, so far as the right of the residence of the wife during 
probation (iddat) is concerned, it cannot be given up even by mutual 
agreement. This view is based on the ground that right of residence is a 
reUgious obligation ordained by God and has been specifically provided in 
the Holy Qur'an, wherein it is laid down in respect of divorced women. 
'O'Prophet (PBUH)! When ye 
Do divorce them at their 
Prescribed periods,• 
And count (accurately) 
Their prescribed periods; 
And fear God your lord; 
And turn them not out of their house, 
Nor shell they themselves leave. 
Except in case they are 
Guilty of some open lewdness 
These are limits set by Gocf^ 
In the instance verse of the Holy Qur'an Allah has decreed not to 
turn divorced wife out of her matrimonial house during the period of Iddat 
so that she, in pursuance of religious directive may, as of right, pass her 
55. Supra note 8, p.p. 268 - 69. 
56. Holy Quran LXV : 1, 
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period of probation there. This rule on social ground too is highly 
commendable. The direction contained in the above verse of the Holy 
Qur'an cannot be contravened and so the wife's right to residence shall not 
be lost. It is however, open to a wife to undertake the payment of the rent of 
a house which does not belong to the husband . 
Mode of EfTecting Khula: 
A Khula can be effected by a proposal made by one part>' and its 
acceptance by the other party. No particular form has been prescribed for 
the expression, which may effect Khula. All that is needed is that a 
proposal is made by one side and the consent is formally expressed by the 
other party. It is however, a condition precedent that before the wife accepts 
the Khula she must understand the meaning of the term used by the 
husband because transaction is an exchange like Talaq which involves a 
loss of right. However, it is not necessary that proposal for Khula should 
proceed from one of the parties to a marriage. It can also be made by the 
guardian of the minor. According to some Jurists a third party may 
persuade the husband to give Khula to his wife for the consideration 
agreed to be paid. 
A husband's consent to a proposal for Khula may be expressed or 
imphed as when he accepts the consideration for a proposed Khula without 
57. Supra note 14, p. 561. 
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expressly giving his consent to it. The marriage shall be dissolved on his 
acceptance of consideration even when he does not divorce die wife. The 
proposal must convey the idea of payment of consideration directly or 
indirectly to the other party. Thus, the wife may say, "I give up my such 
and such claim as consideration for your divorcing me" or I gave up my 
CO 
claim for my dower while my husband releases me from the marriage tie" . 
The acceptance of a proposal for Khula must be expressed in the 
same term as the proposal, that is, the acceptance cannot introduce a new or 
different consideration or condition, when a wife delivers the consideration 
demanded by the husband without expressly giving her consent to the 
husband's proposal, it shall be deemed to be as implied consent and Khula 
would be effected. Similarly, it is not necessary that the husband should 
expressly give his assent to the wife's proposal. Such consent may be 
inferred from his conduct. Thus, where a wife seeks a Khula for a specified 
consideration and husband accepts the same shall be presumed and a Khula 
shall be effected as soon as he accepts the same '^. 
Nature of Consideration for Khula: 
As a general rule the objects that can be given as dower may 
also form the objects of consideration in case of Khula because the 
object that can be fixed as a dower in a marriage contract can 
perfectly be made a compensation for dissolving the marriage. 
58. Supra note 8, p. 247. 
59. Ibid. 
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According to Hanafi law, whatever is lawful to be accepted for 
dower can also be lawfully accepted as consideration for Khula. 
Thus, it can consist of such things as of immovable property, cash 
Jewelry etc. But it cannot consist of things which cannot be lawfully 
possessed by a Muslim. Thus, it cannot be wine, pork etc. But if the 
husband agrees to effect Khula to his wife in consideration of an 
unlawful object, the Khula shall be effected but the payment of such 
consideration would not be incumbent on the wife. This is due to the 
fact that a Muslim husband cannot lawfully possess such an object 
and so he can not ask the wife to give it to him*". 
According to Maliki law all the things which are lawful can 
validly form the consideration for Khula. If consideration consists of 
such things as are forbidden like pork, wine or something, which has 
been obtained by theft a violent means or by usurpation, then the 
Khula shall be valid but the husband shall not be entitled to any 
consideration. 
Under Shafai'i law all the things, which can be given for 
dower can be given for khula. It should consist of lawful things. The 
wife must be capable of giving it to the husband. If it consists of such 
things as are not lawful like pork, wine etc. then the wife shall have to 
pay Mahrul-misl i.e. the dower of a woman of equal status. Imam 
60. Ibid.: p.573. 
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Ahmad bin Hanbal holds that Khula is agreed for an unlawful things 
will be effected but no consideration shall be paid by the wife'*. 
According to Abu Hanifa and Imam Shafai'i the amount of 
consideration to be paid for Khula must be specific and be of 
ascertainable value. According to Imam Malik, however, an 
unknown and unascertainable thing too may form consideration for 
Khula. The reason for this difference is that according to Imam Abu 
Hanifa and Shafai'i, the compensation for Khula resembles the 
consideration in sale hence, all the attributes of consideration for 
sale have to be observed in the matter of compensation for Khula as 
well. But according to Imam Malik, however, the compensation for 
Khula has the characteristic of a gift, or bequest, hence its existence 
at the time of Khula was unnecessary". 
If a husband gives a Khula to his wife without specifying or 
fixing any consideration and wife agrees to it, an irrevocable divorce 
shall be effected but no consideration shall be payable by her. She 
shall however, have to return the dower if she has already realised it. 
If she has not realised it, it shall be effected but no consideration 
shall be payable by her. Moreover, all the rights of the wife against 
the husband arising out of marriage shall be extinguished. However 
there must be a definite mention of payment of consideration. If 
61. Ibid. 
62. Supra note 10, p. 520. 
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there is no mention of any consideration then the expression used by 
the husband may amount to a divorce but cannot effect khula . 
Quantum of Compensation for Khula: 
"Ifye (Judge) do indeed fear, 
that they would be unable to keep limits ordained by 
God, there is no blame on either of them if she gives, 
something for her freedom'^ 
The above verse of the Holy Quran has been interpreted to mean that in 
Islam a Muslim wife can seek freedom from her marital bond by providing 
iwaz or compensation to her husband. But the instant Holy verse does not 
explicity mention quantum or amount of compensation to be paid by the 
wife to her husband for her freedom. Consequently, tiie expression there is 
no blame on eitiier of them if she gives something for her freedom, have 
been differently interpreted by the Muslim Jurists which leads to the 
emergence of the following three views about the amount of compensation 
in Khula ^^. 
1. According to some Jurists, the quantum of compensation can be larger 
than what the husband has given to the wife in consideration of 
marriage. 
2. According to some, quantum of compensation cannot be in excess of 
that the husband has given to the wife in consideration of marriage; 
63. Ibid. p.521 
64. Holy Quran ; 11. 229, 
65. Mohd. Altaf Hussain Ahangar, Compensation in Khula-An Appraisal of 
Judicial interpretation in Pakistan; P. 113; XIII ICLR (1993). 
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3. According to some, quantum of compensation cannot be more than 
stipulated or proper dower. 
Unlimited Compensation: 
The Jurists who uphold validity of unlimited compensation on 
the part of the wife in Khula argue that there is no limit mentioned 
on the compensation in Holy Quran verse II ; 229 and so whatever 
compensation is agreed upon between the parties, it shall be lawful. 
Caliph Hazrat Umar appears to have endorsed this view point in a 
case. It is reported that before him appeared a women and her 
husband. The woman wanted a divorce. Hazrat Umar advised her to 
live with her husband, but she refused. Therefore, he shut her in a 
room full of rubbish. She was taken out after three days, he asked her 
how she was. She replied. By Allah; " She had real comfort in these 
nights". Hearing this, Hazrat Umar said to the husband, " Give her 
Khula even if it be in lieu of her ring". This view point also finds 
favour of Caliph Hazrat Usman.^^ 
Abdul Razzaq has reported that Rabia bint Muawwadh bint 
Afra told him that she obtained Khula from her husband in return of 
everything of which she was owner. When the matter was taken to 
Caliph Usman, he held the same to be lawful. Imam Shafai'i and Imam 
66. Supra note 1, p. 63. 
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Malik approved payment of excessive compensation. They hold that taking 
back more than dower is lawful. 
Jafari Shias also do not recognise any fetter on compensation Umit. 
BaiUie writes in this regard that there is no limit to the amount of 
compensation and therefore, it may lawfiiUy exceed whatever was given to 
the women as her dower. ^ 
In a Tehran Publication it is found that Ali bin Ibrahim through his 
father Ibn Ali Amir and he through Imam Muhanunad Baqir reports that a 
woman to whom Khula is given, the man may take compensation from her 
whatever she likes to give or on what botii agree; it may be dower amount 
or more than that.*' 
Compensation Equivalent to Transferred Benefit: 
Most of the Jurist have read the Holy verse " If ye fear for her 
release " in conjunction with the tradition of Holy Prophet (PBUH) 
(PBUH). Consequently, they disallow the taking of more than what the 
husband has given on the basis of rule deducible from Holy Prophet's 
directives in the instance relating to the wife of Thabit Ibn Qais. As stated 
before, on hearing the complaint of Jameela, wife of Sabit Ibn Qais, the 
67. Ibid. 
68. Neil. B.E. Baillie; A Digest of Moohammedan Law, Vol. II, P. 130 (1965) 
Smith & Co. London 
69. Al-Istibsar, Haq-i-Khula-wa Mubara'ai; Vol. VllI P. 101, Quoted by Mohd 
Altaf Hussain Ahangar: Supra note 70. 
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Holy Prophet (PBUH) asked her if she was prepared to return the garden 
give to her by her husband by way of dower. She repUed tiiat she was 
prepared to give him even more if he demands more. The Holy Prophet 
(PBUH) said, " No, not more than that". This tradition establishes very 
clearly that a husband cannot lawfully take from the wife more than what 
he had given to her by way of dower. 
Amongst the companions of the Prophet (PBUH) CaUph Abu Bakar 
considered the taking of compensation by husband exceeding the benefits 
received by his wife from him to be unlawfiil and maintained that the 
husband shall be made to return the same to the wife. Taus and Zuhri also 
hold tiiat it is not lawfiil for husband to take back more than what he had 
given to the wife . 
According to Imam Abu Hanifa, the amount of consideration paid or 
to be paid for a Khula should not exceed the amount of dower or property 
given to the wife by the husband. His disciple Muhammad al Shaybani writes 
that if the wife in return for anything gets herself released through Khula, it 
shall Judicially be lawfiil but I do not approve that husband should take 
from his wife more than what he has given to her inspite of the fact that 
difference had arisen on account of wife. If the difference arises on account 
of husband I do not approve a husband taking anything at all. If he takes 
70. See : for detail Supra note 30, P. 159. 
71- Supra note 10, P. 518. 
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some thing, though it shall be lawful Judicially but in all the conscience i.e. 
between man and God, it shall be loath some"'^. 
Strangely, the compensation equivalent to transferred benefit rule 
has not found any explicit acceptance in the legislation enacted in various 
Muslim countries. 
Compensation not exceeding dower amount: 
The third group of the Jurist have interpreted the Quranic verse 
II : 229 and tradition pertaining to compensation in Khula to mean that 
maximum compensation cannot be more than dower paid by the husband. 
According to Ata, if the husband takes anything more than dower, he shall 
be made to restore the same. The Hedaya also treats it abominable on the 
part of the husband to have more than dower itself. 
Reason for Difference of Opinion : 
The basis of different opinions of Jurists regarding the quantum of 
compensation in Khula is due to their reliance on different interpretations 
of law. Those persons who hold the taking of quantum larger than what the 
husband has given to his wife as compensation for effecting Khula to be 
lawful, base their argument on Quranic Verse 11:229. They takes its 
apparent meaning that the Holy Quran dopes not limit to amount of 
compensation either away. They further rely on Qiyas and hold Khula to 
72- Mohammed al-Shybani; Mmvatta, P. 251, Karachi- Pakistan. 
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resemble those matter in which compensation is paid. Hence, according to 
them, whatever compensation is agreed upon between parties, it shall be 
legal. If the husband demands more than that he has given to his wife and 
she agreed to it the same shall be legal . 
On the contrary, the Jurists who forbid taking more than what the 
husband had paid, argue on the basis of tradition narrated by Zubair that 
Thabit b. Qays intended to effect Khula to his wife and when Holy Prophet 
(PBUH) inquired of his wife whether she would return that to her husband 
which he had given to her as dower, she replied, "yes" and more than it. 
Thereupon Holy Prophet (PBUH) forbade her from giving more^ '*. 
Judicial View 
In Pakistan as well as India there is no enacted law which deals 
exclusively with the institution of Khula. Consequently, the problem 
pertaining to Khula, particularly compensation, fixation have been 
entrusted to the Judiciary. Expectedly, Judiciary has come out with varyiag 
decision on the issue of compensation. 
In Mohammed Amin case the husband had petitioned for the 
restitution conjugal rights whereas, in response, the wife had sued for 
dissolution of marriage on various grounds. The trial court decreed 
73. SupranotelO,?. 519. 
74. Ibid 
75. Mohammed Amin v/s Aisha Bibi; 1984, CLC 1389, Lahore. 
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restitution of conjugal rights. On appeal, the first appellate court allowed 
Khula in favour of wife with observation: 
"I propose to grant Khula in lieu of waiving the right 
ofAisha i.e. wife for recovery of dower and any past" 
maintenance". 
On second appeal, the court while deciding not to disturb any part of 
first appeal observed: 
"/ find that the question of Khula and the benefit 
received by the wife have been attended to by the 
learned Additional District Judge. He had applied his 
mind and given sound reasons to support his decision. 
The learned Judge further observed that if dowry 
means that whatever was given to the wife at the time 
of marriage by her husband, then the compensation is 
within the Shariah limits and cannot be objected. 
However, if the dowry included the property which the 
wife brought with herself from the parental house at 
the time of marriage, then obviously the court has 
allowed excessive compensation to the husband" '^ . 
In Razia Begum^^  case, the Karachi High court held that if a wife 
seeks Khula without pointing out to any default of husband and court 
consider it proper to grant a decree for Khula then wife should be ordered 
to return all the benefits received by her and also forgo such rights under 
which she can claim any benefits. 
76. Ibid. P. 1390. 
77. Razia Begum v/s Saqir Ahmad, 1982, CLC. 27. 
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Contrary to the above judgements, the other judicial trend in 
Pakistan is to decree the return of all conferred benefits by wife to her 
husband as a compensation upon". In Bilqis Fatima v/s Najmul Ikrant 
while allowing Khula court observed the wife is entitled to the dissolution 
of marriage on restoration of what she receive in consideration. 
Bilqis Fatima case was followed by full bench of Pakistan Supreme 
Court in Khursheed Bibi v/s Mohd AmirP^. In this case while allowing 
Khula, the court observed that in the instances of Khula, the wife has to 
return the benefits of marriage. As a general rule she cannot retain the 
benefit i.e. the consideration of marriage. Therefore it is necessary for the 
court to ascertain in a case of Khula what benefit have been conferred on 
the wife by the husband as the consideration of marriage. 
In Parveen Begum v/s Mohammed All the court again observed; 
"Taking hack more than what the husband has given 
to his wife as ransom of Khula; though not expressly 
prohibited in the Holy Quran, is a Sheer deviation 
from the establishes tradition of Holy Prophet 
(PBUH). Therefore I totally disapprove any such 
fixation of ransom which evidently is in negation and 
defiance of commandment of Prophet (PBUH)" 
Disentitlement to compensation : 
Ordinarily, payment of compensation by a wife to her husband is 
78. PLD, 1959Lahore. P. 567 
79. PLD. 1967, SC121. 
80. PLD, 1981, Lahore P. 116. 
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sine-qua-non for the obtainment of Khula. However, Jurists in general have 
identified certain circumstances under which a husband can be deprived of 
compensation. 
In Radd-ul-Mukhtar, it is provided that if Khula is due to ill-
treatment by the husband, he cannot lawfully take any consideration from 
the wife because Allah has enjoined on the husband not to take back any 
thing from the wives . 
It is stated in Al-Hedaya that if the cruelty is from the side of the 
husband his realising from the wife compensation for effecting Khula is 
disapproved. If insubordination is from the wife in that case the husband 
may take back only property given to her by him*^ . 
The above viewpoints are based on the authority of following verse 
of Holy Qur'an: 
"And if ye wish to have one wife 
in place of another, and you have given 
one of them a heap of gold take nothing 
from it'^^. 
The dictate is based on expediency. The wife in such situation is put 
to the inconvenience of having her marriage dissolved by the husband and 
so she must not, in addition there to , be put to financial loss .Hence the 
81. Supranote65, P. 114 
82. The Hedaya, Vol I, P. 113, Translated by Charles Hamilton, Islamic Book 
Trust Delhi. 
83. Holy Quran IV. 20. 
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above quoted Quranic verse , in its broader sense, disentitle the husband 
from realising any compensation from the wife in lieu of effecting Khula 
when he himself is the initiator of Khula . In other words if the husband is 
to be blamed for disagreement or discord, then he is forbidden to realise 
from wife any compensation for effecting Khula . 
The above views suggest that over all there is a moral and not legal 
bar against the husband claiming compensation from his wife when he him 
self is the initiator of Khula or the wife is put in compelling situation to 
demand for Khula. 
However, in Munshee Abdul Azize v/s Noor Miyar^ cruelty was 
considered as legal bar claiming compensation. In the instant case, the wife 
claimed divorce on various grounds including Khula and cruelty. The trial 
court dismissed wife's plaint. On appeal, the court reversed the finding of 
trail court and decreed suit on the ground of cruelty and Khula. Aggrieved 
by the judgement, the husband filed an appeal on the ground that appellate 
court having not determined the benefits taken by the wife was not legally 
justified to decree the suit. Dismissing appeal, the Lahore High court 
observed that since the marriage has been dissolved on the ground of 
cruelty of petitioner (husband) with the respondent wife, the mere fact that 
learned appellate court failed to determined the benefits derived by wife 
would not make any difference. 
84. 1985, CLC, 2546. 
149 
A husband is entailed to compensation only when his wife has 
derived some benefit from him in consideration of marriage . where the 
wife has not been benefitted at all, she is not legally Uable for the payment 
of compensation to her husband in consideration of Khula , In Ghulam 
Mustafa V/S Mst. Ghulam Sakina^^, the Court observed that in absence of 
proof of receipt of benefits from husband , wife would be entitled to grant 
Khula without restoration of unproved benefits. 
Where the husband pronounces Khula to his wife without any 
demand or specification of compensation, the question which arises is, can 
he claim compensation later on or is he disentitled to claim compensation? 
In this regard, Baillie is of the view that when they have mutually entered 
into a Khula without mentioning any exchange it is correct to say that each 
of the parties would be freed from his fellow and that no part of dower were 
due by the husband she would be obliged to restore what ma>' have been 
advanced to her as dower amount* .^ 
Abdur-Rahman clears the position thus : 
"Where a husband pronounces Khula repudiation against his wife 
without any compensation, the respective claims of husband and wife are 
not cancelled , and they can sue each other for payment of any debts which 
may be due*'." 
85 . PLD 1986 Lahore, 324. 
86. Supra note 68 P. 313. 
87, Abdur Rahman; Institute of Mussalman Law, P. 157, (1980) Lahore. 
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What can be safely deduced from tbe above views is that when 
compensation has not been demanded by the husband at the time of Khula, 
wife is not supposed, of her own, to restore him any marriage benefit and 
meanwhile other rights and obligations of parties remain intact. 
Effect of Non payment of Compensation: 
Ordinarily, Khula is a dissolution of marriage on the payment of 
compensation by the wife to her Husband. Therefore, one of the basic 
requirements for the grant of Khula as enjoined by Islam and held by the 
courts of Pakistan is that if wife has oblained any tangible benefit from the 
husband she should be made to return the same as a condition precedent for 
the grant of Khula in case the husband does not forego the same but ask for 
their return. However, where the compensation is determined between the 
parties or settled through the court and later on wife fails to pay it, then 
what are the effect upon the Khula itself 
In this regard the Hedaya lays down that the consent given by the 
husband to a separation on condition of wife abandoning dower, or paying 
him a certain sum, or making over to him any property, does not entitle him 
to cancel Khula on her failing to fulfil the contract but he may either sue for 
the amount she agreed to pay him or set-off the same against any claim she 
may advanced against him**. 
88. Supra note 82, P. 320. 
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This point was taken up by privy council in case of Moonshee Bazul-
ur-Rehmar?^ case where in the court observed that the non -payment of 
consideration by the wife for the divorce no more invalidate divorce. 
The point again came up before Karachi High court in 
Shamshad Begum^ case where in the court made following 
observation: 
"Although, consideration is a valid and even generally an 
essential requirement for Khula and such payment 
ordinarily is payable immediately, or at an agreed time, the 
view expressed by M.N. Ahmad in his valuable and 
exhaustive treaties, " Principles of Muslim law" at page 
259 is that failure of wife to pay consideration does not 
cancel Khula but husband shall be entitled to recover the 
same from wife under law or he may set-off same against 
claim that she may have against him". 
Endorsing the observation in Moonshee Buzul-ur-Rehman case, the 
Pakistan Supreme Court is Dr. Akhlaq Ahmad case'' observed : 
"Once the family court came to the conclusion that the 
parties cannot remain within the limits of God and 
dissolution of marriage by Khula must take place, the 
inquiry into terms on which such dissolution shall take 
place does not affect the conclusion but only creates civil 
liabilities with regard to the benefits to be returned by the 
wife to the husband and does not affect dissolution itself. 
89. Moonsee Bazul-UR- Rahman v/s Lateefun -Nissa (1861) lA. 378. 
90. Shamshad Begum v/s Abdul Haque, PLD 1977 Karachi P. 55. 
91. Dr. Akhlaq Ahmad v/s Mst. Kishwar Sultana, PLD 1983 SC. 169. 
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Power of Compensation Determination 
It has been seen that the Jurists regarding the quantum of 
compensation have presented different views. But the question, which 
arises is that who has a final say in determination of the compensation in 
case wife seeks Khula through court order. The classical Jurists have not 
provided any answer to this question. However, the direction by the Holy 
Prophet (PBUH) to the Thabit bin Qais to receive his garden back and 
divorce his wife implies that the court has got power to determine the 
amount of compensation to be paid by wife to the husband and same is 
binding upon husband'^ . 
The Judicial trend on this issue is not definite and certain. In Bilqis 
Fatima'^  case tiie Lahore High court observed that while effecting 
separation the Qazi or the judge has the power to adjust the financial 
matters so as to direct a partial or total restoration of the benefits received 
by the wife. 
From this observation of the court it is clear that the court has got 
inherent power to determine the payable compensation but the court 
explicitly recognise the Judicial direction in this regard when it says that if 
the husband is not in any way at fault there has to be restoration of property 
received by the wife and ordinarily it will be whole of the property but the 
92. Supra note 65, P. 132. 
93. PLD. 1959 Lahore. P. 566. 
153 
judge may take into consideration reciprocal benefits received by the 
husband and continuous living together may also be a benefit received. 
From tiiis it is evident that the authority of court to award 
compensation is at most to the extent of the return of marriage benefits 
given by the husband to wife and court can lessen the compensation in view 
of reciprocal benefits received by the husband. Thus, the court has no 
discretionary power to direct the wife to compensate her husband from her 
personal property or beyond the marital benefits received by her during the 
coverture. The case of Khurshid Bibi also highlights the same position. 
A close look into Khurshid Bibi case reveals somewhat conflicting 
judicial trend. On the one hand husband given is free hand in claiming 
compensation from wife witiiin the limits of marriage benefits given to her 
by her husband at the time of marriage and simultaneously, court claims 
power with the judiciary regarding compensation finally payable to 
husband. The judicial pronounce-ments also estabhsh beyond all the doubts 
that in case of dispute as to the payable amount of compensation, final 
authority rests with the court to determine the compensation amount to be 
paid by wife to her husband in lieu of Khula. 
Power of court to grant Khula against Consent of Husband: 
The question to be considered is whether the husband consent is a 
94. Ibid. 
95. Khurshid Bibi v/s Mohd. Amin, PLD 1967 SC97. 
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condition precedent to the dissolution of marriage under the provision of 
Khula or has the Qazi or Judge the power to separate the parties even 
against the wishes of husband when he is satisfied that spouses cannot live 
within limits set by Allah. This is a very important rule of Muslim Law and 
greatly affects the rights of Muslim wives. It is, therefore, necessary to 
discuss the matter in some detail. 
The Muslim Jurists have generally expressed the view that the Qazi 
(Judge) is not competent to dissolve the marriage if the husband refuses to 
divorce his wife under the doctrine of Khula. The courts in India have 
followed this view. The Allahabad High Court in Mariam Bibi v/s Nur 
Mohd** held that a suit by a Muslim wife to compel her husband to give her 
a Khula is not maintainable. It was further held that a divorce by Khula is 
the sole act of husband and to exercise such power is wholly a matter 
within his own discretion and it is not demandable by wife as a matter of 
right under Muslim Law. 
The Lahore High Court also expressed the same view in Mst. Umar 
Bibi v/s Mohd. Din'^. The court observed that it is only husband or his 
agent who can effect the Khula and it is not possible for a Qazi or Court to 
do so as no such powers are vested in them. Again a bench of the same 
High Court in Sayeeda Khanum vs MohammadSalim^ observed that the 
96. 1882, Allahabad. 83. 
97. A. I. R. 1945 L. 
98. 1952,P.L.D. Lahore: 131. 
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decisions of tiie courts in khula cases was greatly influenced by the views 
expressed by some of the Muslim scholars that right to divorce is an 
absolute power of the husband and subsistence of the marriage tie in all the 
circumstances can be put to end only by the utterance of the husband and 
non else. 
The decisions of the courts in the instant cases suggest as if the right 
to dissolve the marriage is an absolute and unilateral power of the husband 
and its exercise depends on his sweet will and non-else. Whereas the case 
decided by the Prophet (PBUH) and the caliphs strongly lead to the view 
that decision of such does not depend on the sweet will of the husband. The 
case of Jamilah and her husband Thabit b. Qays discussed herein before 
establishes beyond all the doubts that in the case of Jamilah Holy Prophet 
(PBUH) asked Thabit to divorce his wife. It also establishes the fact that in 
genuine cases Khula was freely granted but in course of time women's 
rights were greatly curtailed by adverse views and men placed many 
restrictions on their rights and present doctrine of Khula is one of such 
99 
cases . 
The verse II: 229 of the Holy Qur'an explains the law of Khula. In 
this very verse, the words, "if ye fear —" are addressed to the Muslim 
authorities i.e. the courts and this suggests the wisdom of law of Shariah: 
that if husband and wife caimot agree on Khula, then they should turn to the 
99. Supra note 8. P. 240. 
156 
law. This is proven by the fact that women took their cases to the Holy 
Prophet (PBUH) and his rightly guided Caliphs and they heard their 
complaints and gave their decisions. This is a clear testimony that if two 
parties can not mutually agree on Khula then the women should turn to the 
Court. Now if the Judge had the right only of hearing the case and in case 
of husband disagreeing, had not power to enforce his decisions, then it 
would be utterly meaningless to give him authority to which people may 
appeal*"". 
To find if Judge is really powerless, we should look into traditions 
but in all the decision of Holy Prophet (PBUH) and his rightly guided 
Caliphs, the wording is either imperative as give her a divorce "or" separate 
fi^om her "or" leave her, or it is stated that the Holy Prophet (PBUH) 
ordered the man to do this. And the narration of Ibn Zubair fi-om Abu 
Abbas mentions that the Holy Prophet (PBUH) separate them. And the 
report from Jamilah bint Abi Salul contains the same words. Therefore, 
there seems no room for doubt that the Judge has right or authority to order 
for divorce in case of Khula^ ^V 
The incident that happened in the time of Hazrat Umar, the second 
Caliph, and which has already been discussed throws light on this question. 
The Caliph had kept in confinement for three days and nights the wife who 
wanted a release from her marriage tie. After being satisfied with the 
100. Supra not 1, p. 65. 
101. Supra note 1 P. 66. 
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genuineness of the wife's aversion for her husband he told the husband to 
divorce her. There was a possibilit>' that husband might have refused to 
comply with Caliph's suggestion if it was only a recommendation because 
people were very free with him. The Caliph must have known tiiat he could 
dissolve the marriage on the husband's refusal to do so, otherwise where 
was necessity to keep the wife in confinement. Supposing tiie husband had 
refused to divorce the wife and the caliph did not passes the right to 
dissolve the marriage then confmement of the woman would have been not 
only meaningless but an infringement of her freedom. Hazrat 'Umar', therefore 
must have felt sure that on husbzind's refusal to divorce his wife, he as a ruler 
or a Qazi could dissolve the marriage. This also supports the view that a Qazi 
can in case of necessity order the husband to divorce his wife'" .^ 
However the Judicial trend seems to have gone under sea change in 
Pakistan and the present day courts hold the same view as was held by the 
Prophet (PBUH) and his companions in Khula-suit brought before them. 
The changing trend of the court finds expression in the noted case Bilqees 
Fatima v s Najmul Ekram wherein their lord ship of justice. Shabbir 
Ahmad, Justice B. Z. Kaikaus and justice Masud Ahmad held that if court 
arrived at the conclusion that the couple would not be able to maintain the 
limit set by God, it could then get Khula effected without the consent of the 
husband by ordering the wife to pay reasonable compensation to the 
husband. 
102. Supra note 8. P. 242 
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Modern legislation and Khula: 
There has been neo-legislation in most of the Muslim countries 
regarding wife's right of obtaining Khula from her husband. 
EGYPT: 
Code of Personal status 1929 (Amended 1985)"'. 
There appears to be no status law on the subject of Khula in Egypt. 
However, it is dealt with in accordance with the general Hanafi law as laid 
down under section 280 of the Act No. 31 of 1910. The sections 273 to 278 
of the law deahng with Khula are given here under: 
Section 273: 
Accordance to section 273 of the said code, in case of disagreement 
between the married couple if they are apprehensive of not being able to 
perform the conjugal rights and fulfil the demands of marriage their 
effecting divorce or Khula shall be valid. 
Section 274: 
For the validity of Khula it is a condition that tiie husband who 
effects Khula must be capable of pronouncing divorce and the wife must be 
capable of being the subject of Khula. 
Section 275: 
According to the instant section, compensation in Khula is not 
condition. Hence, Khula effected with or without compensation shall take 
103 Tahir Mahmood; Personal LOM' in Islamic Countries; p. 39 1 st ed. (1987) 
New Delhi. 
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effect, whether sexual intercourse with the wife has taken place or not. 
Section 276: 
This section lays down clearly that it shall be judicially correct for 
the husband to effect Khula to his wife for a higher compensation than what 
he had given to her. 
Section 277: 
Section 277 provides that effecting of Khula takes effect as 
irrevocable divorce whether it is with or without compensation. The 
intention of effecting three divorces therein shall also be correct. The Khula 
is not dependent on court's decree. 
SYRIA: 
Code of Personal Status, 1953 (Amended) 1975"^ 
The Syrian law incorporates the Islamic doctrine of Khula under 
which a wife can persuade the husband to divorce her by accepting a 
consideration. As contained in the Qanun al-Ahwal al-Shakhsiyah, 1953, 
following are the relevant provisions of law relating to Khula that are in 
force in Syria. 
Section 94: 
This section contains that every divorce take effect as a revocable 
divorce except the one completed by three pronouncement or that 
pronounced prior to the consumption of marriage or effected for 
consideration i.e. Khula. It means that Khula effects an irrevocable divorce. 
104. Ibid. pp. 145-46. 
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Section 95: 
According to this section it is a condition for the validity of Khula 
that the husband who effects it must be capable of pronouncing divorce and 
the wife who is affected with Khula must be capable of being subjected to 
it. If the wife has not attained the age of discretion and she is the subject of 
Khula, the payment of compensation for Khula except in the case of an 
agreement with the guardian of her property is not incumbent upon her. 
Section 96: 
According to section 96, it shall be valid for each of the couple to 
revoke his or her proposal before its acceptance by the other. 
Section 97: 
This section provides that everything, which is legally acceptable, 
may be valid compensation for Khula. 
Section 99: 
Section 99 provides that if parties to Khula at the time of its being 
effected do not mention anything to the contrary they shall be absolved of 
the rights of dower and of maintenance against each other. 
Section 100: 
Section 100 lays down if parties to Khula specifically stipulated that 
there will be no compensation, in case of the wife obtaining such Khula 
shall come under the description of a simple revocable divorce. 
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Section 101: 
According to the rule contained under section 101 maintenance of 
iddat shall neither laps nor the husband shall be relieved of it, unless there 
is an agreement to the contrary in the contract of Khula. 
MORACCO: 
The Code of Personal status 1957 °^^  
The Maliki law of Khula is enforced by the Morocco code of 
personal status with emphasis on the free desire of wife in such a 
transaction. It is, however, only after the completion of twenty-one years of 
age that a wife can enter into an agreement of Khula. Further the 
consideration in a transaction of Khula should not prejudice the right of the 
children. It is however, lawful for the married couple to agree on divorce by 
means of Khula. The wife, who has attained the age of discretion, can 
obtain Khula. If she has not attained the age of discretion and she obtains 
Khula, it shall take effect as divorce and the payment of compensation shall 
not be due on her without the consent of guardian of her property. 
PAKISTAN: 
There is no specific statutory law regarding Khula in Pakistan. 
Hence, the court were in great difficulty before the decision by the supreme 
court of Pakistan in Khurshid Begum case (PLD 1967 SC 97) in applying 
105. Ibid P. 117. 
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correct law. However, the apex court of the Pakistan in the instant case 
finally laid down the law by holding that the wife is entitled to Khula as of 
right, if she satisfied the conscience of the court that it will otherwise mean 
forcing her into a hateful union. Where the husband disputes the rights of 
the wife to obtain separation by Khula, it is obvious that some third party 
has to decide the matter and consequently, the dispute will have to be 
adjudicated upon by the Qazi with or without tiie assistant of Hakams. The 
wife is entitled to the dissolution of marriage on restoration of what she 
received in consideration of marriage if the judge apprehends that parties 
will not observe the limits of God. 
Concluding Remarks: 
The discussion on Khula makes it clear that Islamic law maintains a 
balance between the rights of man and women. It is an error on the part of 
its follower that they have in actual practice deprived women of rights of 
Khula. Contrary to the principles of Shariah, we have left Khula to the will 
of the husband. This has led to and is even leading to the denial of justice to 
women for which law promulgated by Allah and his Messenger is not to be 
blamed. If this right of the women can be rehabilated even today many of 
difficult problems plaguing our marital affairs will be solved and most of 
them will not arise at all. 
The factors that have practically robbed woman of right of Khula is 
the mistaken belief that law-giver has left Khula entirely to the spouses and 
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court has nothing to do with it unless the matter is submitted to it. The 
resuh is that it is only upto the man to grant or deny woman a Khula. If the 
women wants Khula and husband out of selfishness or sheer mischief does 
not want this, the woman finds no remedy in sight. This situation is 
contrary to the intention of lawgiver. The lawgiver had no intention 
whatever to make one of the parties to marriage bond helpless and place all 
powers in the hand of other party. Had it been so the lofty moral and 
cultural objectives associated with the marriage would have been 
meaningless. 
It has already been explained that Islamic Shariah bases marital bond 
on the principle that so long as this bond can be maintained with moral 
purity, love and compassion, it is laudable and necessary to strengthen it 
and reprehensible to break it. WTien this bond became a source of moral 
transgression for both or one of the spouses or in place of love and 
compassion it gets permeated with hatred and disgust, its dissolution 
becomes necessary and its continuance runs counter to the objective of 
Shariah. To serve this basic principle, the Shariah has equipped both the 
parties to the marriage bond with a tool with which they can solve their 
problems. In case the marriage tie becomes unbearable the tool given to the 
husband is the divorce which he is free to use subject to the divine rules 
contained in the Holy Book. On the other hand, the woman is equipped 
with a legal tool of Khula. The procedure laid down for the use of this tool 
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is that in case she wants to do away with marriage bond, she must first put 
the demand before the husband. If he turns it down, she must have recourse 
to the court. 
From the above discussion it can be safely concluded that Khula is 
basically a right of v^fe and the permission of the husband or his consent to 
it is not necessary for dissolution of marriage under Khula because the 
court can give effect to an offer of Khula by v^e when it comes to the 
conclusion that parties would not be able to observe limits prescribed by 
God. However, the Qazi or court has power to redress a wrong and so if it 
fmds that a marriage has proved a failure on account of the husband's 
misconduct, he has to separate the spouse by effecting dissolution. As a 
general rule if Qazi or court fmds that husband is at fault, he shall order the 
husband to divorce his wife and husband shall become liable for the 
payment of her dower if not already paid. If it is wife who is found to be at 
fault, the Qazi shall dissolve the marriage under Khula and wife shall have 
to pay such compensation to the husband as may be fixed by the Qazi or 
court. A person is considered to be at fauh when he or she does not follow 
law laid down by Allah or when transgresses limits fixed by Allah. 
Part-B 
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(B) DIVORCE BY BIUBARA'AT: A RIGHT TO 
SEPARATION BY MUTUAL CONSENT 
Conceptual Analysis: 
It has been widely impressed upon from tiie ages that the greatest 
defect of Islamic matrimonial law is absolute and unilateral power of 
divorce given to the husband to dissolve the marriage bond by 
pronouncement of verbal formula of divorce with or without any cause. The 
allegation is rebuttable, for, among various religions, the Islam has been the 
first and foremost divine religion to provide for a divorce by mutual 
agreement of the spouses from where it was adopted by other legal systems. 
It is now recognised as one of the forms of judicial divorce under several 
other laws applicable in India and other countries. In Muslim law, the 
dissolution of Marriage by mutual consent of the parties to the marriage 
takes the form of either Mubara'at or Khula. Though the incidents of two 
look somewhat similar but they are indeed quite different from each other. 
The basic principles underlying Mubara'at are reciprocality and a bilateral 
desire to get rid of the marital bond V 
So, when the husband and wife with their mutual consent and desire 
obtain release and freedom from their marital tie, it is called Mubara'at 
1 Tahir Mahmood; The Muslim Law of India: p. 110 (1980), Law Book Co. 
Allahabad. 
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(Mutual freeing). It takes effect as one irrevocable divorce without the aid 
of court. 
The literal meaning of the word Mubara'at is obtaining release from 
each other. The proposal in Mubara'at, may be made either of the two, the 
husband or wife and with its acceptance by the other, marriage is 
completely dissolved. No Qazi (Judge) is required to pass any decree for 
the same. 
The term Mubara'at, in law, signifies mutual discharge from die 
marriage tie. As Fyzee puts it, while in Khula the requests proceeds from 
the wife to be released and the husband agrees for certain consideration, 
usually the Mahr, in Mubara'at apparently both are happy at the prospects of 
getting rid of each other. No formal form is insisted upon for Mubara'at by the 
Sunni Jurists. The offer may come from either side. When both the parties 
enter into Mubara'at all mutual rights and obligations come to an end .^ 
Sunni Law: 
According to Sunni law Mubara'at as a matter of fact is a mutual 
agreement of the husband and wife to dissolve the marriage which becomes 
effective by the pronouncement of divorce by the wife under the agreement. 
Hence, if the married couple for some reasons mutually agree to dissolve 
their marriage contract, they are without the intervention of the court 
2 Asaf A. A. F>-zee; Outlines ofMuhammadan Law; p. 164 4* ed. (1974), Oxford 
Press New Delhi. 
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entitled to do so. Mubara'at with respect to its effect like Khula is one 
irrevocable divorce ^. 
Shia Law: 
According to Shia law, it is necessary that both the parties should 
find the matrimonial relationship irksome inorder to justify the parties 
entering into a Mubara'at. According to them, Mubara'at is the mode of 
dissolving the marriage tie which has become irksome to the husband and 
wife by relinquishing any claim which one may have against the other. 
Viewed in this respect, there does not seem to be much difference between 
the doctrine of two sects *. 
According to Shia Law, in Mubara'at also, the divorce must be 
pronounced expressly. The expression of Mubara'at is, "I have discharged 
you from the obligations of marriage for such a sum, and you are separated 
from me. "If the husband were simply to say, without using the word, "1 
have discharged you", the entire proceeding would be invalid; whilst if he 
says Anta talikum, without using expression about the "discharge", it would 
take effect as a talaq and he would be hable for dower. The Shariah, 
however, adds that when there is inability to use the Arabic language or 
when the parties are not congnisant of the technicalities of the law. 
3 Ibid. 
4. Syed Ameer Ali; Muhammedan Law, Vol. 11, P. 476, (1986), Kitab Bhawan New 
Delhi.. 
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attention must be paid to their intention. If it be clearly evident from their 
conduct and their words that "a mutual release" is intended, it would take 
effect as such, tiiough the exact expression may not have been used . 
According to Shia Law Mubara'at, as a matter of fact, is a mutual 
agreement of the husband and wife and is similar to Khula. The only 
difference is that in Khula it is only wife who bears aversion for the 
husband but in Mubara'at the aversion is mutual. In Mubara'at it is not 
lawful for the husband to take from the wife consideration greater than the 
dower paid by him. It is necessary in case of Mubara'at to indicate a 
separation between the two by use of some word which indicate divorce '. 
In Khursheed Bibi v/s Mohd. Amin ' it was held that when both the 
husband and wife feel aversion for each other and they dissolve their 
marriage by agreement, it is called Mubara'at. It was further observed that 
Mubara'at like Khula is dissolution of marriage by agreement. The 
difference between them is that when aversion is on the side of the wife and 
she gives the husband consideration for separation, the transaction is called 
Khula. When the aversion is mutual and both the parties desire separation, 
the transaction is called Mubara'at. The offer of separation in Mubara'at 
may proceed either from the wife or from the husband and as soon as it is 
accepted by the other party, dissolution is complete. In such case no 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid. 
7. P.L.D. 1967, Supreme Court, 97. 
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reference to court is necessary and the matter is settled by agreement 
between the parties. 
Therefore, where a suit filed by the husband for restitution of 
conjugal right has been decreed but as against that wife's suit claming 
dissolution of marriage had been dismissed by the trial court, it was held 
that it was wife who sought severance of the marital tie and not the husband 
and, therefore, in the circumstances divorce ultimately agreed upon by 
Q 
parties was not Mubara'at but a Khula . 
Effect of Mubara*at: 
The effect of Khula and Mubara'at are that whatever rights are 
created between husband and wife on account of marriage contract lapse 
and couple are exonerated fi^om obligations owing to each other. It is said in 
Khulasatul Fatwa that they are not liable to be exonerated if divorce is 
effected for consideration. Al-Kasani is of the opinion that Khula or 
Mubara'at effected for compensation resembles divorce effected for 
consideration and it is an established rule that rights of person do not lapse 
unless they are made to lapse by him. Hence only those rights shall lapse in 
Khula that are mentioned in agreement of Khula or Mubara'at but all those 
debts which are not due on account of marriage contract shall not lapse'. 
8 P.L.D. 1964, Supreme Court, 456. 
9 Tanzil-ur-Rahman; A code of Muslim Personal Law; Vol. 1" P. 554, (1978), 
Karachi-Pakistan 
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Therefore, the wife's dower, if not paid, and the maintenance 
allowance for the period of her probation on account of Khula being 
effected shall not be annulled except when there is some agreement to the 
contrary between the husband and the wife but not with standing any 
agreement to the contrary, the house in which wife resides at the time of 
Mubara'at her right of residence therein shall continue during the term of 
probation at the cost of husband '". 
Hanafi View: 
It is written in "Al-Mukhtasar" of Al-Quduri that according to Imam 
Abu Hanifa, the husband and wife, in case of Khula or Mubara'at is 
effected, become exonerated from all the obligations created under the 
marriage contract. Indeed, the obligations due to reasons other than the 
marriage shall not lapse ". 
Imam Al-Shaybani's View: 
Mohammed Al-Shayabani does not agree with Abu Hanifa on this 
point. According to him the rights without being mentioned cannot lapse. 
According to him, therefore, in Mubara'at or Khula in either case, all 
the rights under marriage contract unless expressly mentioned by 
both shall not lapse *^ . 
10. Ibid. 
11. Ibid. p. 555. 
12. Ibid. 
171 
Imam Abu Yusuf s View: 
Imam Abu Yusuf agrees with Imam Mohammed in case of 
Khula, that is to say, according to him as well, in case of Khula the rights 
without being specifically mentioned cannot lapse. But he agrees with Abu 
Hanifa in the case of Mubara'at. The rights, in the case of divorce by 
mubarat, that are created between the couple under the marriage contract do 
lapse". 
Thus, on examining various authorities it can be safely concluded 
that opinions of Imam Abu Yusuf and Muhammad in the matter of Khula 
are more sound and acceptable and the opinion of Imam Abu Hanifa and 
Abu Yusuf on the question of Mubara'at appear to be more correct. In other 
words, only the non-financial commitments that are established on account 
of marriage contract shall automatically lapse on Khula or Mubara'at but 
husband shall not be exonerated of the liability of the fmancial rights, such 
as, dower and maintenance except when the wife agrees to it at the time of 
Khula being effected. Then, in the case of Mubara'at the husband and wife 
shall be deemed to be exonerated of the entire fmancial or non-fmancial 
commitments that existed during the subsistence of marriage between them, 
except when there is an agreement to the contrary*"*. 
As regards the wife's right of maintenance during the period of 
probation (Iddat) is concerned, it does not lapse in Khula or Mubara'at 
unless agreed upon between the husband and wife. Indeed so far as the right 
13. ftid. 
14 Ibid. p. 556. 
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of residence of the wife during Iddat is concerned, it cannot be given up 
even by mutual agreement. This is a religious obligation ordained by God 
by who commands: 
"O, Prophet (PBUH) when ye Divorce women, 
Divorce them at their prescribed periods; And fear 
Allah your Lord. And turn them not out of their house; 
Nor shall they (themselves) leave Except in case they 
are Guilty of some open Lewdness"^^. 
Thus, Allah in the instant verse has clearly decreed not to tum tfie 
divorced wife out of the house so that she, in pursuance of religious 
directives may, as of right, pass her period of probation there. This rule on 
social grounds too is highly commendable. 
However, it is lawful for the spouses to agree to Khula or Mubara'at 
on the condition that the wife shall be responsible to maintain a child or 
children as the case may be, bom of the marriage during the period \^en 
the child is a minor. But it is a necessary condition of such agreement that 
the period during which the wife is made responsible for their maintenance 
should be specified. If the period has not been specified, the condition shall 
not be valid and the wife shall not be responsible for maintenance of tiie 
minors. There is, however, an exception to this rule. In case of an infant if 
no period is specified the condition shall not be valid because it is 
presumed that she has to suckle the child for the usual period of two 
years* .^ 
15 HolyQur'an;LXV:l. 
16 Supra note 2 p. 166. 
CHAPTER - V 
173 
DELEGATION OF DIVORCE : WOMAN'S RIGHT TO 
DECLARE DIVORCE 
Conceptual Analysis: 
Under Islamic Matrimonial law, a husband can divorce his 
wife without the intervention of the Court or Qazi. However, he can 
either exercise the right of dissolving the marriage himself or appoint 
an agent to exercise this power on his behalf or delegate to his wife. 
Such a delegation of power of divorce to the wife is called Tafwid 
and is well recognized in Muslim LawV 
The meaning of expression "Delegation of the right of 
Divorce" is the entrustment with the wife by the husband of the right 
to act as her husband's delegate in effecting divorce to herself. 
Hence, wife's making it a condition with the husband, at the time of 
her being contracted into marriage, that she shall have authority of 
effecting divorce to herself is legally valid. Likewise, delegation of 
authority by husband to the wife at any time during married life; 
effecting divorce to herself is also valid if the wife at the time of 
marriage contract acquires the right from her husband of effecting 
divorce or she becomes entitled to this right after the marriage contract, 
she may, by exercise of this right and effecting divorce upon herself. 
1- K.N. Ahmad; The Muslim Uw of Divorce, p. 183; (1984), l" ed. Kitab Bhawan, 
New Delhi. 
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break of marital relationship and this divorce shall be as effective as 
that pronounced by the husband . 
According to the Hedaya, Tafwid al-Talaq or delegation of 
divorce, is where the husband delegates or commits the pronouncing 
of divorce to his wife, desiring her to give the effective sentence, and 
it is comprehended under the three different heads, option, liberty 
and wilP. 
Although the power to give divorce belongs primarily to the 
husband and he may either in person repudiate his wife or he may 
delegate the power of repudiating her to a third party or even to the 
wife herself, such a delegation of power of the divorce is technically 
called Tafwid or delegation of divorce. If the man says to his wife 
"choose", (thereby meaning divorce) or "divorce yourself, the 
woman has power to divorce herself so long as she remains in the 
specific situation in which she received it; but if she moves or turn 
her attention to anything else, the power thus vested in her is done 
away, and her option no longer remains, because the exercise of the 
optional power thus committed to the woman is held, by all the 
2- The Durr-Ul-Mukhtar: English Translation by B.M. Dayal; p. 172, (1992), Kitab 
Bhawan, New Delhi. 
3- The Hedaya. Translated by Charles Hamilton; Vol. 1, p.224, (1985), Kitab 
Bhawan, New Delhi. 
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companions of Holy Prophet (PBUH), to be restricted to the specific 
situation in which it is received'*. 
Thus the husband under Muslim law has the power to delegate 
his own right of pronouncing divorce to some third person or to the 
wife herself. A stipulation that under certain specified conditions, the 
wife can pronounce the divorce upon herself has been held to be 
valid, provided first, that option is not absolute and unconditional 
and secondly that conditions are reasonable and not opposed to the 
public policy of Muslim law. Therefore, an antenuptial agreement by 
a Muslim husband in a Kabinama that he would pay separate 
maintenance to his wife in case of disagreement and the wife would 
have the power to divorce herself in case of the failure to pay 
maintenance for certain period is not opposed to the public policy 
and is enforceable under Muslim law. The wife exercising her power 
under agreement must establish that conditions entitling her to 
exercise the power have been fulfilled. However, the delegation of 
the power of divorce or Talaq-e-Tafwid is perhaps most potent 
weapon in the hand of a wife to obtain her freedom without 
intervention of any court and is now beginning to be fairly common 
in India. An agreement by which the husband authorises to his wife 
to divorce herself from him in the event of his marrying a second 
4. Ibid 
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wife without her consent has been repeatedly held to be both valid 
and irrevocable*. 
Classification of Delegation of Power: 
The Muslim Jurists have classified the delegation of the 
power of divorce by husband into three classes, namely, 
> Tafwid, i.e. delegating to the wife power of divorcing herself; 
> Tawkil or agency i.e. appointing an agent to pronounce divorce; 
and 
> Risalah or messengership i.e. commissioning a person to divorce 
the wife. 
Tafwid: 
The wife to whom the power is delegated exercises it in 
respect of her own person and has absolute right to exercise the 
power or not, as she may choose^. 
Tawkil: 
In Tawkil the husband appoints an agent to divorce his wife on 
his (the husband's) behalf. The agent exercises the power delegated 
to him in respect of another, that is, the wife. He has no authority to 
5. Asaf A. A. Fyzee: Outlines of Muhammad Law; p. 159, 4* ed. (1976), Oxford 
University Press, Delhi. 
6. Dr. Taiual-Ur-Rahman: A code of Muslim Personal Law; Vol. I; p. 339 (1978); 
Karachi - Pakistan. 
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continue the marriage, as such power has not been given to him but 
can only divorce the wife . 
Risalah: 
In Risalah the husband appoints a person, his messenger, to 
convey his message to wife that he has delegated his power of 
divorce to her (wife). The power given by Tafwid cannot be revoked 
but other two i.e. Tawkil (agency) and Risalah (Message) can be 
8 
revoked by the husband so long as it has not been exercised . 
Religious sanction to Doctrine of Tafwid: 
Holy Qur'an: 
All the Sunni schools of law recognise the doctrine of Tafwid 
al-Talaq. According to them the doctrine of delegation of power of 
divorce is based on an incident mentioned in Holy Quran wherein the 
Prophet (PBUH) told his wives that they were at liberty to live with 
him or to get separated from him as they choose. Thus it is stated in 
Surah Al-Ahzab of the Holy Qur'an. 
"O' Prophet say to thy consorts: 
If it be that ye desired the life of this world, And 
its glitter, then come I will provide for you 
Enjoyment and set you free in a handsome 
manner^. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid. p. 340. 
9. Holy Qur'an; XXXIII: 28. 
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The Holy Qur'an further says in this regard: 
"But if ye seek God And His Apostle, 
And the home of Hereafter, 
Verily God has prepared for the well-doers 
amongst you a great reward^^. 
Explaining the instant verses, noted Islamic Jurists Maulana 
Syed Abul A'Ala Maududi writes that it means O' Prophet (PBUH), 
say to your wives "If you seek the world and its adornment, come I 
shall give you of these and send you offing good away. But if you 
seek Allah and his messenger and abode of the hereafter, you should 
rest at assured that Allah has prepared a great reward, for those of 
who you do good". 
It is explained by Muslim jurists that Prophet (PBUH) had, in 
the obedience to the above injunctions of the Quran, empowered his 
wives to choose between living with him or a separation: that they 
might either get their marriages dissolved or choose their 
continuation. Hazrat Ayesha has explained that we, the wives, chose 
the Prophet (PBUH) that is we preferred the continuation of marriage, 
and so the marriages were not dissolved. It is inferred from this 
tradition that a husband can lawfully delegate to his wife the power 
to dissolve the marriage, if she so chooses*^. 
10. Holy Qur'an; XXXIII: 29. 
11 Syed Abul A'Ala Maududi. The Holy Qur'an; Translation and brief notes with 
Text, P. 71, 2"", ed. (1987), Islamic Publication Delhi. 
12. Supra notes 6 p. 340. 
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Ahadith: 
It is narrated by Hazrat Ayesha that Allah's messenger gave us 
the option to remain with him or to be divorced and we selected 
Allah, the Almighty and his messenger. So giving us that option was 
not regarded as divorce'^. 
Narrated Musruq: I asked Hazrat Ayesha about option. She 
said, "the Prophet gave us the option. Do you think the option was 
considered as a divorce. I said, " it matters little to me if I give my 
wife the option once or a hundred times after she has chooses me*"*. 
Imam Muslim narrates that Hazrat Ayesha reported; when the 
Messenger of Allah (PBUH) was commanded to give option to his 
wives, he started it from me saying; I am going to mention to you a 
matter which you should not decide in haste until you have consulted 
parents. She said that he already knew that my parents would never 
allow me to seek separation from him she said: Then he said. Allah, 
the exalted and glorious, said; Prophet say thy wives; If ye desired 
this word's life and adornment then come, I will give you a provision 
and allow you to depart a goodly departing; And if he desire Allah 
and His Messenger and the abode Hereafter, then Allah has prepared 
13. Sahih-Al-Bukhari; Translated by Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan, Vol. VII, p. 137 
(1984), Kitab Bhawan New Delhi. 
14. Ibid. 
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for the doers of good among you a great reward she is reported to 
have said; About what should 1 consult my parents, for I desire Allah 
and His Messenger and the Abode Hereafter. She (Ayesha) said; then 
all the wives if Allah Messenger did as I had done*'. 
This shows on the one hand the Holy Prophet's (PBUH) keen 
sense of justice and, on the other hand, intense love of his wives for 
him. All the wives of Holy Prophet (PBUH) have strongest desire to 
keep him in their respective apartments for maximum time in order 
to receive the greatest blessing from his blessed company. The 
instant tradition also set a precedent that even if the power of divorce 
has been delegated to the wife, she should not exercise it in haste 
without consulting the senior male members of the family. 
Thus, in Talaq-e-Tafwid, though it is the wife to whom the 
power is delegated who exercises the power of divorcing and the 
divorce in the eye of the law is made by the husband. Thus, when a 
wife is delegated the power of divorce and in the exercise of that 
power she pronounces the divorce, the power is exercised on behalf 
of the husband who had delegated it to her and, therefore, in law it is 
a Talaq of the wife by the husband. 
15. Sahih Muslim, Translated by Abdul Hamid Siddiqi, Vol. 2°" P. 761 (1978) Kitab 
Bhawan New Delhi. 
Classification of Tafwid: 
The Muslim Jurists have divided the expression Tafwid by 
which the power is delegated to the wife into three classes, namely -
1 Ikhtiyar or Option i.e. giving the choice. 
2 Amr-Ba-yed or Liberty i.e. putting her business in her hand 
3 Mashiat, or Will i.e. giving her power to do as she pleases 
1. Ikhtiyar or Option: 
The delegation of power of divorce by the husband to his wife 
by means of Ikhtiyar confers on the wife the option of divorcing 
herself but it restricts the exercise of the power to the precise place 
or situation in which she was the recipient of the option. When a man 
says to his wife "choose thyself thereby meaning divorce or divorce 
yourself The woman shall have power to divorce herself so long as 
she remains in the specific situation in which she received it, but if 
she moves or turn her attention to anything else, the power thus 
vested in her is done away, and her option no longer remains because 
the exercise of the optional power thus committed to the women is 
held, by all the companions, to be restricted to the specific situation 
in which it is received and also because this species of delegation is 
transfer of power, not commission of agency and to give effect to the 
former, the reply is required on the spot declaration. The right of the 
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option of the women is annulled upon the instance of her rising from 
her feet, as that circumstances proves her rejection of it. And where a 
husband thus addresses his wife, an intention of divorce is a 
condition requisite to the effect, because the word "choose" is one of 
the implication of divorce, as it is capable of two constructions, by 
one it desires the woman to choose house-herself and by another 
choose her clothes and so forth: and if she chooses herself, a divorce 
irreversible takes place'^. 
Analogy would suggest, in this case that from choosing herself 
nothing whatever should ensue, although divorce would be the 
intention of the husband, because he cannot himself effect divorce by 
use of such words; that is to say, if he were to say to his wife "I have 
chosen myself from you" nothing whatever would follow, and 
consequently how can be give a delegation of this natures. But here 
divorce takes place upon a more favorable construction, for two 
reasons; Firstly, all the companions agree that divorce takes place 
from the use of this expression. Secondly, the husband has it at his 
option either to continue the marriage with his wife, or to put her 
away, and hence it follows that he may constitutes her his substitute 
with respect to that rule; and where the woman is left to her option 
16- Supra note 3, p. 244. 
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and says "I choose myself, a divorce irreversible takes place, 
because the woman's choosing of herself cannot be established but 
by her becoming sole and independent, which can only be the case in 
irreversible divorce, as where it is reversible the husband is at liberty 
to take her back without her consent and at any time during the 
continuance of her iddat and thus she would not become sole and 
independent on the instant, which the nature of the case required . 
Thus, in case of Ikhtiyar or option one divorce only takes 
place, and not three, although the husband should actually have 
intended the latter option not being of different descriptions. If a 
man says to the wife 'choose', 'choose', 'choose' and she reply I have 
chosen the first or the second or the third, three divorces take place, 
under Hanafi law. According to Imam Abu Hanifa the intention of 
the husband is not requisite although the word here used be an 
implied expression, because his repetition of the word 'choose' 
proves his intention to divorce, as the option given to the woman is 
repeated only with that view. The two disciples of Imam Abu Hanifa, 
namely. Imam Muhammad and Imam Yusuf say that only one 
divorce takes place in either case; but they agree with Imam Abu 
Hanifa that intention is not essential for the reason above assigned 
and in the same manner if woman were only to reply I have chosen. 
17. Al-Haj Muhammad-Ullah: The Muslim Law of Marriage, p. 68; (1986) New Delhi. 
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it is effective of three divorce. And so also if she were to say I have 
chosen a choice. This is admitted by all the Jurists; because where 
she only says, I have chosen a choice. This is admitted by all the 
doctors; because where she only says, I have chosen, it is productive 
of three divorces and consequently, when she speaks in a way to give 
this additional force, it produces the same a fortiori and if she were 
to reply, I have divorced my self or I have chosen myself with 
respect to one divorce, one divorce reversible take place. However, 
when a man addressing to his wife says, "one divorce is at your 
option", or choose to single divorce and she replies I have chosen 
myself, one divorce of reversible nature takes place, because the man 
has given the woman an option so far as one divorce is concerned 
and expressing it in direct terms, the divorce proceeding from it is 
reversible**. 
The delegation must refer distinctly to the person to whom the 
power is entrusted and therefore it is stated to be necessary that 
where the husband uses the expression "choose" it is requisite that 
personal pronoun self be mentioned either by the husband or the 
wife. For example, if a man said, choose yourself or choose a 
repudiation and women answer, 1 choose, it would amount Talaq or, 
if he said, choose, and she answered, I have chosen myself it would 
18. Supra note 3 P. 48. 
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be sufficient. But if husband were merle to say, choose, and she 
replied 1 have chosen, divorce does not takes place because the effect 
of divorce is established by all the doctors on the condition of 
mentioning of personal pronoun by one of the parties*'. 
2. Amr-ba-yed or Liberty: 
In a delegation of liberty, divorce takes place according to the 
number mentioned by the wife independent of the husband's 
intention and the divorce which follows is irreversible. If, for 
example, a man says to his wife "your business is in your own hands, 
intending three divorces, and the woman answers. "I have myself 
with one choice, three divorces take place. The proof of this is drawn 
from the nature of these expressions in their original idiom. But if 
the woman were to reply I have divorced myself with one divorce or 
I have chosen myself by one divorce, one divorce takes place and 
this divorce is irreversible, although the reply be delivered in express 
and not in ambiguous terms, because it bears relation to the words of 
the husband, which being an implication, amounts to a delegation of 
irreversible divorce and not of reversible divorce. The reason why an 
intention of three divorce is admitted in the present instance is that 
the word "your business is in your own hands" are capable of both a 
restrictive and an extensive construction, and hence may imply three 
19. Ibid, p. 249. 
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divorces, as well as one, an intention to that effect, therefore holds 
good since that is one of the senses in which the word may be taken 
contrary to the expression considered in preceding section 'chosen' 
that being incapable of bearing an extensive construction^". 
The delegation of liberty may be restricted to a particular time 
or to several different specified periods of time, if a man says to his 
wife, your" business in your own hands this day and after tomorrow", 
the night is not included and if the woman rejects the liberty thus 
given to her for this day, it is with respect to this day annulled but it 
still remains to her for the day after tomorrow, because the husband 
has expressly specified two particular periods with intervention of a 
similar period to which the liberty does not extend and hence it 
appears that these are two distinct liberties and the rejection of one 
does not amount to a rejection of other and both amount only a single 
liberty. This being analogous to a case where a man says to his wife 
"you are divorced this day and the day after tomorrow which implies 
one divorce only and not two and hence, in like manner, one liberty 
only is implied. But to this it may be replied that divorce is not of a 
nature to admit restriction to any particular time where as liberty is 
capable of such restriction and hence that which regards first period 
mentioned is restricted to that period and that which regards the 
20. Supra note 17, p. 70. 
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second period commences denovo*^ 
Thus, in Amr-ba-yed also it is necessary to use the word self 
or some analogous expression. As in case of express delegation 
(Ikhtiyar) the husband has no power to recall the authority once 
entrusted. The only difference between the two is that in Ikhtiyar, the 
intention to give an irrevocable divorce at once is not valid. Where 
as in Amr-ba-yed it is when a man tells to his wife " thy business is 
in thy hands", his intention being to give her the power of divorcing 
herself, and she is present and has heard what he said, the power is in 
her hands whilst she continues at the place. If she was absent, and 
the option were given in general terms, she may exercise it at any 
time whilst at the place where the intelligence reached her. But if it 
were restricted to the particular time, and intelligence reached her 
before the expiration of period, she has only the remainder of time 
for the exercise of power, whilst if the time has expired, there is no 
option. When a husband does not intend to divorce by these words, 
"Thy business is in thy hands", they are of no avail except when 
uttered in anger or in conversation regarding Talaq^^. 
3. Mashiat or Will: 
The expression Mashiat or pleasure or option means that it 
21. Ibit. p. 71. 
22. Syed Ameer Ali; Muhammadan Law, Vol 11, P 457. (1986) Kitab Bhawan New 
Delhi. 
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depends on the pleasure of wife whether to divorce herself or not to 
do so. Thus, the husband may say to his wife "meaning that he has 
given the power to her to divorce herself or not to do so as she may 
please. Mashiat is similar to the "Amr-ba-yed" or liberty form of 
delegation with the difference that in case of Mashiat, the exercise of 
the power is absolutely at the pleasure or the will of the party to 
whom power is delegated . 
Therefore, where a man empowers his wife to divorce herself 
in express terms, the divorce, which follows, is reversible. Therefore, 
if a man says to his wife " divorce yourself intending one divorce 
and the woman replies I have divorced myself then a single 
reversible divorce takes place. And if she were to say " I have given 
three divorces, then three accordingly take place where such is the 
intention of the husband. The reason of is this that divorce being a 
general expression takes place in the lowest species, but like other 
generic nouns, it also applies to the whole. An intention of three 
divorce is admitted and, where there is no particular intention, a 
single reversible divorce takes place because the power of divorce is 
delegated to the wife in express terms and express divorce occasions 
a divorce reversible. If the husband should in this case intend two 
divorces, it is not admitted because a generic noun does not bear that 
23. Supra note 1, P. 191. 
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construction were the woman is free but if she be a slave an intention 
of two divorce is admitted being considered as the whole with 
respect to her^ "*. 
It is also wroth to mention here that power of divorce thus 
delegated to the wife by the husband under the doctrine of Mashiat 
or will cannot be retracted. Therefore, where a husband says to his 
wife, "divorce yourself, he is not at liberty to retract, as his 
expression involves a vow because he has, in this instance suspended 
upon the execution of it by his wife, and a now is an obligatory act, 
for which reason a man is not allowed to recede from it. The power 
may be granted generally. As, where a man says to his wife divorce 
yourself when you please. She is at liberty to divorce herself either 
upon the spot or at any time in future, because the expression used 
by the husband seems to be of general nature and extends to all the 
time and hence it is the same as if he were to say, " divorce yourself 
at whatever time you like. Where a man says to the another person, 
divorce my wife", the person so addressed may divorce her either 
upon spot or at anytime and the husband may also retract, because 
this is a commission of agency and, therefore is neither absolute nor 
restricted in point of place. Contrary to it where the husband says to 
his wife "divorce yourself, this being a transfer of power not 
24. Ibid. p. 192. 
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commission of agency as the woman thus addressed acts from herself 
and not from another. But if a man says to another "divorce my wife 
adding, if you please", the man so empowered may divorce the wife 
upon spot only and here the husband may not retract. The argument 
of Islamic doctors is that the words of the husband are a transfer of 
power as he suspends the divorce upon the will of the person whom 
he addresses and he is the principle who act from his own will . 
However, a wife who is empowered by the husband under the 
doctrine of Mashiat or will to give herself three divorces may give 
herself only one divorce but when she is empowered to give herself 
only one divorce, she can not give herself three divorces. For 
example, if a man says to his wife " give yourself three divorces but 
she pronounce upon herself one divorce only, one divorce takes 
place accordingly because having been empowered so far as three 
divorces it necessarily follows that she is enabled to give a single 
one. But where a man says to his wife " divorce yourself once" and 
she gives herself three divorces, nothing would take place, according 
to Imam Abu Hanifa. However, according to Imam Muhammad and 
Imam Yusuf, a single divorce takes place^*. 
When the power of divorce under the doctrine of Mashiat is 
25. SupranoteS, p. 258. 
26. Ibid. p. 259. 
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expressed with an unrestricted practice in respect to the time of 
effecting divorce, it is perpetual, extending to all the time and 
palaces. If a man says to his wife, " you are divorced when you 
please" or "when ever you please" and she rejects his offer saying I 
am not desirous of it, her rejection is not final. Because, the power 
thus vested in her is not confined to the place or situation where it is 
delegated, on which account she is at liberty to use it either there or 
elsewhere. Because the terms when and whenever, are used with 
reference to all time and extends to every time indiscriminately and 
hence, the sense of expressions, "when you please" and whenever 
you please is at whatever time you please and they are therefore not 
confined to place. And if the woman rejects at present, still it is not a 
final rejection. Because her husband has empowered her to divorce 
herself at whatever time she pleases . 
This rule is technical and what is necessary is that the wife 
should make it quite clear that she is divorcing herself under the 
power delegated to her. But of course there should be no ambiguity 
in the expression used by her. She must make it fully clear that she 
was dissolving the marriage and completely severing the relationship 
of the husband and wife. The wife has to address the husband if he is 
present. If he is absent then she has to inform him that she has 
27. Ibid. p. 261. 
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divorced herself. When the husband vests this power in his wife, she 
does not become entitled to act on her own behalf but acts only as a 
representative or agent of the husband. Hence if she says to her 
husband, "I have divorced thee", then this statement will be 
ineffective because actually she represents the husband. Moreover, 
divorce is attributed to a woman and not to a man. She has, 
therefore, to use an expression like the following, "I am unlawful on 
thee", "1 am absolutely separated from thee." "I divorce myself on 
thy behalf or "I divorce myself under the power delegated to me be 
thee"". 
Conditional Delegation: 
The delegation of the power of divorce by the husband to his 
wife may either be conditional or without any condition. Just as the 
husband is entitled to pronounce the Talaq conditionally or 
contingently, so also delegation of power may be made subject to the 
fulfillment of any condition or happening of any contingency. There 
is nothing, whatever, unreasonable in the husband's delegation to his 
wife the power to divorce on the happening of the certain events. 
This is clear from the illustration given by the Muslim Jurists in 
connection with the delegation of the power of the divorce. Thus, for 
28. Al-Fatawa al-Hindyah. Vol. II p. 72, quoted by K.N. Ahmad; The Mushm law of 
Divorce P. 185 (1984), Kitab Bhawan, New Delhi. 
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example, the husband may authorise the wife to divorce herself if he 
marries another woman. In such a case the wife shall be entitled to 
exercise the power only when he marries another woman . 
Similarly, where a husband authorize his wife to divorce 
herself on his failure to maintain her for a period of two years. He 
fails to maintain her for a period of two years. In such a case the 
wife shall become entitled to divorce herself on the fulfillment of the 
condition i.e. failure of the husband to give maintenance for 
stipulated period. It is however, necessary that in the instant case the 
wife should not have contributed to the breach of condition by the 
husband^". 
Judicial Trend: 
In Hamidullah V/S Faizunnisa^^ an instrument was executed 
by the plaintiff upon his marriage with the defendant. Under the deed 
plaintiff agreed to allow the defendant to be taken to her father's 
house four time a year, and to erect a house for the defendant and to 
live with her there. He also agreed not to beat or ill-treat the 
defendant and to pay Rs. four hundred as dower money on demand. 
The agreement further stipulated that if plaintiff violated any of 
29. Supra Note 17, p. 70. 
30. Ibid. 
31. I.L.R. 8, Cal. 327(1882) 
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conditions contained in it, the defendant would have the power of 
divorcing herself from him. Sometime after the marriage, the 
defendant divorced herself alleging ill-treatment and refusal to pay 
dower money. The plaintiff thereupon sued the defendant for the 
restitution of conjugal right. The lower court gave the decree 
considering that Muhammdan law did not give the wife the power of 
divorce. In appeal against the order of lower court, the high court 
agreeing with the decision of lower court observed: 
"The Muhammdan law on the subject which has 
been laid before us provides for the delegation of 
power of divorce by the husband to the wife on 
certain occasions by words of mouth, but it in no 
way, so far as it has been laid before us, limits the 
exercise of that power to those occasions. It 
would seem rather that, by providing how the wife 
should act, it recognises her power to divorce her 
husband, if he gives power to do so. We are aware 
of no reason why an agreement entered into 
before marriage between persons able to contract, 
under which wife consented to marry on condition 
that under certain specified conditions, all of a 
reasonable nature, her future husband should 
permit her to divorce herself under the form 
prescribed by Muhammdan law. The court also 
observed that the condition under which it is 
stipulated that this power should be exercised by 
wife are certainly not opposed to the policy of 
Muhammdan law on the subject." 
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In Ahmad Ali v/s Saleh Khatun Bibi"*^  it was held that where 
the husband did not pay maintenance to the wife as stipulated in 
Kabinnama, the wife could exercise the right to divorce herself. But 
where the Kabinnama gave power to wife to divorce herself if 
husband did not give the wife maintenance for two year and the 
circumstances of the case showed that it was the wife who was to be 
blame for the husband's failure to provide maintenance, the wife had 
no right to effect a divorce in exercise of such power. 
In Ghul Nawaz Khan v's Mst. Mahrunnissa^^ it was held that 
under the dissolution of marriage act, non-payment of maintenance 
gives a wife right to seek dissolution of marriage and there is no 
reason why marriage cannot dissolved by exercise of delegated 
powers on failures to pay maintenance and dower. The court further 
observed that an agreement made, whether before or after of 
marriage, by which it is provided the should be at liberty to divorce 
herself in certain specified contingencies is valid if conditions are of 
reasonable nature and or not opposed to the public policy of 
Mohammedan law. When such an agreement is made the wife may, 
at any time of the happening of any of contingency, repudiate the 
32- P.L.D. 1952, Dacca 285. 
33- P.L.D. 1965, Dacca 274. 
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marriage in the exercise of power and a divorce will then take effect 
to the same extent as if a talaq has been pronounced by the husband 
the power so delegated to the wife is not revocable and she may 
exercise it even after the institution of a suit against her for the 
restitution of conjugal rights. 
In Shrimati Ayatun Nissa Bibi v/s Karam Ali the question 
was raised whether a wife who has been given power under the 
marriage contract to divorce herself in the event her husband's taking 
second wife, losses her option by failing to exercise the power at the 
very moment she learns the news that he has done so. It has been 
held by the court that when the power is given to the wife by the 
marriage contract to divorce herself on her husband's marrying again, 
she is not bound to exercise her option at the very first moment she 
learns the news of her husband's taking second wife. The injury 
done to her is a continuing wrong and it is reasonable that she would 
have a continuing right to exercise the power. Thus, delay in 
exercising the right of divorce on the happening of the stipulated 
contingency does not imply a waiver on her part. 
In Mirzan Ali v/s Maimuna Bibi^^ it was observed that when a 
wife seeks to exercise the power delegated to her to divorce herself, 
34. I.L.R. 36 Calcutta 23. 
35. AIR. 1949, Assam, 14. 
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she must establish clearly that the condition under which she was 
authorised the exercise the power have been fulfilled. 
From the above discussion it is clear that under Muslim law 
the delegation of the power to divorce by the husband to the wife 
may be absolute or its exercise may be subject to certain conditions. 
It is contended sometime in legal proceedings that absolute or 
unconditional delegation is not valid and the delegation of power of 
divorce by the husband to the wife must be subject to certain 
conditions. The difference in views lies in the fact that the Muslim 
Jurists consider that a husband is an absolute owner of the marriage 
and has unrestricted power to dissolve it and it is immaterial whether 
he exercise that power by himself or through an agent who may be 
the wife herself. The wife according to them, is a representative of 
the husband and so she can wield same power as can be exercised by 
the husband. The courts do not agree with the view and consider that 
wife cannot exercise an absolute and unrestricted power to dissolve 
the marriage, in This way they have been influenced by the 
conception of a Christian marriage as well as by law of contract 
relating to the agreements. Notice has not been taken in these cases 
of the fact that there is a great difference in the conception of the 
nature of a Christian marriage and that of "Muslim" marriage. A 
Christian marriage is indissoluble at the will of the parties to it. The 
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principle governing to it is that marriage is a voluntary union for life 
of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others. A Muslim 
marriage, on the other hand, is dissoluble by a husband and under 
certain conditions by or at the instance of a wife or by mutual 
agreement of a husband and his wife. The Muslim law, therefore 
allows a provision in an agreement for a future separation and does 
not look as such an agreement. The fact that a provision of Muslim 
law is opposed to a provision in contract Act or of the English law or 
the English conception of marriage is certainly not a sufficient 
ground to nullify it, particularly as the Muslim are to be governed by 
their own personal laws in the matters of marriage and divorce. It 
may also be noted here that clause IX of the Dissolution of Muslim 
Marriage Act, 1939 provides that a marriage can be dissolved on any 
other ground which is recognise as valid for the dissolution of 
marriage under Muslim Law. It is quite clear from the Muslim 
authorities that a wife can dissolve her marriage regardless of the 
fact whether a condition is in restraint of marriage or is now 
considered unreasonable or opposed to the present public policy. 
Hence, no objection should be raised to the delegation to and 
exercise of such power by the wife^ *^ . The Dacca High court in 
36. SupraNotel,p. 1%. 
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Aklima Khatoon v/s Mohih-Vr-Rehman^'' has also held that an 
unconditional delegation of the power of divorce is valid. 
Capacity for delegation of divorce: 
Husband's capacity: 
A delegation to be valid must fulfil certain requirements. The 
husband must possess the same qualifications when delegating the 
power of divorce himself. He should be major and sane in order to be 
competent to lawfully delegate his power of divorce to his wife or to 
any other person. The majority will be determined by the provisions 
of Muslim law and not by the Indian Majority Act. Hence a person 
who is major under the provisions of Muslim law but a minor under 
the "Majority Acf'can lawfully delegate to his wife or to another 
person the power to divorce. In Marfat Ali Mirza v/s Zabeedunnissa^^ 
it has been held by the court that even if parties are minors, consent 
on his or her behalf can be expressed by guardian for marriage who 
is legally authorised to make a valid contract of marriage. 
In case of Tafwid the condition of sanity must exist at the time 
of delegation of power and any subsequent change in the mental 
condition of the husband who delegated the power of divorce to the 
37. P.L.D. 1963, Dacca 602. 
38. A.I.R. 1941, Cal. 657. 
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wife does not affect the validity of delegation. Thus, if a person 
delegates the power of divorce to his wife while in a sane condition 
but afterwards becomes insane, his subsequent insanity shall not 
invalidate the authority. However a minor cannot appoint an agent 
for delegating his power to divorce his wife^'. 
Wife's capacity: 
Under the Hanafi law the wife to whom the power of divorce 
is delegated need not be major or sane and the Muslim Jurists Justify 
this rule on the ground that a divorce given by a wife under the 
doctrine of Tafwid is some what akin to the conditional divorce 
which takes place on the fulfillment of the agreed condition, here 
condition being the exercise of power by the wife. It may also be 
said that when the wife divorce she does not do it in her own right 
but only on behalf of the husband, who is major and sane. Under the 
Hanafi law the power can be delegated to a minor or non-Muslim 
wife. But she can not exercise the said power unless she is sane and 
major for the purpose of Muslim law'*". 
In Marfat Ali Mirza v/s Jabeedunnissa*^ it was held that if the 
wife herself wants to settle the terms with her husband, then she 
should be major as understood by Muslim law. If the wife be minor 
39. Supra note 3, at 489. 
40. Ibid. 
41. A.I.R. 1941, Cal. 657. 
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then her guardian can settle such terms with the husband on her 
behalf and she shall be entitled to the benefit of these conditions, 
even though she was not a party to the agreement. 
The Shafi'i law is different from Hanafi law in this respect. 
Under the Shafi'i law the power of pronouncing divorce cannot be 
delegated to a minor wife. Under the Hanbali law the power to 
divorce can be delegated to a minor wife if she is competent to 
understand what is meant by divorce. If she cannot so under stand 
the power cannot be delegated to her. 
Time of Delegation: 
The power of pronouncing divorce may be delegated by the 
husband to the wife either at the time of marriage or subsequent 
thereto. If the power has been conferred before the marriage has 
taken place, it must be so intended as to take effect after marriage. 
Thus, under the provisions of Muslim law, the option of Talaq can be 
delegated at any of the three stages, namely. 
a) Prior to the marriage; or 
b) At the time of marriage; or 
c) Subsequent to the marriage. 
The Muslim Jurists hold that delegation of the power is 
perfectly valid at whichever of these stages it is given. The time of 
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delegation does not, under the Muslim law, affect the validity of 
delegation in any way. Most of the authorities on Muslim law^  have 
discussed the cases of delegation of the power to the wife after 
marriage. They have also given instances when the power was given 
prior to the marriage. 
Judicial views as to the time of delegation: 
The courts in general agree with the verdicts of the Muslim 
Jurists as to the first and second cases namely, when the power is 
delegated before or at the time of marriage. But they have differed 
with them in the cases where power is delegated to the wife 
subsequent to the marriage and have held such delegation to be 
invalid for the want of consideration. They have attached greater 
importance to the matter of consideration. It is contended that when 
an agreement has been executed or the terms have been agreed, inter-
alia, conferring option of divorce upon the wife or future wife, 
before or at the time of marriage with the consent of parties, it is 
valid, because marriage itself is a sufficient consideration, and she 
can exercise this right over and above any other right that is 
conferred on her by the dictates of the Shariah or agreement of the 
parties. But, according to some decisions of the superior courts of 
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the pre-partitioned India, where an agreement is executed after a 
marriage, in the absence of consideration has been held invalid. 
In Abdul Phiroz Khan v/s Hussain Bibi^^ a person had entered 
into an agreement with his wife and a quarrel arose between them 
and the husband entered into a second agreement with his wife's 
brother undertaking to carry on the terms of his previous agreement, 
it was held that latter agreement was nothing more than a promise as 
it was without consideration. 
The courts are not, however, unanimous on this point and have 
expressed different views in different cases. The Oath Judicial 
commissioner's Court has distinguished the cases where an 
agreement is entered into at the time of marriage and where it is 
entered into subsequent to a marriage. 
The Calcutta High court in hAst. Fatima Khatoon v/s Fazal 
Khan has taken a different view and has held that an agreement 
under which the wife is given an option to divorce herself on behalf 
of her husband on breach of certain condition is valid and not 
opposed to the public policy, even when it is entered into subsequent 
to the marriage. 
42. 6, B.L.R. 728. 
43. A.I.R. 1928, Cal. 303. 
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In another case, Sabid Khan v/s Bilatunnisa Bibi*^ Calcutta 
High Court held that such an agreement the conditions of which have 
been settled before the marriage but executed subsequent to the 
marriage is perfectly valid. 
The Lahore High court in Mst. Sadiqa Begum v/s Ata Ullah*^ 
has also held such subsequent delegation to be valid and not opposed 
to the public policy. The Lahore High court in another case 
Muhammad Amin v/s Amina Bibi*^ held that there is ample authority to 
the effect that an agreement made before or after the marriage by which 
it is provided that the wife should be at liberty to divorce herself from 
her husband under certain specified valid condition is valid. 
Under Muslim law the agreement shall not be invalid because 
it considers such agreement to be merely the appointment of an agent 
with the authority to do certain act under certain conditions. It 
attaches no importance to consideration or to its absence. But what is 
more important is the fact that before the actual solemnization of the 
marriage the prospective husband has no control over the prospective 
wife and it is only when the marriage has been performed that he 
gets a right to have some control over her. The Muslim Jurists are of 
the opinion that in agreements executed before or at the time of the 
44. 30, CLJ 510. 
45. A.I.R. 1933, Lah. 885. 
46. A.I.R. 1931, Lah. 134. 
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solemnization of marriage, it should be made clear that the 
agreement shall be applicable after the solemnization of the 
marriage. 
The difference of opinion between the Muslim Jurists and the 
Courts is due to the difference in the point of view from which the 
matter is considered. The Muslim Jurists hold that the husband 
possesses the power to divorce his wife at any time he likes. He may 
exercise the power to dissolve the marriage by himself or he may 
appoint an agent to exercise the power on his behalf. It makes no 
difference as to who that person is. He therefore, can authorise his 
wife to exercise the power on his behalf When the wife dissolves the 
marriage, she does not exercise the power in her own right but 
merely as an agent of the husband. It is therefore, immaterial 
according to them at what stage the power is delegated to her. They 
hold that it is only after the marriage that the husband can validly 
delegate the power to the wife. He can not delegate it before the 
actual celebration of the marriage. The delegation of a right to the 
wife necessarily involves the idea that man is possessed of a right 
which he is vesting in the wife. The prospective husband has no 
concern with or control over the prospective wife. He can, therefore, 
exercise no power over her, and when it is not possessed of the 
power, he obviously cannot delegate, it to the girl. If he execute any 
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agreement before the marriage, he has to make it clear that the 
agreement shall be enforceable only after the celebration of 
marriage. Thus, he has to state something like this, "when I am 
married to you then I shall be bound by the condition specified 
below". Or, when I am married to you then you shall have the power 
to dissolve the marriage on my behalf whenever you like. If there is 
no reference to the forthcoming marriage or if it is not made clear 
that the agreement shall be enforceable only after the marriage then 
according to the Muslim Jurists it shall be invalid and so ineffective. 
Thus, if he says in the agreement executed before the marriage. 1 am 
being married to you and I delegate to you the power of dissolving 
the marriage absolutely subject to the term in the agreement, then the 
agreement shall be invalid because being a stranger he has no right 
or control over the prospective wife and cannot exercise any control 
over her and so he can not delegate any right to her as he himself is 
not possessed of any of such rights. The Muslim Jurists do not attach 
any significance to the question of consideration. The courts that 
have differed with Muslim Jurists have based their judgements on the 
basis of "consideration". They have held that when an agreement 
delegating the power of divorce is entered into before or at the time 
of marriage, then the marriage itself forms its consideration, but 
when such an agreement is made subsequent to the marriage then 
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there is no consideration for the husband's delegation and so the 
agreement is invalid . 
It may be submitted that law of delegation of the power of 
divorce is an integral part of the Muslim law of marriage and divorce 
and the Muslims are governed by their own personal law in these 
matters. The notion of consideration as expounded by the conception 
of English law or the Indian Contract Act, has little to do with the 
doctrine of the delegation of power of divorce (Tafwid al-Talaq) 
which falls within the domain of Muslim Personal Law of Marriage 
and divorce and it should be left alone to be so determined. 
Therefore, there is no reason why an agreement executed subsequent 
to marriage should not be allowed to govern the right and liabilities 
of the parties. 
Time of Exercise of Power of Delegation: 
In the absence of the condition the wife must according to the 
Hanafi Law exercise the power immediately she is invested with or 
receives the information that she has been so invested with the 
power. If it be subject to condition, then the wife can exercise the 
right subject to the condition. 
It is stated by the author of the Hidayah that she must exercise 
47. Supra note 6, p. 345. 
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her right in the same sitting and in the same posture in which she 
received the information. Stress is laid on condition to such an extent 
that if she was sitting when the power was given to her or when she 
received the information and then lies down or stand up before 
exercising her power then her right should be lost. Similarly, if she 
makes herself busy in some other occupation such as reading or 
taking her meals after being invested with the power and before 
exercising the same then too she loses her right***. 
It is explained that when her attitude shows that she is not 
keen on exercise of her right but if she will not lose wants the time to 
consult her father or to call witnesses, then her right shall not be lost 
on account of delay. She will not lose her right if she was standing 
when she receive the news of delegation and then sits down. It is 
explained that these act do not denote her lack of interest. On the 
contrary, they indicate her interest and desire to deeply consider over 
the matter. If the husband raises her up right or is intimate with her 
even by force then too she shall loose her right because, it is 
explained, she could have exercised the power to divorce herself 
immediately it was delegated to her so as to leave no chance to the 
husband to undo this delegation and her delay shows her lack of 
keenness in the matter, namely exercise of the power delegated to the 
48. Supra note 1,P 213. 
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wife as a general rule is at present time made to depend on the 
occurrence or non-occurrence of the specified condition and so wife 
gets sufficient time to think over and decide the matter before-hand. 
In other case, the power is so delegated as to give the wife the power 
to make the advantage of its whenever she may so like and it is not 
obligatory on her to exercise it the moment the husband commits a 
breach of specified condition or conditions'*'. 
Nature of Tafwid al Talaq (Delegation of Divorce): 
The divorce pronounced by a wife under her delegated 
authority shall be in the nature of a revocable divorce which may be 
revoked by her at any time during her iddat unless otherwise 
intended by the husband at the time of delegation. Therefore, the 
nature of the separation effected by a divorcee pronounced by a wife, 
under delegated authority generally depends on the expression used 
by the husband and its exercise by the delegatee wife. There is 
however, some difference of opinion in this respect among the 
different schools of thoughts. 
Imam Abu Hanifa lays down that the separation effected by 
exercise of power of divorce by wife shall amount to an irrevocable 
divorce. He explained that if it be held to be revocable then it can 
49. Ibid. p. 214. 
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serve no purpose and the wife gains no advantage from the 
delegation. The argument seems to be quite sound and purposeful^". 
Imam Malik holds that when a husband authorises his wife to 
divorce herself, he shall be deemed to have empowered her to effect 
an irrevocable divorce. He explains that in such a case the object of 
husband's delegation is that the wife should be separated from him. 
Similarly, her object, when she exercises the power, is to be 
irrevocably separated from him. Imam Malik, Therefore, concludes 
that spouse would be separated irrevocably and so such shall be the 
effect of the exercise of the power by the wife^V 
According to one report Imam Shafi'i holds that separation 
effected in the case of delegation to the wife amounts to dissolution 
of marriage. But according to his later opinion, the category of the 
separation shall be that of divorce and its nature shall depend on the 
intention of the husband while delegating the power. If wanted 
separation to be effected irrevocably, the divorce effected shall be 
irrevocable. If on the other hand, he wanted to delegate power of 
revocable divorce, then only a revocable divorce shall result". 
50. Supra note 3, p. 356. 
51. Ibid. 
52. Ibid. p. 357. 
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Effect of Delegation by the Husband: 
The effect of delegation of the power of the divorce by the 
husband to his wife is that she becomes authorised to exercise that 
power as a representative of her husband and the pronouncement of 
divorce by the wife amounts to her husband's pronouncing it. There 
is no difference between a husband agreeing that he shall be held to 
have divorced his when a certain contingency arises and a condition 
allowing the wife to divorce herself upon certain contingency 
• • 53 
arising . 
The delegation does not divest the husband of the power of 
divorce and both he and his wife can exercise the power. Ibn Nujaym 
states, while discussing the subject of Tafwid or delegation of power 
of divorce to the wife, that a question arises here as to how can the 
husband exercise the power of divorce when he has delegated the 
power to the wife and so made her the owner of the divorce. He then 
explains on the strength of al-Kafi that what husband entrust to the 
wife is not the ownership of the divorce, but only the right to 
exercise the power of divorce and so he still remains the owner of 
divorce, hence, both husband and wife can effect a divorce. The 
husband is not divested of his power and he can exercise the power 
53. Ibn Nujaym; Al-Bahr al-Raiq; Vol III. p. 335, quoted by K.N Ahmad; The Muslim 
ofDivorce p. 214(1984) 
212 
as long as the wife does not divorce herself on his behalf*'*. 
The power of pronouncing divorce delegated by the husband to 
his wife is irrevocable, as an option conferred on her. However, there 
is a difference of opinion about the revocability of the authority of 
divorce delegated by the husband to his wife. The preponderant 
view, however, is that the husband after delegation to his wife of the 
right or option to divorce herself, cannot revoke it, because, wife 
then becomes the owner of the option in her own right. She may in 
her own discretion, exercise that option or not. 
Modern Legislation and Talaq-e-Tafwid: 
Islam gives to the parties to an intended marriage freedom of 
mutually stipulating any condition that is not repugnant to its law or 
social policy. The basic policy of Islam is not to impose on the 
parties any thing by force of law; beyond prohibiting a few thing 
specially it follows the rule of contractual freedom. The contracting 
parties can mutually opt out of anything which the law permit but 
does not make obligatory. Similarly, they can opt for something 
special, which is neither prohibited nor imposed by law. This is 
called Khaiyar al-Shart (option of the stipulation). The doctrine of 
freedom of marital stipulation is specifically recognized by 
legislation in Jordan, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia. All the lawful 
54. Ibid. 
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condition mutually agreed upon at the time of marriage, as also an 
option reserved by the wife to dissolve the marriage if any such 
condition is violated, are judicially enforceable in these countries . 
Egypt: 
Personal Law on Status 1929 (Amended) 1985^^ 
Section 2 of the code provides that a conditional Talaq which 
is not meant to take effect immediately shall have no effect if it is 
used only as an inducement to do some act or to abstain therefrom. 
According to section 11(A), a man getting married shall 
declare his marital status in his application for registration of 
marriage. If he is already married, he shall disclose the name and 
address of his existing wife or wives. The registrar shall in this case 
inform them of the new marriage by registered post 
acknowledgement. A wife whose husband has married again can seek 
divorce on the ground of the matrimonial injury caused by it, making 
it impossible to live with him irrespective of fact whether or not 
marriage contract incorporates a stipulation giving her such a right. 
If the Qazi fails to effect the reconciliation between the parties he 
will grant an irrevocable divorce. The wife's right to seek a divorce 
under this provision will laps if she does not initiate action within 
55. Tahir Mahmood; Personal Law in Islamic Countries, p. 272, (1987), Academy 
Law and Religion, New Delhi. 
56. Ibid. p. 283. 
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one year from the date on which she comes to know the second 
marriage or if she has consented to it expressly or impliedly. She 
will have, however, this right each time her husband married again. 
If new wife did not know at the time of marriage, the fact and 
requires no action forbidden by law, and which has been recorded in 
the certificate of marriage, compliance with it shall be obligatory as 
follows: 
Where the wife has stipulated for something that gives her a 
right not forbidden by law and not affecting a third person's right 
e.g., that she will not be required to go out of station or that husband 
shall not marry another woman, or that she can divorce herself 
should she so desire or that she would live in a specified place the 
condition is valid and obligatory and if the husband does not fulfil it 
the wife can apply for divorce on that ground without loosing any of 
her rights resulting from marriage. 
Where the husband stipulated for something that gives him a 
right not forbidden by law and affecting a third person's right e.g., if 
he stipulates that she will not go out for work or that she will live 
with him at his place of work the condition is valid and obligatory, 
and if the wife does not comply with it the marriage may be dissolve 
at the instance of the husband who will be absolved of his liability 
for her deferred dower and maintenance of Iddat. 
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Where the contract of marriage contains a condition which is 
repugnant to the object of marriage or requires an action forbidden 
by law e.g., where either party stipulates that they will not live 
together or that the other party must drink alcohol of the man being 
already married and comes to know of it subsequently, she can 
similarly seek a divorce. 
Iraq: 
Code of personal Status 1959 (Amended) 1980^ ^ 
Article 6 (3) of the said code provides that lawful conditions 
stipulated in a contract of marriage shall be valid and must be 
complied with. 
Sub-Clause (4) of the Article 6 says that the wife may claim 
dissolution of marital contract on the ground of non-compliance by 
husband of any such condition stipulated in the contract. Article 
34(1) lays down that divorce terminate the bond of marriage when 
pronounced by the husband, or by the wife who has been assigned or 
delegated an authority in that regard or by the Qazi. No divorce shall 
be effective except when pronounced through the legally prescribed 
formula. An assignment shall be irrevocable in regard to 
reconciliation proceedings, arbitration and pronouncement of Talaq. 
57. Ibid. p. 57. 
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Jordon: 
Code of Personal Status 1976*": 
Article 19 of the said code lays down that where in a contract 
of marriage has been stipulated a condition for the benefit of either 
party which is not prejudicial to the objects of marriage or must not 
meet either of his or her parents the condition will be void but 
marriage will be lawful. 
Law in Pakistan and Bangladesh*^: 
Section 8 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961, deals 
specifically, with divorce by Talaq-e-Tafwid. This Section reads: 
"Where the right to divorce has been duly 
delegated to the wife and she wishes to exercise 
that right, or where any of the parties to a 
marriage wishes to dissolve the marriage 
otherwise that by Talaq, the provisions of Section 
7 of the said Ordinance shall, mutatis mutandis 
and so far as applicable. " 
Section 7 of the Ordinance: 
Section 7 of the said Ordinance, dealing with the 
pronouncement of Talaq by the husband reads: 
"Any man who wishes to divorce his wife shall, as soon as 
may be after the pronouncement of Talaq in any form whatever, give 
58. Ibid. p. 80. 
59. Ibid. p. 247. 
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the Chairman of the unit of local government, notice in writing of his 
having done so, and shall supply a copy thereof to the wife". 
Clause (2) of the Ordinance says that whoever, contravenes the 
provisions of sub-section (1) shall be punishable with simple 
imprisonment for a term which may not extend to one year or with 
fine which may extend to Five Thousand Rupees or with both. 
Clause (3) of the Ordinance provides that "save as provided in 
sub-section (5) a talaq, unless revoked earlier expressly or otherwise, 
shall not be effective unit expiration of ninety days from the date on 
which notice under sub-section (1) is delivered to the Chairman. 
Clause (4) of the section 7, of the Ordinance says that "within 
thirty days of receipt of notice under sub-section (1), the Chairman 
shall constitute an arbitration council for the purpose of bringing 
about a reconciliation between the parties and the arbitration council 
shall take all the steps necessary to bring about such reconciliation. 
Clause (5) of the section 7 of the Ordinance enjoins upon that 
if the wife is pregnant at the time the Talaq is pronounced, Talaq 
shall not be effective until the period mentioned in sub-section (3) or 
the pregnancy, whichever be later, end. 
Clause (6) of the Section 7 of the Ordinance provides that 
nothing shall debar a wife whose marriage has been terminated by 
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Talaq effective under this section from remarrying the same husband, 
without an intervening marriage with a third person, unless such 
termination is for third time so effective. 
From the combined reading of Sections 7 and 8 of the said 
Ordinance, it is clear that having pronounced Talaq the wife is 
required to notify the pronouncement to the appropriate public 
official and to her husband and that pronouncement will not becomes 
an actual divorce until ninety days have passed from the date of 
receipt by the official of such notification . 
During the intervening ninety days, the pronouncement is 
revocable; the question is by whom is it revocable? As previously 
explained, the question of whether the husband has foregone his right 
of revocation depends on the wordings of delegation itself. If the 
husband has conferred upon the wife not merely the right to 
pronounce Talaq,- or three Talaq, but not to dissolve the marriage 
effectively, completely, and extra Judicially by means of Talaq 
procedure, he must be held to have renounced any right of revocation 
of the Talaq or Talaq pronounced by her. In these circumstances, the 
revocation possible under Ordinance can be revocation by the wife of 
the pronouncement she herself recited*'. 
60. Lucy Carrll; Talaq-i-Taf\\'id and Stipulations in Muslim Marriage contracts; Legal 
theor>- - legislative provisions - Judicial Rulings; Religion and Law Review ,Vol. 
VI No. 1, p. 83(1997). 
61. Ibid. 
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Conclusion: 
The above discussion of the doctrine of Tafwid al Talaq Leads 
to the conclusion that the delegation of the right of effecting divorce 
is, in fact, an option given to the wife for effecting divorce on 
herself. The giving of an option means offering a chance to his wife 
who is given option to pronounce to herself in appropriate 
circumstances and on her own volition. When the husband gives his 
wife the option of effecting divorce, he rather authorises his wife 
that she may effect divorce to herself and sever the relationship of 
the husband and wife between them, if she likes. It is evident that the 
wife, in such circumstances, acts in her own right. It means that the 
wife too can make the use of the husband's right, which is over the 
above and not in place of that of the husband, as it is in the nature of 
Khiyar (option). This view is fortified by the very verse surah Al-
Ahzab Ayat 28 which is the basis of the right of the husband to 
delegate his right of divorce to his wife. That is why Jurists have 
termed this delegation as Khiyar al-Talaq which means that the wife 
is given option to divorce herself if she chooses. 
Thus, the traditional Muslim Law recognise the delegation of 
the power of effecting divorce by a husband to his wife. According 
to Hanafis and Malikis, it is an irrevocable divorce; but under section 
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8 of the Muslim Family laws ordinance 1961 of Pakistan the divorce 
nevertheless be revocable by consent of the parties. It is a very 
important provision of Muslim law of marriage which enables a wife 
to safeguard her future married life. She can make a condition at the 
time of her marriage that husband should delegate his power of 
divorce to her so that she can exercise it i.e. divorce herself on his 
behalf, whenever she is not satisfied with his behaviour, or the 
husband commits a breach of terms agreed upon. Such a divorce by 
her will take effect as if a divorce had been pronounced by the 
husband himself. 
As the Muslim husband has the right to dissolve the marriage 
by pronouncement of Talaq formula, he may delegate the right to 
exercise this power on his behalf to another person. Such delegation 
does not deprive the husband of his right to pronounce Talaq but 
merely means that two people are possessed of the power to dissolve 
the marriage by verbal formula. If the husband delegates to his wife 
the right to exercise the Talaq on his behalf in regard to her own 
marriage, she is assured of being able to terminate the marriage 
extra-Judicially and expeditiously while retaining her claim to the 
full amount of dower. 
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Like the husband's pronouncement of Talaq, the wife's 
pronouncement under the authority delegated to her by the husband 
(Talaq-i-Tafwid) dissolve the marriage without the intervention of 
the court. Nonetheless, question concerning such extra Judicial 
divorce may come before courts in various ways. A husband may 
answer his wife's suit for maintenance, for example, by alleging that 
he has divorced her by Talaq and is thus no longer financially 
responsible for her support. Similarly, wife may sue for her deferred 
dower o the ground that she has dissolved the marriage by Talaq-i-
Tafwid. She may raise same argument in defense to a suit for 
restitution of conjugal rights brought by her husband or she may 
petition for declaration that marriage is no longer subsisting because 
of her exercise of delegated right of Talaq. 
CHAPTER - VI 
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DIVORCE BY ILA: CONCEPT AND UTILITY 
Conceptual Analysis: 
Ila is not exactly a divorce, but has been treated as a form of 
divorce by the Muslim theologians and Jurists. It was a common 
practice in pre-Islamic days. Actually, before the advent of Islam, 
the Pagan Arabs had many special kinds of customs of oaths for each 
of which they had a special name in their language. Some of them 
related to sex matters, and caused misunderstanding, division or 
separation between husband and wife. Sometimes in a fit of anger or 
caprice a husband would take an oath by Allah not to approach his 
wife. This deprived her of conjugal rights, but at the same time kept 
her tide to him, indefinitely, so that she would not marry again. This 
was highly unfair and unjust to the woman in wedlock because she 
was neither liberated from the marital bond nor treated as a wife by 
swearing husband but was kept in a suspensory and torturous state 
for indefinite period'. 
Islam in the first place disapproved in perfectly general terms 
for not making thoughtless oaths in the name of Allah an excuse for 
not doing the right things when it is pointed out to us, or for 
refraining from doing some thing which will bring people together^. 
1. Abdullah Yusuf Ali; The Glorious Qur'an; Translation with brief notes & 
Commentary, p. 89, 2"^ ed. (1977), American Trust Publication Canada. 
2. Ibid. 
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The Holy Qur'an says to this effect in the most categorical terms. 
"And make not 
Allah's name an excuse 
In your oath against 
Doing good or acting rightly or making peace, 
Between persons, for Allah is one 
Who heareth and knoweth all things"^. 
Therefore, Islam at one hand discouraged and condemned, in 
general, of taking thoughtless oaths but on the other hand insisted on 
proper solemn intentional oath being scrupulously observed. The 
Holy Qur'an again commands; 
"Allah will not call you to account, 
For thoughtless in your oaths. 
But for the intention in your hearts, 
And He is oft-forgiving most forbearing"'^. 
Thus, in the serious matter like that affecting a wife, if the 
oath was put forward as an excuse, the swearing man is commanded 
that it is not an excuse at all. Allah looks to intention and not mere 
thoughtless words. The parties are, therefore, allowed a period of 
four months to make up their mind and see that an adjustment is 
possible. 
Hence, by 'Ila' the marriage was not completely dissolved by 
3. Holv Qur'ao; II. 224 
4. Holy Qur'an 0:225; 
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the pagan Arabs but it meant a cessation of sexual relations between 
the husband and wife. The wife was thus deprived of the sexual 
intimacy during the swearing period but she remained tied down to 
her husband and could not contract another marriage. Islam has put a 
rational check to the evil effect of this barbarous practice. It has 
discouraged the use of such expression by imposing a penalty on the 
husband who wants to retain his wife after the use of the expression 
Ila. If he does not repent and cancel his declaration within prescribed 
period of four months, he stands to loose his wife^. 
Definition of Ila: 
Ila in its primitive sense signifies a vow of abstinence from 
approaching the wife for a period. In law it implies a husband's 
swearing to abstain from carnal relation with his wife for any time 
above four months if she is a free woman or two months if she is a 
slave woman. If a man swear that he will not have sexual connection 
with his wife or that he will not have such connection with her 
within four months, an Ila is established^. 
The person making the vow is called a Mooli who is defined as 
a person who can not approach his wife for a period of four months 
without incurring some penalty or some very troublesome, serious or 
5. K.N. Ahmad; The Muslim Law of Divorce, p. 105, (1984) Kitab Bhawan New 
Delhi. 
6. The Hedaya: Translated bv Charles Hamilton, Vol. II, p. 109, (1985) Kitab Bhawan 
New Delhi. 
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difficult liability. In Muslim law, it implies a husband's swearing by 
God or making a declaration to abstain from sexual intercourse with 
his wife for a period of four months or a longer period or that he 
shall undergo some specified hardship by way of penalty if he 
intimates with the wife within the specified period of time or make 
some specified expiation that shall involve some hardship to him . 
Thus, the literal meaning of the word Ila is to vow not to have 
sexual intercourse with one's wife. Consequently, if a person makes a 
vow that he shall not have intercourse with his wife for a period of 
one or two months but less than four months, it should be an Ila in its 
literal sense, but ineffective legally. Ila shall be effective legally 
when a person makes a vow that he shall not have sexual intercourse 
with his wife for a period of four months or more. It is a condition 
for Ila that it must in the form of a vow otherwise it shall have no 
8 legal effect' 
Therefore, Ila is a husband's prohibition of himself from 
approaching his wife for four months when he is a free man, and two 
months when a slave, the prohibition being confirmed by a Yameen 
or vow, either by God, or without Him; as by repudiation, 
emancipation, fasting, pilgrimage, or the like. So that if the husband 
7. Ibid. 
8. Dr. Tanzil-Ur-Rahman: A Code Muslim Personal Law, Vol. f, p. 498, (1978) 
Karachi, Pakistan. 
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should approach his wife during that time, he would be forsworn, 
and liable to expiation, when the oath is by God, whether by Himself 
or by any of his attributes by which it is customary to swear, or for 
the consequence of the condition in other cases; and the Ila would 
cease after approach. On the other hand, if he should not approach 
her during the time, she would become irrevocably repudiated by one 
repudiation and the oath would be at an end, if it were for four 
months; but if it were for ever, as by the husband's saying, "By God 1 
will not approach thee for ever", or if he were to say, "By God I will 
not approach thee", without adding/or ever, the oath would remain, 
except in so far that the repudiation would not be repeated without a 
second marriage. If however, he were to marry her a second time, the 
Ila would revive, and if she were not enjoyed, another repudiation 
would take effect after the expiration of four months from the 
marriage; and if he were to marry her a third time, the Ila would 
again return, and on the expiration of other four months another 
repudiation would take effect if there were no intermediate 
intercourse. If, subsequently to all this he should marry her after 
another husband has had her, repudiation would not take effect on 
tlat Ila but the vow would remain; and if he would have intercourse 
with her he would be liable to expiation'. 
^ ^ , t tB .E .»e ;A '5^« ofMoohummadan l^; p. 274. (1865), London. 
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Holy Qur'an and Ila: 
11a is an abstinence from the sexual intercourse from a wife for 
a period of not less than four months in pursuance of a vow to that 
effect. The pre-Islamic Arabs effected such a divorce by taking a 
vow of continence followed by abstinence for a certain length of 
time. As no definite time period was set prior to Islam, it may be 
presumed what determined this was the intention of the husband 
which could very well be to abandon his wife. The principle seems to 
be that the husband lost his right as non-user. The wife was, 
therefore, instructed to wait until the intention of the husband 
became apparent which sometimes extended to a long period of time 
leaving the wife in suspense as to whether or not she was divorced. 
This injustice was removed when Islam set a time limit of four 
months during which husband is at liberty to break his vow or 
resume his cohabitation with his wife**. 
The Holy Qur'an declares: 
For those who take an oath for abstention from their wives, 
A waiting for four months is ordained; 
If then they return, 
God is oft-forgiving most merciful, 
But if their intention is firm for divorce, 
God heareth and knoweth all the things^^. 
10. Ibid. p. 275 
11. The Holy Qur'an; II : 226 
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Commenting upon the aforesaid verses of the Holy Qur'an, a 
well-known Islamic Jurist Maulana Abul A'ala Maududi observed 
that although it is true that relations between husband and wife do 
not always remain cordial yet Allah's law does not allow that the 
strained relations should continue indefinitely. Therefore, it lays 
down the maximum period of four months for a separation in which 
they legally remain husband and wife but practically live separate 
life without any conjugal relations between them. Such a separation 
is called 11a in the Islamic Code of Law. During this period they 
must either make reconciliation between themselves or part for good 
so that they may be free to remarry a suitable person of their liking^^. 
From the words "those who take an oath" the Jurists belonging 
to Hanafi and Shafi'i school of thoughts conclude that this period of 
four months applies to only those cases of separation which are made 
on oath; if they remain separate for any length of time without an 
oath, this law would not apply to them. On the other hand, the Jurists 
belonging to Maliki school of thought are of the opinion that 
maximum period of four months apply to all the cases of separation. 
A saying of Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal also supports this view'^. 
12. Syed Abul A'ala Maududi's; The Meaning of The Qur'an; Vol. f, p.157, (1979) 
Islamic Trust Publication. New Delhi. 
13. Ibid. p. 158. 
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Hazrat Ali, Hazrat Ibn-Abbas and Hasan Basri are of the 
opinion that this law applies only to that case of separation which is 
the result of the strained relations, and does not apply to the case in 
which the husband and the wife agree to discontinue conjugal 
relation with mutual consent for some common good and at the same 
time keep cordial relations. There are Jurists who are of the opinion 
that law of Ila would apply to every case of separation made on oath 
irrespective of the fact whether their relation remain good or bad, 
hence it should not go beyond term of four months'^. 
According to the verdict of Caliph Uthman, Ibn Masud, Zaid 
bin Thabit and some other Jurists, they can re-unite only within four 
months. The expiry of this term itself is a proof that husband has 
decided upon divorce. Hence after its expiry, divorce will 
automatically take place and the husband will forfeit the right of 
reunion. If, however, both of them agree, they may remarry. There is 
a verdict to the same effect from Hazrat Umar, Hazrat Ali, Ibn Abbas 
and the Jurists of the Hanafi schools have accepted it* .^ 
Ahadith and Ila: 
The principles of Ila under the Muslim law is founded on the 
following Ahadith: 
14. Ibid. 
15. Ibid. 
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It was narrated by Anas bin Malik that Allah's Messenger took 
an oath that he would abstain from his wife, and at that time his legs 
had been sprained (dislocated). So he stayed in the Mashruba 
(Anattic room) for twenty-nine days. Then he came down and the 
people said "O Allah's Apostle you took an oath to abstain from your 
wives for one month". He said, the month is of twenty-nine days . 
Another tradition by Nafi is that "Ibn Umar used to say about 
Ila which Allah defined in the Holy Book, "if the period of Ila 
expires, then the husband has either to retain his wife in a handsome 
manner or to divorce her as Allah has ordered". Ibn Umar added that 
when the period of four months has expired, the husband should be 
put in prison so that he should divorce his wife, but the divorce does 
not occur, unless the husband himself declares it. This has been 
mentioned by Hazrat Uthman, Hazrat Ali, Aisha and twelve other 
companions of the Prophet (PBUH)''. 
Hazrat Ali bin Abu Talib used to say; when a man vows not to 
cohabit with his wife, the women will not be divorced, even if four 
months should pass, until the case is taken to a Judge and husband be 
compelled either to give divorce or cohabit'*. 
16. Sahih Al-Bukhari: Translated bv Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan Vol. VII. p. 160, 
(1984) Kitab Bhawan. New Delhi. 
17. Ibid. 
18. Muwatta Imam Malik, Translated with exhaustive notes by Prof. Mohammad 
Rahimuddin; p. 248, P* ed. (1981) Kitab Bhawan New Delhi. 
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Hazrat Abdullah bin Umar used to say; "when a man 
pronounced Ila upon his wife and four months elapse, the husband 
should be brought before a Judge and compelled either to divorce or 
take her back. The lapse of four months without divorce will not 
bring the divorce into effect"''. 
Shihab reported that Sa'id bin Al Musayyab and Abu Bakar bin 
Abdul Rehman used to say; "the man who pronounces Ila against his 
wife and after four months one divorce would become effective, but 
the husband has the option to take the wife back during Iddat 
probation^". 
It reached Malik that Marwan bin Hakam was asked to give 
decision about a man who pronounce Ila against his wife. He said, 
after the lapse of four months, one divorce become effective but 
husband has option to take her back during Iddat^V 
Therefore, divorce by Ila is a temporary separation from the 
wife and is duly mentioned in the Holy Qur'an and supported by the 
authentic traditions of the Holy Prophet (PBUH). 
In literal sense it signifies a vow, but in Islamic Shariah this 
means angrily abstaining from sexual connection with one's wife for 
19. Ibid 
20. Ibid. p. 249. 
21. Ibid. 
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four months. If a man swears that he will not have any sexual 
connection with her within four months, an Ila is established. 
Person Competent to Pronounce Ila: 
According to Imam Abu Hanifa the persons competent to 
pronounce an Ila are those who are competent to repudiate the 
marriage, i.e., he should be adult and sane. However, according to 
the two disciples of Imam Abu Hanifa, the persons competent to 
pronounce Ila are those who can make a vow. But they were all of 
opinion that no person can be Mooli except by an oath against 
natural intercourse and if he is forsworn by other than an oath of that 
description he is not a Mooli". 
The woman in respect of whom an Ila vow can be made should 
be the wife of the person making the vow at the time when Ila is to 
take effect. But an Ila can be made in respect of a woman not yet the 
wife of the speaker provided it is to take effect in future at the time 
when the marriage has actually taken place and she becomes his 
wife. Thus, a man may say to a woman, "By God, I shall have no 
sexual intercourse with you when I marry you", then Ila shall be 
effected if he marries her because his vow makes Ila applicable when 
the woman acquire the status of being his wife. But if Ila is made in 
22. Supra note 5. p. 107. 
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respect of a woman other than the wife without reference to her 
status at the time when Ila is to take effect then Ila shall be 
ineffective. Thus, if a person says to a woman who is not his wife, 
"By God I will never have sexual intercourse with you", and he 
afterwards marries her then Ila shall not be established. Here there is 
no reference to her status at the time when Ila is to take effect . 
Mode of Expressing Ila: 
The words by which Ila is effected may be either sureeh 
(express) or kinayah (implicative). The sureeh or express is such 
word which first present to the mind the idea of sexual intercourse. It 
would be an express term if one were to say, "I swear by God that I 
will not approach thee or by some other words by which an oath may 
be effected to a woman who is not in her menses because in case of a 
woman, during her menses, the abstinence is due to pollution rather 
than to the vow. As if one were to say, "I swear by God that I will 
not cohabit with thee", "I will not have carnal connection with thee". 
All these would amount to an express Ila^ "*. 
The Kinaya or implicative are the words that do not directly 
present to the mind the idea of coition and are susceptible of an other 
meaning so long as Ila is not intended by them. The implicative 
23. Ibid. 
24. The Durr-ul-Mukhtar; Translated by B.M. Dayal; p. 234 (1992) Kitab Bhawan 
New Delhi, 
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expression of Ila are, "I will not touch thee", or "I will not approach 
thy bed". I will not enter upon thee. It would be eternal 11a if one 
were to say, for, instance, "I would not approach thee till the coming 
out of the earthly beast", or till the coming out Dajjal or till the day 
the sun rise from the west^^. 
Therefore, a Ila may be contracted by all expression by which 
a vow may be contracted. As if he were to say, "By God or by the 
Majesty or greatness of God". It can not be contracted by any words 
which are not sufficient to effect a vow; as if he were to say, "By 
Knowledge of God, 1 will not approach thee or the wrath of God be 
upon him and the like. All the Sunni Jurists hold that invoking the 
name of God or one of His attributes where by the husband makes it 
unlawful for himself to be intimate with his wife is necessary to 
constitute Ila. But there is a difference of opinion whether a vow of 
other classes where by the husband abstains from intimacy will 
constitute an Ila. The correct view is that whatsoever be the vow by 
which intimacy is to make unlawful an Ila shall be effected provided 
the vow incurs some hardship. The above opinion has been expressed 
by Abu Hanifa, Imam Malik Shafi'i etc". 
25. Ibid. p. 235. 
26. Ibid. 
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It is a necessary condition of Ila that there should be no 
uncertainty or vagueness in the expression used. The expression nay 
be conditional or unconditional. But a vow depending on a condition 
which is uncertain or which may be or may not happen within four 
months does not constitute 11a. Thus, the expression, "By God I will 
have no sexual intercourse with you till such a person arrives or such 
a thing happens when it is possible for the person to come within 
four months or for the thing to happens within that period of time, 
does not amount to an Ila . 
A husband can take a vow that he will not be intimated with 
his wife and that on breach of the vow he shall be liable to particular 
penalty some great hardship and in such a case, i.e., if he commits a 
breach of his vow he shall incur only the particular penalty specified 
by his, if the penalty involved is light and something of everyday 
practice then there shall be no Ila. Thus if he says, "By God, I shall 
not be intimated with you for four months, 1 commit a breach of my 
vow then it shall be incumbent on me to read the Holy Qur'an or to 
offer prayers", etc. then no Ila shall be constituted. But if he says 
that he will recite the Holy Qur'an one hundred times or to offer 
prayers hundred times then Ila shall be constituted because these acts 
do involve hardships. Similarly, if he swear by God that he will have 
27. Supra note 5, p. 109. 
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no sexual connection with his wife for a period of four months and 
that if he should commit a hreach of the vow within that time then he 
shall perform a Hajj or fast for a specified time, etc. then on a breach 
of the vow he shall have to perform the particular penalty specified 
by his, as for example, the performance of the Hajj or fasting for the 
specified for the number of days or whatever other penalty he had 
declared in his vow^*. 
In Bibi Rehana Khatoon v s Iqtedar-JJddin Hussain^^ it was 
held that a declaration by the husband that his wife would be a wife 
in name only was not to amount to an Ila vow. This can be based on 
due fact that here the husband had merely made a statement and had 
not taken a vow and does not undertake any penalty on being guilty 
of its breach. 
Period of Ila: 
The minimum period of vow for Ila must be for four months or 
for a longer period or for an indefinite time and thus for maximum 
period no time limit has been prescribed. But if it relates to a period 
less than four months then the vow does not constitute Ila. This is so 
even though the accumulated period of two or more consecutive Ila 
vows may amount to four months or a long period of time. Thus, if a 
28. Ibid. p. 110. 
29. AIR. 1943, All. 84. 
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man makes a vow, saying to his wife, "By God I will not have sexual 
connection with you for two months, nor for two months after that, 
Ila is established". But if a man swears that he will not have sexual 
connection with his wife for two months", and then remains silent 
for a day, and next day again swears that he will not have carnal 
connection with her for two months after the other two months, Ila is 
not established because the second vow is distinct and separate from 
the former'*". 
A husband shall not be held to have pronounced Ila except 
when he takes an oath against having sexual intercourse with his 
wife. If the husband's oath refers to something else than sexual 
intercourse then he shall not be held to have made Ila. Thus if a man 
says to his wife. "By God, my skin shall not touch thy skin, he shall 
not be deemed to have made an Ila because the vow refers to a 
breach of something other than sexual intercourse and touching their 
skin is possible without there being intimacy between them. It is also 
a necessary condition of Ila that it should not be possible for the 
husband to violate the vow, that is, to have sexual intercourse with 
his wife without being guilty of the breach of his vow. Thus, if a 
husband being in Karachi and his wife being in Delhi swears that he 
will not go to Delhi then Ila is not established because there is no 
30. Supra note 5, p. 108. 
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reference to intimacy while he can still be intimate with his wife 
without incurring any penalty as by sending for her at Karachi and 
being intimate with her there^V 
Effect of Ila: 
If the vow is kept, i.e., if the husband abstain from sexual 
intimacy with his wife or does not cancel the Ila within four months, 
then under the Hanafi Law, there shall be effected an automatic 
divorce on the expiry of that period. If he is intimate with his wife 
during the period of four months, then he is forsworn in his vow . 
However, according to Imam Malik, Imam Shafi'i and Ahmad 
bin Hanabal, there can be no automatic divorce, but the matter shall 
remain suspended till the husband either revokes his Ila or divorce 
his wife. If he does neither then wife can have recourse to Qazi^^. 
According to Hanafi law, in case of Ila divorce gets effected 
without intervention of a Qazi. Only the passing away of the 
prescribed period is the condition. But according to Malik law, the 
Qazi shall ask the husband to resume his sexual connection with his 
wife or to divorce her. If the husband refuses or fails to comply with 
the Qazi's order, the Qazi shall himself dissolve the marriage. Imam 
31. Ibid. 
32. Ibid. 
33. Ibid. 
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Shafi'i and Ahmad bin Hanbal expressed the same view as that of 
Imam Malik"*'*. 
The difference between the Hanafi and other Sunni schools 
arises due to difference in interpretation of Qur'anic verse II: 227 of 
Surah al-Baqrah about Ila. 
The Hanafi School argues that husband's not breaking vow for 
four months is a proof of his firm intention to divorce the wife. They 
also assert that Ila was a form of divorce in Pre-Islamic days and 
Shariah has only placed conditions and limitations on it without 
changing its nature and effect. The other reason in support of this 
view is that Ila is a wrong caused to the wife by husband who denies 
her right of marital life and as such he is punished by dissolution of 
marriage^*. 
The opposite view, on the other hand, is justified on the plain 
reading of the verse, referred to above, which speaks of formation of 
intention of divorce after the expiry of Vow and not divorce itself. 
The other reason in support of this view is that Ila is a wrong caused 
to the wife by the husband who denies her the right of marital life 
and as such he is punished by the dissolution of marriage at her 
instance^^. 
34. Supra note 8, p. 499. 
35. Ibid, p 500. 
36. Ibid. 
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Nature of Divorce by Ila: 
Under the Hanafi law, the divorce that is effected by Ila 
amounts to an irrevocable divorce. But according to Imam Malik, 
and Ahmad bin Hanabal it would amount only to a Rajai or revocable 
divorce. Such divorce declared by Qazi shall also amount to one 
revocable divorce. According to Ahmad bin Hanbal, as certain report 
say, it would amount to an irrevocable divorce . 
Under the shia law, the husband who vow an Ila should be 
major, sane and should posses understanding and have free will and 
intention to effect Ila. The woman should be his lawfully married 
wife. There can be no Ila in respect of a women married in Muta. 
According to shia jurists, the Ila should for a period exceeding four 
months. The Ila cannot be conditional. It cannot be cancelled by 
words. It can only be cancelled by cohabitation. However, if the 
husband is temporarily unfit for cohabitation, he can do so by 
speech, declaring that he will cancel the Ila by cohabitation when he 
is able to do so. According to shia jurists, a divorce is not effected 
by the mere expiry of the time of four months. The wife shall have to 
make a petition to the Judge"'*. 
37. Ibid. 
38. Jafar bin-Al Hasan; Kitab Shariah al-Islam; p. 228, (1937) Tehran. 
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The Judge, however, cannot dissolve the marriage but shall 
order the husband either to take back his wife or to divorce her. On 
the husband's failure or refusal to do so the Judge can imprison and 
punish him to force him to choose one of the above two alternatives. 
The separation effected by a divorce given on an Ila shall amount to 
a rajai (revocable) divorce, unless the husband gives a bain 
(irrevocable) divorce"*'. 
The Shia Law wants the continuation of marriage and to 
discourage its termination as far as possible. Hence, if the husband 
alleges that he has cancelled the 11a by being intimate with the wife 
during the period of four months or says that period of four months 
has not expired but wife denies such an allegation then husband's 
version would be accepted in preference to her denial so that 
marriage may not be dissolved'*". 
Expiation: 
If the husband has intercourse during the period of 11a, it 
amounts to the violation of his vow. He should, therefore, make the 
expiation for the breach of his vow. It consists of manumission of a 
slave, or clothing or feeding ten poor persons. If he has no ability to 
do either of them, he should fast for three days consecutively. The 
39. Ibid. 
40. Ibid. 
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rule of expiation is based on dictates of the Holy Qur'an as contained 
in the following verse of Surah Al-Maidah: 
"God will not call you 
To accept for what is 
Futile in your oaths, 
But He will call you 
To account for your deliberate, 
Oaths; for expiation, feed 
Ten indigent persons, 
On the scale of average 
For food of your families. 
Or cloth them; or give 
A slave his freedom 
If that is beyond your means, 
Fast for three days; That is expiation*^. 
The commandment about oath has been laid down here in 
connection with instruction about food, because some people had 
taken oaths for making some lawful things unlawful for themselves. 
The commandment is that if one uttered a word of oath without any 
intention behind it one shall not be bound to observe it, for, there is 
no punishment for this. But if one has deliberately taken such an oath 
one must break it and expiate for the violation because one must 
abrogate such a sinful oath^ .^ 
41. Holy Qur'an; W: 92. 
42. Supra Note, 12 p. 74. 
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Concluding Remarks: 
From the above discussion it may safely be concluded that Ila 
is a temporary separation from the wife, but in Islamic Shariah this 
means angrily abstaining from sexual connection with one's wife for 
four months. If a man swears that he will not have any sexual 
connection with his wife or that he will not have any such connection 
with her within four months, an Ila is established. 
It was a practice of pre-Islamic days by which the wife was 
kept in a state of suspense, sometimes for whole of her life. In pre-
Islamic days the Arabs used to take such oaths frequently and as the 
period of suspension was not limited, the wife had sometimes to pass 
her whole life in bondage, having neither the position of a wife nor 
that of a divorced woman free to remarry elsewhere. Islam reformed 
this state of affairs by commanding that if the husband did not assert 
the conjugal relations within four months, the wife should be 
divorced''^. 
If any one swears or says to his wife that by Allah he will not 
have sexual intercourse or by Allah he will never do sexual 
intercourse with her or something else in this respect, then its order 
is that if he actually did not have sexual intercourse then at the end 
43- Mohammad Iqbal Siddiqui: The Family Laws of Islam; p.238, (1988), International 
Islamic Publishers, New Delhi. 
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of four months it will have the effect of divorce and now they cannot 
live as husband and wife without remarriage. But if before the expiry 
of four months, he breaks his oath and did sexual intercourse, then 
there will be no divorce but he shall have to give recompensation for 
breach of oath**^ . 
If the husband, thus, decides to keep away from the wife 
without divorcing her and translate his decision into action, the 
shariah law does not keep the wife for rest of her life at the mercy of 
her husband recognising this action of the husband (called 11a) as a 
kind of desertion, it permits him to prolong it only upto four months 
within which time he must resume cohabitation and if he has taken a 
vow not to cohabit and has committed the breach of his vow before 
the expiry of four months, he must make expiation before resumption 
of cohabitation. If the husband does not resume cohabitation till the 
expiry of four months, the law enables the wife to become free from 
the marital bond'* .^ 
A Shafi'i or Ithna Ashari woman whose husband has deserted 
her by Ila may submit a suit for the dissolution of her marriage under 
section 2 clause (ix) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act 
1939. However, without a decree of faskh, her marriage will not be 
dissolved. If the woman is a Hanafi, her marriage will be dissolved 
44 Ibid. 
45. Tahir Mahmood; The Muslim Law of India, p. 106, IF'' ed. (1982) Law Book Co. 
Allahabad. 
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automatically by a talaq which the husband cannot revoke. If the 
husband still compels her to live with him, she can submit a suit for 
a decree under section 2(ix) of the Act of 1939 for confirmation of 
dissolution of her marriage^^. 
From the above discussion, the result which comes out is that 
divorce by Ila again is aimed to protect in long terms the interest of 
the wife against a particular kind of desertion by the husband. The 
law of Ila is wrongly included by the authors of Muslim Law among 
the forms of divorce by the husband. It is infact a principle of 
Islamic matrimonial law which protects the wife against a desertion 
by the husband. According to section 2(ix) of the Dissolution of 
Muslim Marriage Act, 1939, she has a right to go to court for the 
dissolution of marriage against her husband. 
46. Ibid. 
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DIVORCE BY ZIHAR: EFFECTS AND EXPIATION 
The pre-Islamic Arabs had devised a system of separation known as 
zihar whereby a wife was deprived of sexual intimacy with the husband yet 
she remained a wife. The means employed for such a separation was that 
the husband compared his wife to the back of his mother. This was known 
as 'zihar' where the marriage subsisted, the woman still remaining the wife 
of the person, but deprived of all sexual intimacyV 
It is not quite clear whether the comparisons in such cases were 
regarded by the ancient Arabs as 'Assimilation injurious', or as promoting 
the woman from the status of a wife to the position of an adoptive mother. 
It is probable that each view was held but at the different historic periods. 
Whatever may have been its original significance, there is no doubt that at 
the time of Holy Prophet Mohammed (PBUH), this mode of divorce had 
become so frequent and had assumed so mischievous character that it 
tended to degrade the morality of the Arab tribes beyond any other custom .^ 
Islam freed the wife from this infamous practice discouraging the 
use of such expressions. In clarified a wife's position stating that she does 
not become the mother or any other relation by mere idle statements. It 
fiirther imposed a penalty on the husband who expressed zihar but wishes 
1 Dr. Zeenat Shaukat Ali; Marriage and Divorce in Islam: An Appraisal; P. 222, 
(1987) Jaico Publishing House, Bombay. 
2. Ibid. 
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to retain his wife. The wife was further empowered to force the husband 
either to divorce her or re-estabhsh the matrimonial connection on adhering 
to the prescribed penalty"*. 
Thus in pre-Islamic Arabia, Zihar was considered to be a sort of 
divorce. Muslim Law, however, while preserving its nature which is 
prohibition from intimacy with the wife, has altered its effect to a 
temporary prohibition which does not dissolve the marriage. Hence, Zihar 
does not exactly amount to a divorce and is distinct from it. 
Meaning and definition of Zihar: 
The word Zihar is derived from the word "Zahr" which means 
"back" of man, animal or thing. In the language of law, it signifies a man 
comparing his wife to any of his female relation, within such prohibited 
degree of kindred, whether by blood, by fosterage, or by marriage, as 
renders marriage with them invariably unlawfiil. If the husband compares 
his wife to a woman permanently forbidden to him, such as mother, sister 
or aunts, it is called Zihar. Likewise, his comparing any part of the body of 
his wife with any part of the body of a woman who is permanently 
forbidden to him, is included within the definition of Zihar, provided that 
part of the body mentioned be such by which the entire body may validly 
be understood*. 
3. Ibid. 
4. The Hedaya. Translated by Charles Hamilton; Vol. 2"" , p. 117, (1985) Kitab 
Bhawan, New Delhi. 
248 
If a man says to his wife, "you are to me like the belly of my mother, 
or, "the thigh, or, "the pudendum" Zihar is thereby established, as Zihar 
signifies the likening of a woman to a kin woman within the prohibited 
degrees which interpretation is found in the comparison being applied to 
any of the parts or members improper to be seen. Zihar is in the same 
manner established by the likening of the wife to the any other kin woman 
within such prohibited degree as that marriage with them is at all times 
unlawful, such as, sisters, and aunts as well, foster mothers, who are 
invariably prohibited, as well as, natural mother. And so also if a man says 
to his wife, your head is to me like the back of my mother, because by these 
the whole person is figuratively expressed. And so also if he were to say, 
your half or your third because in this case the effect is established in a 
diffusive portion and consequently extends to the whole person*. 
However, where a person sa\'s to his wife, "you are to me like my 
mother". In such case it is requisite that his intention be examined into so as 
to discover true predicament in which the wife stands; and if he declares 
that his meaning was only to show respect to his wife, it is to be received 
according to his explanation, because in speech respect may be expressed 
by a general comparison : or if he declares his intention, to have been Zihar, 
that is accordingly established for, here appears a comparison with the 
5. Ibid. 
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whole person of his mother in which her back is included but as that is not 
expressly mentioned, the speaker's intention is requisite to estabhsh it. And 
if he declares his intention to be divorced, a divorce irreversible takes place, 
as his comparing his wife with his mother is likening her to one who is 
prohibited to him, and is therefore same as if he were to say; you are 
prohibited to me, thereby intending divorce; but if he declares that he had 
no positive intention neither Zihar nor divorce is established^. 
According to Imam Abu Hanifa and his two disciples Imam Abu 
Yusuf and Muhammad if the husband intends to render the wife unlawful to 
him by saying to her, "Thou art to me like the back of my mother", then 
expression will amount to divorce. But if he says to his wife; "Thou art my 
mother without saying, "to me" intends nothing in particular then according to 
Imam Abu Hanifa and his disciples, the effect is nil and there is no Zihar'. 
Thus, zihar is a form of imprecation which involves separation of the 
husband and wife until expiation is made. 
Religious basis of Zihar: 
The law about the zihar is based on the injunctions of the Holy 
Qur'an given as below: 
6. The Durr-UL-Mukhtar: English Translation by B.M. Dayal: p. 26 (1992) Kitab 
Bbawan, New Delhi. 
7. Ibid. 
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"Allah has not made 
For any man mo hearts 
In his (one) body: nor has 
He made your wives whom 
Ye divorce by Zihar nor has 
He made your wives whom 
Ye divorce by Zihar 
Your mother; nor has He 
Made adopted sons 
Your sons, such is (only) 
Your (manner of speech) 
By your mouths. But 
God tells you the truth and He 
Shows the (right) way'^ 
Regarding the zihar God at another place in the Holy Qur'an 
commands: 
"God has indeed 
had accepted the statement 
of the woman who pleads 
With the concerning her husband 
And carries her complaint 
(In prayer) to God; 
And God always hears 
The argument benveen both 
Sides among you: For God 
If my men among you 
Divorce their wives by zihar 
8. The Holy Qur'an; XXXIII; 4. 
251 
(Calling them mothers) 
They cannot be their mothers 
None can be their mothers 
Except those who gave them birth 
Andlnfact they use words (both) iniquitious, 
And false but truly 
God is one that blots out sins 
And forgives again andagain:^ 
Again the Holy Qur'an says: 
"Bui those who divorce their wives by Zihar 
then wish to go back on the words they uttered 
It is ordained that such one should free a 
Slave before they touch each other; 
To this are ye admonished 
To perform, and God is well acquainted with all that 
ye do."'" 
The Holy Qur'an further says to this effect; 
"And if any has not the means 
He should fast for mo months consecutively 
Before they touch each other. 
But if any is unable to do so, 
He should feed sixty indigent persons 
That is in order ye may show 
your faith in God. "" 
The occasion for the revelation of the instant verses is reported by 
Hazrat Ayesha that Khawlah Bint Thalabah presenting herself before the 
9. The Holy Qur'an; L Vlll: 2. 
10. The Holy Qur'an; L VIII. 3. 
11. The Holv Qur'an; L VIII: 4 
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Holy Prophet (PBUH) complained that she passed the prime of her life in 
the company of her husband but now that she had grown old, he had 
committed Zihar to her. Hence, she laid her complaint before God. It is said 
that by Hazrat Ayesha that Khawlah had yet not moved away when the said 
verses were revealed". The fact is that during Jahiliyah the evil custom of 
zihar was practiced by the Arabs by which they used to selfishly deprive his 
wife of her conjugal rights and kept her tied to himself like slave without 
his being free to remarry. He pronounced the word importing that she was 
like her mother. After that she could never demand conjugal rights but at 
the same time she was also not free from his control and could not contract 
another marriage. The Holy Qur'an had condenmed it in the strongest 
possible terms and punishment is provided for it. A man sometimes says 
such words in a fit of anger. They did not affect him but they degraded the 
position of a wife^ .^ 
However, in Pagan Arabs Zihar as a custom in the form of divorce 
was very much prevalent as it happened to Khawlah bint Thalabah. After 
using the word that "thou art to me as the back of my mother", the husband 
freed from any responsibility for conjugal duties. It means husband is not 
bound to support her and her children. In the case of Khawlah, the woman 
was having children who were too young and she was not having any 
12. Abdullah Yusuf Ali; The Glorious Qur'an: Translation and Commentary, p. 1103, 
2nd ed. (1977) American Trust Publication, Canada 
13. Ibid. 
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resources to support herself and her children. She pleaded before the Holy 
Prophet (PBUH), her just plea was accepted and this inquitous custom 
based on false word was abohshed. Because, He is a just God and will not 
allow human customs or pretences to trample on die just rights of the 
weakest of His creature. Such words are false in fact and inquitous, in as 
much as they are unfair to the wife and unseemly in a decent society. He 
prescribed in the next verse because He wishes to blot out what is wrong 
and gives as a chance to reform by his forgiveness* .^ 
Commenting upon the verses referred herein before. Islamic jurist 
Maulana Syed Abul A'ala Maududi lays down that indeed Allah has heard 
the saying of the woman who was pleading with the Holy Prophet (PBUH) 
about her husband and was making her complaint to Allah. Allah was 
hearing your mutual conversation and hears and sees all the things. Those 
of you who put away their wives by zihar should know that their wives are 
not their mothers. Their mothers are only those women who gave birth. 
They utter a monstous and lie and infact Allah is all pardoning and all 
forgiving. Those who pronounce zihar with regard to their wives then go 
back on what they had said shall have to free a slave before touching each 
otiier. This you are advised to do and Allah is well aware of whatever you 
do. And the one who does not have means to free a slave should fast two 
14. Ibid. 
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consecutive months before they touch each other. But if anyone is unable to 
do so, he should feed sixty indigent persons . 
No doubt, the principles of institution of zihar has been in detail 
explained in Sura LVIII: 1 to 5 of the Holy Qur'an and for the further 
clarification, it becomes necessary to go through the authentic Ahadith 
reported from the Holy Prophet (PBUH) on different occasions. 
"Salamah b. Sakhr al-Bayadi said: I was a man who was more given 
than others to sexual intercourse with woman. When the month of 
Ramadhan (fasting month) came, 1 feared lest 1 should have intercourse 
with my wife and this evil should remain with me till the morning. So 1 
made my wife like my mother's back to me till the end of Ramdhan. But 
one night when she was waiting upon me, something of her disclosed. 
Suddenly 1 jumped upon her. When the morning came 1 went to my people 
and informed them about this matter. 1 said; Go along with me to the 
Apostle of Allah (PBUH). They said: No by Allah. So 1 went to the Prophet 
(PBUH) and informed him of the matter. He said; Have you really 
committed it, Salamah? I said; 1 corunitted it tvdce, Apostle of Allah. I am 
content with the commandment of Allah; so take decision about me what 
Allah has shown you. He said; free a slave, 1 said; By Him who sent you 
with truth, 1 don't possess a neck other than this and 1 struck the surface of 
15. Syed. Abul A'Ala Maududi; The Holy Qur'an. Translation and brief notes with 
text; p. 557,2nd ed. (1987) Lahore. 
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my neck he said; then fast to consecutive months. I said; whatever I 
suffered was due to the fasting. He said; then feed sixty people with a wasq 
of dates. I said; by Him who sent you with the truth. We passed the ni^t 
hungry. There was no food with us. He said; then go to the collector of 
sadqah of Banu Zuraiq. He must give it to you. Then feed sixty indigent 
people with a wasq of dates and you and your family eat remaining dates. 
Then I cam back to my people and said to them. I found with you poverty 
and bad opinion and I found with Prophet (PBUH) prosperity and good 
opinion. He has commended me to give alms to you* .^ 
Another tradition relating to zihar is that Khuwaila daughter of 
Malik bin Thalabah said; My husband Awsbin Samit pronounced the 
words; you are like my mother. So 1 came to the Apostle of Allah (may 
peace upon him) complaining to him against my husband. The Apostle of 
Allah (PBUH) disputed with me and said; keep duty to Allah; your husband 
is your cousin. I continued complaining until the Qur'anic verses came 
down; Allah hath heard the saying of her that disputed with thee concerning 
her husband. He then said; he should set free a slave. She said; he can not 
afford. He said; he should fast for two consecutive months. She said; 
Apostle of Allah; he is an old man, he cannot keep fasts. He said; he should 
feed sixty poor people. He said; he is not having anything which he may 
16. Sunan Abu Dawud; English Translation with explanatory noted by Prof. Ahmad 
Hasan; vol. U, p. 597, (1985) Al Madina Pubhcation, New Delhi. 
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give in Alms. At the moment of araq (i.e. a date basket holding fifteen or 
sixteen) was brought to him. I said; I shall help him with another date 
basket (araq). He said you have done well. Go and feed sixty poor people 
on his behalf and return to your cousin*'. 
Narrating another tradition relating to zihar Ikrimah said; 'A man 
made his wife like the back of his mother, he then had intercourse with her 
before he atoned for it. He came to the Prophet (PBUH) and informed him 
of this matter. He asked him what moved you to the action which you have 
committed? He replied; 1 saw the whiteness of her shins in the moonlight. 
He said keep away from her until you expiate for your deed . 
Reporting another tradition regarding the impact of zihar Sayeed bin 
Amar Al Zuraiqi asked Qasim bin Muhammad. If a man says to a woman, if I 
marry you, divorce be to you, what would happen? Qasim bin Muhammad 
narrated that a man had spoken thus regarding a woman in the time of Hazrat 
Umar bin Al-Khattab and said; If I marry her, she shall be me like the back of 
my mother. Hazrat Umar bin Al-Khattab ordered that if he marries her, he 
shall not cohabit with her until he pays the penalty of Zihar. 
"It reached Malik that a man asked Qasim bin Muhammad and 
Sulaiman bin Yasar; what would ensue if a man should speak words of 
zihar to a woman prior to marriage? Both of them said; if that man should 
17. Ibid; p. 598. 
18. Muwatta Imam Malik: Translation with exhaxistive notes by Prof. Rahimuddin; P. 
294, V\ ed. (1981) Kitab Bhawan, New Delhi, 
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marry her, he should not cohabit with her until he paid the penalty of 
Zihar'' 
The brief survey of the above quoted Qur'anic injunction as well as 
Ahadilh lead to the conclusion that mere commission of Zihar by calling 
her "thou art me as the back of my mother", does not dissolve the marriage 
and the woman remains the wife of the person but sexual intimacy between 
couple become unlawful. It did not amount to divorce but only sexual 
intercourse was held to be forbidden till expiation for it was made for 
which no period was fixed. The marriage contract did, however, subsist. 
The above referred Qur'anic injunctions and Ahadith also make it clear that a 
wife does not become mother or his kins woman of prohibited degree by the 
idle and foolish talk of her husband and if he addresses her as his mother or 
sister and then wish to go back on the words he uttered, he is commanded to 
perform expiation prescribed for zihar before touching each other. 
Expression of Language constituting Zihar: 
There is no fixed formula for zihar and any expression can be used 
for the purpose. But the language should be clear, unambiguous and certain. 
There should be no uncertainty to the zihar and an uncertain expression of 
the zihar is invalid. Thus, if the husband says to his wife, 'God willing you 
are to me', then no zihar will be established. Zihar can be given orally or in 
19. Ibid. 
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writing and even by signs by a dumb person if they are well understood and 
devote his intention in this respect. 
In many cases an expression can amount to a divorce by the 
implication as well as to zihar. It becomes necessary in such a case to find 
the effect of the expression. According to the Muslim Jurists, such an 
expression takes effect according to the husband's intention as explained by 
him. Thus, if he were to say, "you are to me like my mother", it is necessary 
to ascertain his intention. The expression may he used merely to show 
respect or appreciation or to denote a divorce or a zihar or without any 
definite intention at all. In the first and the last cases the expression would 
neither establish a zihar nor a di\'orce. But in the second and third case, a 
zihar or divorce would be established according to the intention of the 
speaker. Hence, if he declares that he had no particular intention, zihar will 
not be established. But if he intended divorce, the divorce will be 
established. '^ 
When the expression used consists of a comparison of the wife to a 
part of the body of his mother or other prohibited woman as when he says, 
"You are me like the back of m\ mother", zihar only will be established 
because the expression is used only for zihar and it can not be used for 
20. Suprs note 6, p. 260. 
21. Ibid. 
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divorce and so, no divorce would be effected by such an expression even 
when such be the intention of the husband. 
Therefore, the pillar of zihar is a husband's saying, "thou art to me 
like the back of my mother", or the expression of the like effect. When a 
man has said, "thy head is to me", "or thy face", "or thy neck", "or thy 
nakedness", he becomes "a Muzahir"^ "*. So also when he has said, "thy body 
is to me like the back of my mother," or the fourth or half of three", or any 
other undivided portion. But if the part mentioned be one that does not 
imply the whole person, such as the hand or foot, zihar is not estabhshed if 
he should say "thy back is to me like the back of mother", or her belly", or 
her nakedness," it would not be a zihar. But if the person herself is likened 
to any member of his mother that it is unlawful for him to look on, it is the 
same as the likening to her back. So, also, if likening be to any other 
woman among those who are permanently prohibited to him, as his sister or 
aunt or foster sister. When the likening is to what may be lawfully seen as 
the hair, the face, the head, the hand the foot, it is not a zihar. Therefore, in 
order to constitute zihar the expression used must consists of comparison of 
the wife to a part of the body of his mother or other prohibited woman'''*. 
22. Ibid., p. 261. 
23. The term Muzahir means the comparer, "or husband who makes zihar. 
24. Neil B.E. BaUle; Digest of Moohammudan Law, p. 322, (1865), Smith Elder Co., 
London. 
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Therefore, comparison is a necessary condition to constitute zihar, 
and so there will be no zihar if there is no comparison as when a husband 
calls his wife as his daughter, mother etc.; without comparison the 
expression may amount to a divorce if he so intends but can not amount to 
zihar. Further, die comparison should not be to a woman permanently 
prohibited to him. If the wife be compared to a woman, only temporarily 
prohibited, there is no zihar. Thus, a comparison to one's sister-in-law will 
not amount to zihar as marriage with her is possible on the dissolution of 
the present marriage by divorce or on wife's death. When the comparison 
relates to a part of the body of a woman, that part must be such as is not 
proper for him to see. Hence, when the comparison is to what can be seen 
in decency by him as the face, hands, hair, etc., there is no zihar^ .^ 
Under the present law, however, mare statement of the husband will not 
suffice and the court will give its finding on the evidence produced before it 
and will be guided by the circumstances of the particular case. 
Capacity for Zihar: 
It is a condition of zihar that the husband be a person capable of 
making expiation, i.e., he must be a sane and adult. Hence, the zihar of a 
minor or insane person is not valid. Further, the husband should not be in a 
faint or under the influence of sleep. Zihar by any one in one of these 
conditions is not valid. But it is not necessary under the Hanafi law that the 
25. Ibid. p. 323. 
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husband should be in earnest so that zihar by one in jest or mistake is valid. 
Zihar under compulsion is valid and effective according to the Hanafi 
school of thought but Imam Shafai and Ahmad Ibn Hanbal do not agree 
with this view and according to them zihar under compulsion is invalid. 
Zihar by a dumb person is valid when he made in writing or by intelligible 
signs and with intention. Zihar by drunken man is vahd according to the 
Hanafi law^^ . 
The husband is competent to make zihar only in respect of his 
lawfully married wife. Hence, if a person says to a woman who is not his 
wife, "you are to me like the back of my mother" and afterwards marries 
her, Zihar shall not be established because the woman was not his wife 
when he used the expression of zihar. But if says to a woman, "/// marry 
then you are to me as the back of my mother" and afterwards marries her, 
then zihar shall be established and expiation shall become incumbent on 
him^l 
Zihar is valid to an infant wife or one under physical obstruction, or 
in her monthly course, or under purification after childbirth, or one who is 
insane or unenjoyed. If a man gives his wife revocable repudiation, and 
then a zihar while she is in her iddat, the zihar is valid. But not so if given 
to a wife thrice or irrevocably repudiated or to one under Khula even 
26. Supra note 24, p. 325. 
27. Ibid. 
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though iddat was unexpired. However, it is not open to the wife to use the 
expression of zihar against her husband. 
A wife against whom zihar has been made is entitled to call her 
Muzahir (i.e. one who has expressed a zihar) husband to return to his 
matrimonial duties. She can also prevent him from intimacy with her till he 
has made necessary expiation. If he does not make it, then according to 
Muslim law, the Qadi on her complaint is to imprison and punish him till 
he does so or repudiate her. The Qadi can also order the beating of the 
husband in such a case^*. 
Islam has thus forbidden to keep a wife in suspense by giving up 
intimacy with her and at the same time not divorcing her. There is a clear 
Qur'anic injunction in this regard: 
"But turn not away (from a woman) altogether so as to 
leave her (as it were) hanging (in the air) i.e. in the 
suspense"^^. 
If the husband declares that he has performed the expiation, his 
declaration is deemed sufficient and the Qadi is not required to inquire if 
the allegation is true or not and the husband's version will be accepted as 
correct until it is proved to be incorrect. 
28. K.N. Ahmad; The Muslim Law of Divorce; p. 121, (1984), kitab Bhawan, New 
Delhi. 
29. The Holy Qur an; IV: 129. 
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Duration ,of Zihar: 
Zihar can be limited in point of time. Thus, where a husband says to 
his wife, "you are to me like my mother's back for one year", zihar will be 
effective for the period of one year only and will become ineffective after 
that period and he can renew his sexual relations with her on the expiry of 
the period without incurring expiation. But according to Maliki Law, an 
expression of zihar limited in time shall amount to an absolute zihar and 
shall not become ineffective with the expiry of the specified time. Expiation 
would, however, be incumbent on him if he is intimate with the wife before 
the expiry of the period. Imam Shafai and Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal also 
agree with view of Imam Abu Hanifa'". 
Therefore, when a man has said to his wife, "thou art to me like the 
back of my mother, tomorrow", or after tomorrow, it is but one zihar but if 
he were to say; thou art to me like the back of my mother tomorrow and 
when after tomorrow has come, there would be two zihars and if, he makes 
expiation today, it would not suffice for zihar which would take effect after 
tomorrow. If he were to say, "thou art to me like the back of my mother 
every day, there would be only one Zihar which would be cancelled by one 
repudiation. But if he were to say, "thou art me like the back of my mother 
in every day", the zihar would be renewed each day and when one day had 
30. Supranote28, p. 122. 
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passed, the zihar of that day would be void but he would become Muzahir 
by a new zihar for the next day. He might however, have intercourse with 
her in the night and if he makes expiation in the day, the zihar of that day 
would be void, but it would return on tomorrow^*. 
Legal Effect of Zihar: 
The legal effect of zihar is that though the marriage contract shall 
remain intact but having sexual intercourse or any other like solicitation 
with the wife shall be forbidden as long as the husband does not expiate the 
transgression. Hence, if the husband tells his wife that "she is to me like the 
back of my mother", the wife becomes forbidden to him and his carnal 
connection with her becomes unlawful as well as every conjugal 
familiarity, such as, kissing and endearment with the wife becomes 
forbidden until he performs expiation for the zihar according to the rules 
enjoined in sacred Holy verses of the divine Book Qur'an"* .^ 
However, if the husband has sexual intercourse with the wife before 
performing expiation, pardon must be asked of the God but no other 
penalty is incurred than the first expiation and the husband should refrain 
from her till expiation is performed. Though after the zihar, if the husband 
repudiates the marriage irrevocably and then marry her again, the sexual 
31. Supra note 24, p. 325. 
32. Dr. Tanzil-ur Rahman; A code of Muslim Personal Law, Vol. T ' , p. 502, (1978), 
Karachi-Pakistan. 
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intercourse of any other kind of enjoyment with her would be still unlawful 
till expiation is performed by the husband. Similarly, if the wife is a slave 
and her husband commits zihar against her, and then purchases her, so as to 
cancel the marriage by virtue of her becoming his property or if being free, 
she apostatises from the Islam, joins herself to the Dar-ul-Hurb or a foreign 
country; be captured and then purchased by her husband; or if after zihar he 
himself apostatizes from the faith of Islam or if he repudiates his wife three 
times and she was then married to another husband and then subsequently 
returns to the first, in none of these cases would sexual intercourse be 
lawful till expiation. And if both the husband and wife apostatise together 
and then return to the original faith, they would still be under the zihar^ .^ 
In all that has been said with regard to the effect of zihar, it is 
imphed that the zihar is absolute and perpetual. But when it is limited in 
point of time, as if it were for a known time, as a day or month, or year, 
then, if he approaches her within the time, expiation is obligatory on him 
but if he does not approach her till the expiration of the time, expiation is 
dropped and zihar itself is cancelled '^*. 
Thus, the effect of zihar may, in nutshell, be summarized as follows: 
Prohibition of Sexual Intercourse: 
The effect of zihar is that it simply prohibit the person who 
33. Ibid. 
34. Ibid. 
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pronounces it jfrom sexual connection with his wife as well as from kissing, 
embracing or touching her and similar acts until he shall have made 
expiation. The marriage is not, however, dissolved by mere zihar. 
Matrimonial Rights of Wife: 
The wife is entitled to call her Muzahir husband to pay her 
maintenance allowance and on his failure to do so, she can approach the 
court. The court shall force the Muzahir (one who has pronounced a zihar) 
husband either to perform the necessary expiation or on his failure to do so, 
to divorce his wife. The Court should give the husband three months time 
either to make expiation or to return to his wife or to divorce her. If the 
husband fails to do either, the court can restrict his food and water, starve 
him and even beat him to compell him to do one of the alternatives. The 
court can also imprison the husband till he either makes the expiation or 
divorces his wife. But the Judge cannot himself pronounce a divorce on 
behalf of the husband. 
Expiation: 
Another effect of zihar is that it becomes obligatory on the part of a 
Muzahir to make an expiation if he intends to have intercourse with his wife 
after the zihar. But if he is determined that she should remain unlawful to 
him, and has no intention of returning to matrimonial intercourse with her 
he is not liable to expiation. When he has once resolved on renewing such 
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intercourse and expiation has in consequence become incumbent on him, he 
may be compelled to make it but if he again determines to refrain, the 
necessity for expiation would drop and so also if either of the parties dies 
after the resolution to renew^ .^ 
The expiation for zihar is the emancipation of an absolute slave of 
whom the husband is the owner and who is in possession of all his useful 
capacities without any exchange and with the intention of making 
expiation. It makes no difference whether the slave is Muslim fidel, male or 
female an infant or adult. When a slave has been emancipated without any 
intention of expiation, but intention is super added after the emancipation 
has taken place, the expiation is not lawful when a man has incurred two 
zihar and has emancipated two slaves without intending to particularize one 
to each zihar the expiation is lawfiil^. 
When a Muzahir can not obtain a slave to emancipate the proper 
expiation is for him to fast for two consecutive months which do not 
include the month of Ramadhan nor the day of Idul-fitr (the festival which 
follows the Ramadhan) or of Nuhr (the day of sacrifice the 10* of Zil-
Hijjah) nor any of the days of Tasreeh (three days after nuhr i.e., the 10* of 
Zil-Hijjah). If the husband has intercourse with the wife to whom he is a 
Muzahir during the day, whether through forgetfiilness or willfiiUy, he must 
35. Supra Note 24, p. 326. 
36. Ibid. 
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recommence the fast, according to Imam Abu Hanifa and Imam 
Muhammad and if it was willfully in the day, the fast must be 
recommenced according to them all when the intercourse is with another 
woman than the one whom he is Muzahir, then, if the intercourse be one 
which vitiate the fast, it must be recommenced, by general agreement; and 
if it be not one that vitiates the fast, there is no necessity for its renewal. 
When expiation is by fasting and the fast is broken by reason on any cause, 
such as sickness, or a Journey, it must be recommenced. When the Muzahir 
eats during the fast of Zihar through the forgetfuhess of his fast, it would 
not harm^^ . 
When the Muzahir is unable to fast, he must feed sixty poor persons. 
In this respect the Fakeer and Miskeen are alike. It is not lawful to give to 
any one out of his expiation to whom it is not unlawful to give out of zakat 
with the exception only of poor zimmees to whom it is lawful to give out of 
expiation. According to Imam Abu Hanifa and Imam Muhammad the poor 
should be preferred. But it is not lawful to give any of it to the poor 
enemies, though they may be living within the Mushm territory. When the 
Muzahir has directed another to feed poor for him and it is done, the 
expiation is lawful but the person so directed has no right to recourse 
37. Ibid. p. 329. 
38. Both words are applicable to person in want. By the term Fakeer is to be 
understood, a person possessed of property, the whole of which amounts to less 
than a nisab; by miskeen means a person who has no property. A nisab is the 
lowest amount assessable to Zakat. 
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against him on account of food bestowed, for, it is susceptible of being a 
Loan (karz) oral gift and recourse can not be had by reason of doubt. If, 
however, in giving direction he had said, "On condition that you may have 
recourse against me", the person directed might have such recourse '^. 
Application of Zihar in India and Pakistan: 
The doctrine of zihar is very rarely used in India and Pakistan. It is 
proved by the fact that there is no case law on the subject. But doctrine of 
zihar is still applicable to Muslims in India and Pakistan. Section 2 of the 
Muslim Personal law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, and clause IX of the 
section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim marriage Act 1939 make it clear"*". 
Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 
1937 reads as follows: 
"In all the cases regarding dissolution of Marriage including zihar, 
the rule of decision in cases where the parties are Muslim shall be the 
Muslim Personal Law". 
Section 2 Clause IX of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act 
1939 provides; 
"On any ground which is recognised as valid for the dissolution of 
marriage under Muslim Law: 
39. Supra Note 4, p. 54. 
40. SupraNote32, p. 503. 
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This is a residuary provision covering other grounds such as khula 
Mubara'at, Tafwid, Ila, Zihar and lian, as mentioned in the Shariat Act, 
1937. 
The Holy verses enshrined in the Qur'an, the Ahadith reported from 
the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and the opinions expressed by Islamic Jurists 
belonging to all the four schools regarding the institutions of zihar lead to 
the unrebuttable conclusion that mere husband's comparison of his wife 
with his mother or any female relation within the prohibited degrees does 
not by itself dissolve the marriage but its legal effects are that the carnal 
coimection as well as every other conjugal familiarity, such as, kissing and 
touching, becomes unlawful till he has expiated himself by performing the 
penalty as is enjoined in the sacred writing of Holy Qur'an as well as 
directed by the saying of the Holy Prophet (PBUH). 
However, if the Muzahir husband fails to perform the expiation for 
the zihar or persists to his utterance of zihar, then the wife shall have the 
right to approach the court either for judicial separation or for a regular 
divorce on the ground of zihar invoking Section 2 Clause IX of the 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act 1939. 
Thus the law of zihar, too like the law of ila, protects the wife 
against a particular kind of desertion by the husband. This law too does not 
put in the hands of the husband just one more' form of arbitrary divorce. 
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Here the husband may be keeping away from the wife after rendering her 
haram (absolutely prohibited) for him by describing her as his mother or 
sister etc. with whom marriage is permanently prohibited. In this case also 
the husband is expected to expiate and resume cohabitation but unlike Ua, 
there is no fixed period for resumption of cohabitation after zihar^ V 
The law of zihar, too, has a statutory recognition under due Shariat 
Act 1937. Therefore, an Indian wife whose husband has deserted her by 
Zihar can, sue for faskh under Section 2(iv) of the Dissolution of Muslim 
Marriage Act, 1939. At the commencement of the hearing if the husband 
expresses his willingness to resume cohabitation, the suit may be dismissed. 
If he persists in keeping away from the wife after zihar, the judicial divorce 
may be granted'* .^ 
41. Tahir Mahmood: The Muslim Law of India; p. 107, 2nd ed. (1982), Law Book Co. 
Allahabad. 
42. Ibid. p. 108. 
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DIVORCE BY LIAN: CONCEPT AND PROCEDURE 
Conceptual analysis: 
Under the Islamic law a person who slanders another is liable to 
Hadd-ul-Kazf (the specific punishment for slander). Moreover, when a man 
accuses and maligns his wife of adultery, in majority of the cases, he 
escapes the punishment to be inflicted for the slander. Therefore, in order to 
restrain the slanderer and subject him to a defmite penalty for accusation as 
well as to enable the wife to clear her reputation by taking an oath in public 
against the charge of adultery, it was provided that when a charge of 
adultery was made against a woman, the accuser and accused were bound 
to proceed to the Qazi and mutually take oath prescribed by law. This 
exercise is popularly known in Shariah as Lian*. 
The term Lian is derived from the word 'Lan' the literal meaning 
whereof is "to put away or drive away" because one who is subjected to 
Lian is put away from all the pervading mercy of God. Technically, it 
signifies a form of divorce by means of invoking curse. Here it means to 
drive away from the mercy of Allah on account of imprecations involving 
the curse and wrath of Allah. When a husband accuses a lawfully wedded 
wife of adultery directly or indirectly as when he denies the paternity of a 
child bom of her during wedlock, she has a right to apply to the Qazi to 
1. Fatawa-i-Qazi Khan: Translated & edited by Maulvi Mohammad Yusoof Khan; 
Vol. II, p. 153, (1986) Kitab Bhawan New Delhi. 
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order the husband either to support his accusation by taking the special 
prescribed oaths or to admit the falsity of his charge. This procedure of 
taking oaths is called Lian and consists in giving of evidence or testimony 
in person by the husband as well as by the wife before the Qazi. The oaths 
are strengthened by imprecation of curse and the wrath of God. The Lian 
becomes due when the husband accuses his wife of adultery under such 
circumstances that if he had made the accusation against any other woman 
then he would be liable to prosecution for defamation^. 
Therefore, making by the husband and denial by the wife of a charge 
of adultery on oath and invoking the curse and wrath of God by each on 
oneself, if swearing falsely, is called Lian. 
Lian in shariah means the giving of evidence or testimony by the 
husband and wife, each in person, four times in the presence of Qazi, such 
evidence or testimony having been strengthened by oath. The husband's 
evidence being further accompanied by the use of word Ian or curse of 
Allah and the e\idence or testimony of the woman being further 
accompanied by the use of word Ghazab or wrath of Allah, the evidence of 
the husband standing in the place of Hudd-i-Qudhuf; so far as the husband 
is concerned i.e., the husband having accused the wife of zina or adultery, 
he would have been liable to the punishment of kuzuf or slander but for this 
procedure the punishment for slander is extinguished and Lian takes place 
2. Ibid. 
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and so far as the woman is concerned, her evidence standing in place of 
Hadd-e-Zina, i.e. the punishment of zina having become extinguished. The 
Lian takes the place of punishment for Zina. So far as the woman is 
concerned, she invokes the wrath of Allah when giving evidence is more 
destructive in its effect than punishment. The condition for the validity of 
Lian is subsistence of the relationship of the husband and wife and that 
nikah is Sahih and not invalid. The cause of Lian is the husband's accusing 
the wife of zina under the circumstances that if such accusation had been 
made against a stranger woman, it would make him liable to Hadd-e-
Qudhuf, i.e., to say the wife should be Muhsinah and Afifah i.e. one not 
having the reputation of the committing zina. The pillars of Lian are the 
evidence or testimony four in number strengthened by the use of the oath 
by God. The effect of Lian is that after the Lian is made it is unlawftil for 
the husband to have the sexual intercourse with the wife. The person fit to 
make Lian is a man who is qualified to give testimony^. 
According to the Hedaya, Lian in the language of law, signifies 
testimonies confirmed by oath, on the part of a husband and a wife (where 
the testimony is strengthened by an imprecation of the course of God on the 
part of the husband and of the wrath of God on the part of wife) in case of 
the former accusing the latter of adultery. Therefore, if a man slanders his 
3. Anwar Ahmad Qadri; Islamic Jurisprudence in the Modem World; p 395; Z"""; ed. 
1981, Lahore-Pakistan. 
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wife i.e. he accuses her of whoredom or deny the descent of a child bom of 
her by saying, "this is not my child", and she requires him to produce the 
ground of his accusation, imprecation is incumbent upon him provided both 
the parties are competent to testify on oath, that is to say, they are of sound 
mind adultery, free and Muslim and that the woman is of a description to 
subject her slanderer to punishment .^ 
Religious Sanction of Lian 
Holy Qur'an: 
In case of a Lian the husband accuses the wife of adultery but he has 
got no witness to prove it and the wife denies it. Both the husband and the 
wife go to a Qazi (Judge) and take mutual cursing. There shall be 
accusation of adultery four successive times and the wife must deny the 
accusation each time it is uttered. At the fifth time, the husband invokes 
curse upon himself if he is false and the wife upon herself if she is false in 
the denial of adultery. After the parties have thus proceeded, they are 
separated forever by the decree of the Qazi. 
The instant principle of Lian derives the religious legal sanction 
from the following verse of the Holy Qur'an which says: 
4. The Hedaya, Translated by Charles Hamilton, Vol.IInd,P. 123,Kitab Bhawan Delhi. 
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"And those who launch 
A charge against chaste woman 
And produce not four witnesses 
To support their allegation. 
Flog them with eighty stripes, 
And reject their evidence ever after; 
For, such men are wicked transgressors^." 
Describing the procedure of Lian the Holy Qur'an further says: 
"And for those who launch 
A charge against their spouses 
And have in support 
No evidence but their own; 
Their solitary evidence 
Can be received if they bear witness four times with an 
oath by God 
That they are solemnly telling truth. 
And the fifth oath (should be) that they solemnly 
Invoke the course of God, 
On themselves if they tell a lie^." 
And the fifth oath 
Should be that she solemnly 
Invoke the wrath of God. 
On herself if her accuser 
Is telling the truth, 
If it were not for God's grace and mercy 
Is oft returning full of wisdom 
Ye would reuined indeecf. 
5. Holy Qur'an; XXTV; 4. 
6. Holy Qur'an; XXTV: 6-7. 
7. Holv Qur'an; XXTV: 8-9. 
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Occasion of the revelation of above verse: 
The occasion for the revelation of this verse is said to be the case of 
Hilal b. Omayyad. Ibn Abbas reported that Hilal imputed adultery to his 
wife with Sharik bin Sahma in the presence of Apostle of Allah. The verse 
of the Qur'an regarding slander of woman had been revealed before them in 
which it is laid down," those who accuse woman of reputation (of adultery) 
and produce not four witnesses (of the fact) flog them with the eighty 
stripes and never accept their evidence." The Holy Prophet (PBUH) there 
upon asked Hilal to produce four eye-witnesses or to undergo the 
punishment of eighty stripes. Hazrat Hilal expressed his inabilit>' to 
produce the witnesses and said, "O Messenger of Allah, when one of us 
sees a man upon his wife, must he go away to look for witnesses?" The 
Holy Prophet (PBUH) again asked him to bring proof or undergo the 
prescribed punishment. Hilal then said," I am certainly a truthfuhnan; let 
Allah reveal what will prove me not guilty for the prescribed sentence. 
Then the Qur'anic verse," And those who launch a charge against their 
spouse but have no witness except themselves; reciting till he reached". 
One of those who speak truth", was revealed. The Prophet (PBUH) then 
returned and sent for them, and they came to him. Hilal stood up and 
testified and Holy Prophet (PBUH) was saying; Allah knows that one of 
you is a liar. Is there one of you to repent? She got-up and testified. When 
she came near five times, they prevented her and said that it would make 
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(punishment) obligatory. Ibn Abbas said; Then she stopped and delayed till 
we thought that she would return. Afterwards, she said; I shall not 
dishonour my people for all times. Then she went away. The Holy Prophet 
(PBUH) said: Look at her; if she gives birth to a child, black of eye balls, 
perfect of bones and fat of buttocks, it is for Sharik b. Sahma". 
Explaining the principles enshrined in the verse XXIV: 6 and 7 of 
the Holy Qur'an as to the Lian, Abdullah Yusuf Ali comments that the case 
of married person is different fi^om that of outsiders. If one of them accuses 
the other of unchastity, the accusation partly reflects on the accuser as well. 
Moreover, the link which unites married people, even where differences 
supervene, is sure to act as a steadying influence against the concoction of 
false charges of unchastely particularly where divorce is allowed (as in 
Islam) for the reasons other than unchastely. Suppose a husband catches a 
wife in adultery. In the nature of things four witnesses or even one outside 
witness would be impossible. Yet after such an experience, it is against 
human nature that he can live a normal married life. The matter is then left 
to the honour of the two spouses. If the husband can solemnly swear four 
times to the fact and in addition invokes a curse on himself, if he lies, that 
is, prima facie evidence of the wife's guilt. But if the wife swears similarly 
four times and similarly invokes a curse on herself, she is in law acquitted 
8. Sunan Abu Dawud. English Translation with explanatory notes by Prof. Ahmad 
Hasan: Vol. II, p.608 (1985) Al-Madina Publication, Delhi. 
279 
of the guilt. If she does not take this step, the charge is held proved and the 
punishment follows. In either case, the marriage is dissolved as it is against 
nature that the parties can live together happily after such an incident'. 
Commenting on the verse another noted Islamic Jurist Maulana Syed 
Abul A'Ala Maududi writes that those who accuse their wives but have no 
witnesses except themselves, the evidence of one of them is that he shall 
swear four times by Allah and declare that he is true in his charge. Then the 
fifth time, he shall declare that Allah's curse be upon him if he is false in his 
charge. As far the woman is concerned it shall avert the punishment from 
her if she swear four times by Allah that the man is false (in his charges) 
and the fifth time she invokes Allah's wrath upon herself, if he be true in his 
charge. If Allah had not shown you His grace and mercy and if Allah had 
not been most forgiving and all wise you would have been in great fex 
because of accusing your wives'". 
The whole object of introducing this procedure as to making of Lian 
was intended to prevent the husband and wife receiving the punishment 
prescribed respectively for slander and adultery which should have been 
inevitable because of the stringency of law as to evidence. In a proceeding 
of Lian, the curse on the part of the man becomes a substitute for Hadd-ul-
9. Abdullah Yusuf Ali: The Glorious Qur 'an. Translation and commentan,'; p. 1104, 
2"^  ed. (1977), American Trust publication. Canada. 
10. Syed Abul A'Ala Maududi: The Holy Qur'an: Translation and Brief Notes With 
Text; p. 555, 2™' ed. (1987), Lahore-Pakistan. 
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Qaduf (specific punishment for slander) and the Ghazab or wratii on the 
part of the wife becomes a substitute for Hadd-e-Zina (specific punishment 
for adultery) and tiie invoking of wrath of Allah when giving evidence are 
more destructive in its effect than punishment. 
Lian and Ahadith: 
The principle and procedure of Lian described by the Holy Qur'an 
has been translated into realit> by the Holy Prophet (PBUH) of Allah in the 
following cases reported in the Ahadith book which are reproduced here; 
Sahl b. Saad al-Saidi said that Uwaimir bin Ashqar al-Ajlani came to 
Asim bin Adi al-Ansari and said to him; "O Asim, tell me about a man who 
finds a man along with his wife. Should he kill him and then be killed by 
you or how should he act? Ask the Apostle of Allah (PBUH) about it. Asim 
then asked the Apostle of Allah (PBUH) about it. The apostle of Allah 
disliked the question and denounced it. What Asim heard fi-om Apostie of 
Allah fell heavy on him. When Asim returned to his family, Uwaimir came 
to him and asked; what did the Apostie of Allah (PBUH) say to you? Asim 
replied; you did not do good to me. The Apostle of Allah disliked the 
question that I asked him. Thereupon Uwaimir said; 1 swear by Allah, 1 
shall not leave until 1 ask him about it. So Uwaimir came to the Apostle of 
Allah (PBUH) while he was sitting in the midst of the people. He said; 
Apostie of Allah, tell me about a man who finds a man along with his wife. 
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Should he kill him then be killed by you, or how should he act? The 
Apostle of Allah (PBUH) said; A revelation (Qur'an: XXIV:6) has been 
sent down about you and your wife so go away and bring her. Sahl said; so 
we cursed one another while I was along with the people who were with the 
Apostle of Allah. Then when they finished, Uwaimir said; I shall have lied 
against her, Apostle of Allah, if I keep her. He pronounced her divorce 
three times before Apostle of Allah. Apostle of Allah (PBUH) commanded 
him to do so." 
Narrated Sayeed bin Zubair; I asked Ibn Umar; what is verdict if a 
man accuses his wife of illegal sexual intercourse? Ibn Umar said, "The 
Prophet (PBUH) separated (by divorce) the Couple of Bani-al-Ajlan and 
said to them, Allah knows one of you (two) is a liar, so will one of you 
repent? But both of them refused. So he separated them by divorce. Ayyub 
a sub narrator said, Amr bin Dinar said to me, there is something else in 
this Hadith which you have not mentioned. It goes thus; the man said, 'what 
about my money i.e. the Mahr, that I have given to my wife? It was said, 
you have no right to restore any money, for if you have spoken the truth (as 
regards the accusation) you have also consummated the marriage with her; 
and if you have told a lie, you are less rightful to have your money back.^ ^ 
11. Sahih-Al-Bukhari: Translated bv Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan; Vol. VII, p. 174. 
(1984) Kitab Bhawan New Delhi. 
12. Ibid. 
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Narrated Sayeed bin Zubair: I asked Ibn Umar about those who are 
involved in the case of Lian. He said: The Prophet (PBUH) of Allah 
(PBUH) said to the spouses who invoked curses on each other; your 
accounts are in Allah's hands. One of you is a liar and you (the husband) 
have no right over her and she is divorced. The man said, what about my 
property (Mahr)? The Holy Prophet (PBUH) said, "you have no right to get 
back your property if you have told the truth about her, then your property 
was for the consumation of your marriage with her and if you told a lie 
about her then you are less right full to get your property back."" 
Narrates Abdullah bin Masud; we were in mosque on the night of a 
Friday; suddenly a man from Ansar entered the mosque and said: If a man 
finds a man along with his wife and declares (about her adultery), you will 
flog him or if he kills, you will kill him, or if keeps silence, he will keep 
silence in anger. 1 swear by Allah, I shall ask the Apostle of Allah (PBUH) 
about it. On the next day he came to the Apostle of Allah and said; if a man 
fmds a man along with his wife and declares (about her adultery), you will 
flog him or if he kills you will kill him, or if he keeps silence, you will keep 
silence in anger. He said, O'Allah, disclose. He kept on praying until the 
verses regardmg invoking courses (Lian) came down; "And for those who 
accuses their wives but have no witnesses except themselves". So the man 
was fust involved in this trial from among the people. He and his wife 
13. Ibid. 
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came to the Apostle of Allah (PBUH). They invoked cursed on each other. 
The man bore witness before Allah four times that the thing he said was 
indeed true. He then invoked curse of Allah on him the fifth time if he was 
a liar. She then wanted to invoke curse of Allah on him. The Prophet 
(PBUH) of Allah said; Do not do that. But she refiised, and did so i.e. 
invoked curses. When they returned, he said; Perhaps she will give birth to 
a black child with curly hair.*'* 
The effect of the combined reading of the Holy verse XXIV: 6 of the 
Qur'an and Ahadith is that if a man who accuses his wife of immorality and 
he does not have witnesses to support the accusation, should swear four 
times by Allah that he is truthful and the fifth time that Allah's wrath be on 
him if he tells a lie. Similarly the wife can save herself by swearing four 
times by Allah that her husband is a liar and the fifth time by swearing that 
Allah's wrath be on her if her husband is speaking truth. The case of 
Uwaimir Ajlani also makes it clear that after the reported incident husband 
and wife were separated from each other after invoking curses. According 
to Imam Malik and Imam Shafi'i, the separation was effected by invoking 
curses. Abu Hanifa maintains that Judge i.e. the court should separate them. 
Moreover, the Lian is applicable only in that situation when the 
husband is unable to produce four witnesses in support of his accusation 
14. Supra note 8, p. 607. 
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against his wife. Therefore, when the four eye-witnesses of adultery are 
produced, the judge or court has no power to pass order for Lian. 
Capacity for Lian: 
As a general rule only those persons are competent to take Lian who 
have the capacity to appear as witness in any case. It means that they 
should be adult and possessed of the sound understanding. Thus, if a 
husband is a minor and has not attained discretion or is a lunatic or is dumb, 
no Lian is incumbent on him. As a matter of fact he is not liable to 
conviction even for a slander. Similarly, if the wife is a child of tender age 
or is a lunatic or is dumb, she is not entitled to claim Lian. The disability of a 
dumb person is due to the fact that he or she cannot repeat the prescribed oath 
by speech. Also because such a person is not capable of accusing a woman of 
adultery in words while his signs may be misunderstood and imprecations are 
not incumbent unless the accusation is expressed in words. Lian is, however, 
applicable when both the spouses or one of them is blind.** 
Further to have recourse to Lian under the Hanafi law, the husband 
and wife should be Muslims, adults and of sound mind. It is also necessary 
that the wife should not be a slave girl or a Christian or a Jews even when 
married to a Muslim. This is based on a tradition that the Holy Prophet 
(PBUH) has said that there are four classes of women on whom Lian is not 
15, K.N.Ahmad: The Muslim Lcm of Divorce, p. 462, (1984) Kitab Bhawan New 
Delhi. 
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incumbent, namely, Jews, and Christians married to Muslims, and slaves 
married to Muslims and free woman married to slaves. But some Jurists 
hold that Lian can be resorted to even when the wife belongs to a revealed 
religion because the verse of the Qur'an quoted here in before does not 
restrict the word wife to Muslims only. It is also necessary that neither of 
the spouses should have been convicted previously for slander because on 
being punished for slander the husband or wife's evidence cannot be 
admitted afterwards in any case even if he or she repents. According to 
Imam Shafi'i, his credibility shall be restored by retraction or repentance. 
The same rule applies to wife also.**' 
Imam Shafi'i, Imam Malik and Ahmad bin Hanabal do not debar a 
woman of a questionable character or a non-Muslim or a slave girl from 
having recourse to Lian. Under Shafi'i law Lian is incumbent even when 
the husband is dumb because his signs are equivalent to spoken words.'' 
Imam Shafi'i holds that a husband may with impunity accuse his 
wife of unchastity even though he be unable to furnish legal proof when he 
knows for certain that she has been guilty of it or when he has grave and 
well founded suspicion upon the subject or when the woman's guilt is of 
public knowledge as when she and adulterer were surprised by some one in 
the act of her misconduct.*^ 
16. Ibid p. 463. 
17. Ibid p. 464. 
18. Ibid 
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The Shia Law of Lian is practically the same as the Sunni law. It is 
laid down in the Sharai al-lslam that there can be no Lian with respect to a 
woman married by Mutah or temporary marriage. The wife should not be 
deaf or dumb. The husband should not be blind because then he is 
incapable of witnessing the wife's guilt. It is not necessary that proceedings 
of Lian should be held before the Qazi. The parties can agree to follow the 
proceeding before any particular Mujtahid, a duly qualified learned man in 
fiqh.»^ 
Procedure of Performing Lian : 
The special procedure prescribed by Islam for performing Lian is 
laid down in the Holy Qur'an (XXI\': 6 & 8) which has been explained by 
the Muslim Jurists (Faqih) as follows. 
The Qazi (Judge) first should ask the husband either to take the 
prescribed oath or to admit the falsit\- of his charge against his wife. In the 
latter case he renders himself liable to punishment for slander but the 
marriage shall not be dissolved. If the husband refuses to do either, he shall 
be imprisoned till he either takes the prescribed oath or admits the falsity of 
his accusation.^ ** 
However, if the husband persists in his accusation, the Qazi shall 
19. Ibid. 
20 The Durr-ul-Mukhtar: English Translation by B.M.Dayal. p. 266(1992) Kitab 
Bhawan New Delhi. 
287 
first administer the oath to him (the husband) and the husband in the 
presence of the Qazi shall say four times, "I swear in the name of Allah that 
1 am assuredly true in what I say about the adultery of this woman". After 
that the husband will be required to pronounce the imprecations by saying 
about himself, curse of Allah be upon me if 1 am untrue in the accusation of 
adultery that I have made against this woman, while pointing towards that 
woman. After this the Qazi should admonishe the wife and advise her to 
give up her demand, but if she persists, he would ask her either to take 
prescribed oaths or admit her guilt. If she refuses to take the prescribed 
oaths or to admit her guilt then, under the Hanafi Law, she shall be 
imprisoned till she complies with the Qazi's order. Imam Malik, Imam 
Shafi'i and Imam Ahmad bin Hanabal hold otherwise and state that she 
shall be punished for commission of adultery. If she admits her guilt of 
adultery, the marriage shall not be dissolved. But if she persists that her 
husband's accusation is false, then the Qazi shall administer to her the 
oaths. She shall say four times, "1 swear in the name of Allah that the 
husband is assuredly a liar in the accusation of adultery that he has made 
against me and then pronounce the imprecations by saying a fifth time, 
"Allah's wrath descend on me if the husband is true in the accusation of 
adultery that he has made against me".^ * 
21. Ibid. 
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A denial by a husband that a child ah-eady bom to his wife does not 
belong to him amounts to an accusation of adultery and the wife shall have 
the right to Lian. An accusation couched in ambiguous expression and 
made indirectly may not be considered sufficient for Lian. Thus, if a 
husband were to say to his wife, "Your pregnancy is not of me," the 
expression does not necessarily amount to a charge of adultery on the 
ground of uncertainty for, it is impossible that she may not be pregnant at 
all. This is according to Imam Abu Hanifa. But Imam Abu Yusuf and 
Muhammad hold that this statement shall amount to an accusation if a child 
is bom to her within six months of the time of accusation.^ ^ 
When both the parties have taken the imprecations and invoked the 
curse and wrath of Allah, the Judge is to order the husband to divorce his 
wife and on his refusal or failure to do so the Qazi shall himself dissolve 
the marriage. 
Effects of Lian : 
The effect of Lian is that the husband's having sexual intercourse 
with his wife-becomes forbidden so long as the Lian remains in force. If the 
husband after effecting Lian retracts i.e. he proves himself a liar, the 
prohibitory effect of Lian shall cease. After Lian (but before Qazi effects 
separation between the couple) if the husband retracts i.e., he confesses that 
22. Ibid. 
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he had falsely accused his wife, in such event, it shall be lawful for the 
husband (without entering into re-marriage) to have sexual intercourse with 
the wife. If the Qazi effects separation and thereafter the husband admits of 
his being a liar, the couple by mutual consent, may re-enter into fresh 
marriage contract. But if the Lian continues the wife in such event shall 
continue to remain forbidden to the husband. This is how the matter stands 
according Imam Abu Hanifa and Muhammad Al-Shabani. According to 
Abu Yusuf, however, a perpetual prohibition is created on account of Lian 
and they can never unite in marriage in any case as the Holy Prophet 
(PBUH), had said, "Those who effect Lian (both the parties) shall never 
unite." According to Imam Malik, Shafi'i and Ahmad bin Hanabal, 
everlasting separation shall get effected and in no case they would be able 
to reunite." 
Al-Shirani, the author of Al-Mizan al-Kubra, writes that the 
averments of Hazrat Umar, Ha22rat Ali, Ibn Masud, Ibn Umar are also in 
accord with that Abu Hanifa to the effect that on account of Lian a 
restriction is placed on the sexual rights. When the husband belies himself 
i e. he admits himself to be a liar, the restriction shall get removed.^ '* 
Al-Shirani further writes that according to Imam Malik and Imam 
Bin Hanbal, the separation on account of Lian shall get effected but it 
23 Al-Shram Al-Mizanat-Kubra. Vol II, p 127, Quoted by Dr. Tanzil-Ur-Rahman A 
Code of Muslim Personal Law. Vol 1**, p 506, (1978), Karachi-Pakistan 
24. Ibid 
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should be accompanied by the order of separation from the Qazi. The 
assertion of Imam Abu Hanifa is same to that effect. It is a well know 
assertion of Imam Ahmad b. Hanabal that separation shall not get effected 
without the Lian of the wife and the order of the Qazi. The court official 
shall have to decree the separation between the couple. According to Imam 
Shafri, however, separation shall get effected on Lian being effected by tiie 
Husband because on the Husband's Lian the denial of parentage is 
established^ .^ 
Imam Malik has expressed the opinion that a separation takes place 
when the husband and the wife have taken a prescribed oath even before the 
Qazi's order. ^ ^ 
According to Imam Shafi'i the husband's imprecation results in a 
separation between the parties without any order of Qazi. According to Shia 
law, the mandate relating to Lian is established by the Lian itself. The 
marriage gets dissolved ipso facto after the parties have taken the oaths. 
Recognition of Lian under Modern Legislation: 
Under the modem legislation, the doctrine of Lian is not obsolete but 
is still enforceable and often resorted to in India and Pakistan according to 
the procedure adopted by the Courts. The Muslim Personal Law (Shariah) 
25 Dr. Tanzil-Ur-Rahman; A Code of Muslim Personal Law, Vol. 1, p. 507 (1978) 
Karachi, Pakistan. 
26. Ibid. 
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Application Act, 1937 and the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939, 
fully support this view. Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariah) 
application Act, 1937 reads as follows: 
"Notwithstanding any custom or usage to the contrary, in all 
questions (save questions relating to agricultural land) regarding intestate 
succession, special property of females, including personal property 
inherited or obtained under contract or gift or any other provision of 
personal law, marriage, dissolution of marriage, including Talaq, Ila, Zihar, 
Lian, Khula and Mubara'at, maintenance, or dower, guardianship, gifts and 
trust properties and wakfs (other than charities and charitable institution 
and charitable and religious endowments) the rule of decision in cases 
where parties are Muslims shall be the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat)". 
Section 2 Clause (IX) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 
1939, provides for the dissolution of marriage on any other ground 
recognised as valid for the dissolution of marriage under Muslim Law. 
Hence a wife can still claim the dissolution of her marriage under doctrine 
of Lian. 
It is contended sometimes that after the passing of the Dissolution of 
Muslim Marriage Act, 1939, a marriage can be dissolved only on the basis 
of a false charge of adultery having been made by tiie husband against his 
wife. This contention is not correct for the following two reasons, namely: 
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That section 2 of the Act^ ' provides that a wife shall be entitled to 
get a decree for the dissolution of her marriage on any one or more of the 
following grounds. The various grounds have been enumerated in Clause 
(i) to (ix) of the said Act. 
Clause IX of the section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages 
Act, 1939 reads as under. 
"On any other ground which is recognised as valid for the 
Dissolution of marriage under Muslim Law". 
It is clear from the said provision that a marriage which can be 
dissolved under the provision of Muslim Law can also be dissolved under 
the provisions of this Act. 
Secondly, the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 has 
considered it sufficient to state in a general way that a marriage can still be 
dissolved on any ground recognised as sufficient by Muslim law. The 
legislature must have thought it necessary to clear this point so that a doubt 
be not entertained that after the passing of the Act, a marriage could be 
dissolved only on the basis of the grounds specified in the Act and on no 
other grounds. The Act has not given the procedure to be adopted as that is 
clear from any book on Muslim law. Thus, the Act has not given the 
various provisions of Muslim Law relating to Lian, ila and zihar which is 
given in all books on Muslim Law. As a matter of fact, the Act has not 
27. Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939. 
28. The Act Refers to the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act 1939. 
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mentioned all the grounds deemed sufficient for dissolution of marriage by 
Muslim Law nor the procedure to be adopted in those cases. Thus, a 
marriage can be dissolved when only wife of a person embraces Islam. A 
marriage can, therefore, be dissolved not only on the basis of Lian but oa 
several other grounds also.^' 
The question now arises whether doctrine of Lian can still be applied 
entirely in its old form or whether it has become inapplicable. To determine 
this question, it has to be seen that doctrine of Lian consists of two different 
and distinct parts namely; 
i) the investment of a certain legal right in the wife accused of 
adultery and (ii) the procedure to be adopted for the endorsement of die 
wife's legal right. The fu-st part constitutes substantive law while the second 
part merely amounts to procedure. As the Muslim law of marriage and 
divorce is still applied to the Muslim the substantive portion of law shall 
govern them^ **. 
The Pakistani courts have accepted this proposition and have 
expressed the view in several cases. In the case of Mst. Leelan v/s Rahim 
Bukhsh^^^ the high court of Bahawalpur held that the procedure prescribed 
by the Muslim law for establishing legal rights arising from the doctrine of 
Lian was not permissible in courts for the simple reason that the Muslim 
29. Supra note 15 P. 485, 
30. Ibid. 
31. P.L.D., 1951, B&J. 91. 
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law of evidence has been superseded by the Evidence Act. In this case Mst. 
Leelan had sought separation from her husband Rahim Bukhsh on the ground, 
amongst others, that her husband accused her of having iUicit connections with 
some other person. The husband in his written statement admitted of his 
accusing the wife of unchastity and of being unfaithful to him. 
In another case of Lahore High Court, Ghulam Bukhsh v/s Husaina 
Begum^^ the Court held that the procedure for Lian was the result of 
circumstances which no longer exist. This procedure would be wholly out 
of place in the present state of law. and, at the same time, there would be no 
jurisdiction of civil court to compel compliance with it. The procedure of 
Lian was the result of law of Islam relating to slander and adultery. It was a 
concession shown to the husband and wife. Before the Pakistan court, the 
husband does not ask for such a concession and the wife does not stand in 
the need of any for, adulter^' of wife is not punishable at all. Nor has civil 
court the authority to force an>' person to take an oath in the form 
prescribed by Lian and to send him to jail for refusing to take such oath. 
This impossibility of compliance witli the procedure of Lian is by itself an 
argument in favour of the contention that an accusation of adultery without 
recourse to the procedure of Lian is a good ground for dissolution. 
However, the doctrine of Lian is still accepted by Indian Courts as a valid 
Muslim Law procedure. 
32. P.L.D. 1957. Lahore at 998. 
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In the famous case NurJahan bibi v/s Mohd. Qazim Ali^^ where on 
husband bringing a false charge on wife (Lian) the court granted the wife 
the decree for dissolution of marriage under section 2 (ix) of the 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939. It was observed by the court 
that the doctrine of Lian had not become obsolete. The practice is based on 
flie tradition. The husband and wife both have to take oath inviting God's 
curse on liar. If the husband's charge is proved, the wife loses the ground 
for dissolution. If he fails, she can get the divorce as well as sue the 
husband for defamation under the Indian Penal code for bringing a false 
charge of adultery amounts cruelty against the wife and attracts section 2 
clause (viii) of the Act, and the exception I under section 499 of Indian 
Penal code would not apply. 
So far as the point of view that courts have no authority to enforce 
the procedure of Lian is concerned, section 2 of Muslim personal Law 
(Shariat) Application Act, 1937 can be referred to in rebuttal. The various 
methods of dissolution of marriage as envisaged in the Act expressly 
include divorce, Khula, Mubarat, ila and Lian which the courts have been 
empowered to enforce. It is however, correct to say that courts cannot 
enforce the procedure of Lian to avoid Hadd-al-Qadhaf and Hadd-al-zina 
because both these acts are not crimes in India and Pakistan. But so far as 
dissolution of marriage through Lian is concerned, the courts under the 
provisions of section 2 of the Muslim Personal law (Shariat) Application 
33. A.I.R. 1977, cal. 90. 
2% 
Act, 1937 could be held to be empowered to dissolve the marriage 
contract.^ '* 
To call Lian a concession may be correct as it is a view warranted by 
the consequences. But it does not by itself, in any manner, affects its legal 
status. It is however, correct, that under Pakistan Penal Code adulteiy and 
accusation of not being crimes, it is futile for couple to have recourse to 
Lian for the solution to their problem, i.e. to escape punishment prescribed 
in Qur'an.^^ 
To say that civil courts cannot compel one to take oath by way of 
Lian is questionable. If the contention of the non-authority of civil courts in 
this respect be held to be correct then the right of Dissolution of marriage 
contract through Lian, as certainly referred to and provided by section 2 of 
the Shariat Application Act, 1937 shall be unwarrantably frustrated. 
Likewise, to say that ciAdl courts in the even of one refusing to perform 
Lian have no authority to commit him or her, as the case may be, to Jail is 
implied in the order for Lian itself Besides, in the event of non-
compLiance of their order courts have, in any event, the power of awarding 
tazir (punishment) which includes punishment of imprisonment. The courts 
act as Qazi in the matter of Dissolution of Muslim Marriages. 
34. Supranote25P.131. 
35. Ibid. 
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It does not appear correct to say that to put the procedure of Lian 
into practice is impossible, bideed, this much may be said tiiat primary 
purpose of Lian (Protecting the husband from Hadd al-Qadhaf and wife 
from Hadd-Al-zina) has been negatived by omissions of India as well as 
Pakistan Penal Code. But law relating to separation of a couple on account 
of Lian still subsists. In any case, an amendment in titie Dissolution of 
Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 can be made specifically permitting Lian. 
The courts have held that accusation of adultery is by itself a good 
cause for the dissolution of marriage. This may be said to be correct when 
accusation is proved to be false, but if same is proved to be true would the 
court in that event hold merely the accusation of adultery a reasonable 
cause for effecting separation. 
Concluding remarks: 
After going through Qur'anic injunctions, Ahadith and cases 
concerning Lian, the following conclusion are drawn: 
That Lian must be observed in the presence of a Judge or Qazi. It is 
not effective in private company. 
That it is the duty of the Qazi to awaken the consciousness of both 
the husband and wife to the grave responsibility they are undertaking. The 
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false oath and baseless slandering are heinous crimes which invoke the 
v^ Tath of Allah. 
That at the conclusion of Lian, the separation is declared by the Qazi 
officially. This is view held by Imam Abu Hanifa, which is supported by 
the Ahadith that after Lian, the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) made a 
declaration of separation between the husband and wife. There are other 
Jurists who think that Lian automatically annuls the marriage. 
That separation effected by Lian is forever and the husband as well 
as wife cannot be united again with the help of nikah under any set of 
circumstances as it is possible in case of divorce. 
The Mahr (dower) paid by the husband to the wife caimot be taken 
back by the former in case of Lian, even if his allegation is correct. 
If the husband, after leveling charge of fornication against his wife, 
refrains from invoking a curse upon himself (Lian), he would be treated as 
a criminal. Most of the Jurists are of the opinion that he should be punished 
as a slanderer and awarded eight>' stripes. Imam Abu Hanifa is of the view 
that he should be imprisoned. If the woman hesitates at the point of 
invoking curse, she should be stoned to death because it proves her guilt. 
Imam Abu Hanifa suggests imprisonment for her too and not stoning as 
taking of oaths four times by man and then invoking curse by him and the 
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reluctance on the part of woman in invoking curse strengthen the idea that 
she might have committed fornication, but these oaths and imprecations do 
not stand parallel to four witnesses which are essential to estabhsh the 
charge of adultery. 
CHAPTER - IX 
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MUSLIM WOMEN'S RIGHT TO DISSOLVE 
MARRIAGE UNDER THE STATUTORY LAW 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 - Historical 
Perspective: 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 is regarded as 
most revolutionary legislative enactment among the existing 
statutory measures relating to the status of Muslim woman in the 
Indian sub-continent. This is only legislative measure which 
introduced a substantive reform in the Islamic Law of divorce 
provided by the various schools applicable to the Muslims of 
undivided India. The various grounds incorporated in the Act on 
which a Muslim woman may seek a decree for the dissolution of her 
marriage is also popularly known as "Faskh" which means 
annulment or abrogation. It comes from a root which means to 
annul a "deed" or to rescind a bargain. Hence, it refers to the power 
of the Muslim Qazi (in India Law Court) to annul a marriage on the 
application of the wife. The method by which the said Act was 
proposed to be enacted is known as Takhayyur (electic choice) and 
signifies replacement of the principles of one school of Islamic law 
adhered to in a particular region or by particular people with those 
of any other school.' 
1 Asaf A.A. Fyzee; Out Lines ofMuhammadan Law; p. 168, 4* ed. (1974).Oxford 
University Press, Delhi. 
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The Qura'anic verse on the basis of which the instant Act, 
(1939) was adopted and enacted finds expression in Sura al-Nisa of 
the Holy Quran wherein it is laid down: 
"If ye fear a breach betMeen them twain, 
Appoint two arbiters, 
One from his family and other from hers. 
If they wish for peace, God will cause their 
reconciliation^ 
The power of the Qazi or Judge to dissolve the marriage in 
the exercise of power under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages 
Act, 1939 also commands the support from the express words of the 
Holy Prophet (PBUH) who is reported to have said: 
"If a woman be prejudiced by a marriage, let it 
be broken off'^ 
This fundamental principle was accepted by all the schools of 
Islamic law, but in respect of circumstances in which it should be 
applied and the procedure through which a woman's marriage could 
be dissolved, the schools of Islamic law greatly differed from one 
and another. At one extreme there was the Maliki School which 
allowed Qazi to dissolve a woman's marriage on a wide variety of 
grounds. On the other extreme, there was the Hanafi School which 
2 Holy Quran: IW: 35. 
3, Sahih Al-Bukhari: Translated by Prof. Muhammad Mul^in Khan, Vol. VII. P.16. 
(1984) Khab Bhawan, New Delhi, 
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greatly restricted women's right to the dissolution of marriage by a 
Qazi, specially by a non-Muslim Judge. 
India is dominated by the followers of the Hanafi school, 
since, for Muslim wives Hanafi school did not sanction divorcing 
right so being suffocated they started embracing Christianity. Some 
Muslim Jurists laid down a principle that in such cases the marriage 
would not stand dissolved and that woman would be imprisoned till 
she returned to Islam. In British India this device could not obtain 
application. In India, courts applied another rule of Islamic Law 
under which in case of apostasy of a Muslim woman who refused to 
return to her original faith would result in the dissolution of her 
marriage. 
During the first half of the 20'^ century, many Muslim 
women, to get rid of their marriage, sought a refuge under the 
aforesaid principle. As prior to the passing of this Act, (Dissolution 
of Muslim Marriage Act 1939), the classical Hanafi law consisted 
no provision whereby a Muslim wife could seek divorce on such 
grounds as disappearance of husband, his long imprisonment, his 
neglect of marital obligation etc. Finding no other way to get rid of 
undesirable marital bonds, many Muslim women felt compelled by 
4. Tahir Mahood; Muslim Personal Law, p.54, l** ed. (1972), New Delhi 
5. Ibid. 
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their circumstances to renounce their faith. Muslim organisations 
and scholars in India became alive to the situation and began 
thinking of ways and means to check the growing tendency among 
Muslim women to renounce Islam just because their religious law 
did not allow them to lawfully get rid of their disliked husband. The 
Jamiat-ul-Ulma took-up the task. It was found that there was no 
way out but to secure legislation empowering Muslim Judges in 
India to dissolve the Muslim women's marriages in some given 
circumstances. The Ulma, therefore, decided to make 
recommendation for such a law. Leaders of public opinion educated 
in western style like K.J. Khambatta and Mrs. Hamid Ali took the 
active interest in the matter and argued by their writings for the 
legislative recognition of Muslim woman's right to seek judicial 
divorce.'' 
The Jamiat-ul-Ulma prepared a comprehensive draft bill in 
the year 1935 on the basis of a well-known book 'Al-Hilat-al-Najiza 
(a lawful device) written by Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi. Maulana 
Thanvi in his book described in detail the principles of Maliki law 
by applying which Muslim judges could dissolve a Muslim 
marriage in the circumstances specified therein. He found the 
provisions of Maliki school more suitable to the circumstances as 
6. Supra note 4, p.55. 
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against the corresponding provisions of Hanafi school. On this issue 
he consulted the leading Ulma of the Hejaz and even personally 
approached some of them in order to sure that the change proposed 
to be effected in India did not contravene any religious principles of 
Islam. The book was published in Arabic and Urdu language in the 
year 1932 and the appendices to the book consisted the approving 
opinions regarding the contents of book of other theological schools 
in the country.^ 
Maulana Thanvi wrote in his book that Muslim 
parliamentarians should introduce a bill based on the 
recommendations made therein. Accordingly, the bill was prepared 
by Jamiat ul-Ulma and same was introduced in the central 
legislative council by Muhammad Ahmad Kazmi on 17*^  April 
1936. The government of that time did not agree with that provision 
of Bill which was to enact a condition that only a Muslim Judge, 
whether at the District level or in a High Court, could dissolve the 
marriage of a Muslim woman. The government warned if this 
provision was insisted upon, it would not proceed with the Bill at 
all. Moreover, in order to effect uniformity, the select committee to 
which the bill was referred to be recommended that its provisions 
7 Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi. Al-Hilat-al-Najizabi Millat-e-Azza; p.lO (1932) 
quoted by Tahir Mahmood; Muslim Personal Law; p.56, l" ed. (1972) New Delhi. 
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should apply to all Muslims of India irrespective of their sectarian 
distinction. Besides this, other changes were made in original bill 
The statement of objects and reasons issued with the bill read: 
"There is no provision in the Hanafi code of 
Muslim Law enabling a married Muslim woman 
to obtain a decree from the court dissolving her 
Marriage in case the husband neglects to 
maintain her, makes her life miserable by 
deserting or Persistently maltreating her, or 
absconds Leaving her unprotected for or under 
certain Other circumstances. The absence of 
such a provision has entailed unspeakable misery 
to innumerable Muslim women in British India. 
The Hanafi Jurists, however, have clearly laid 
down that in cases in which the application of 
Hanafi law causes hardship, it is permissible to 
apply provisions of the Maliki, Shafai 'i, or 
Hanabali Law. Acting on this principle the 
Ulema have issued Fatawas to the effect that in 
cases enumerated in Clause 3, part A of this Bill 
(Now section 2 of the Act) a married Muslim 
woman may obtain a decree dissolving her 
marriage. A lucid exposition of this principle can 
be in the book called Hilal Al-Najeza published 
by Maul ana Ashraf Ali Sahib who has made an 
exhaustive study of the provisions of Maliki Law 
which under the circumstances prevailing in 
India, may be applied to such cases. This has 
g. Ibid. 
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been approved by large number of Ulema who 
have put their seals of approval on the book. 
The bill was, ultimately, passed by the British Legislative 
assembly with suitable modifications and became law on 17*''March 
1939, as "Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, VIII of 1939 and 
ever since it has been hailed as one of the most progressive 
enactment passed by the legislature within recent years. The Act is 
applicable to all the Muslims in India who may otherwise adhere to 
Hanafi, Shafai'i, Ithna Ashari or Ismaili Law. The Act is in force 
throughout India except in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, where a 
parallel enactment by the name of Jammu and Kashmir state 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1942 is in force with some 
different provisions to the central Dissolution of Muslim Marriages 
Act, 1939.^" 
The Act is divided into two parts. One part of the Act specifies 
the grounds on, and those circumstances in which a court may grant a 
decree for the dissolution of a marriage at the instance of wife. The 
second part relates to the effect of conversion and re-conversion. The 
two parts together make exhaustive and complete code.'' 
9. Gazette of India, part V, p.36, (1938). 
10. Syed Khalid Rashid; Muslim Lcm: p. 110, 3'" ed. (1996) Eastern Book Co. 
Lucknow. 
11. Dr. Saleem Akhtar; Shah Bono Judgement in Islamic Perspective (A Socio Legal 
Study); p.64 I'' ed. (1994) Kitab Bhawan, New Delhi. 
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In Jamila Khatoon v/s Qasim AlP, the Nagpur High Court 
held that the Act had only crystallized a portion of Islamic Law and 
should therefore, be applied in conjunction with the general 
provision of Islamic family law. In several decisions courts have 
claimed that the Act of 1939 as a piece of declaratory legislation to 
ameliorate the hardships caused to Muslim women by enlarging 
their rights. 
Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 
specifies nine grounds on which a Muslim wife may seek 
dissolution of marriage. These grounds are based mainly on the two 
principles, they are: 
(a) Sub-clauses (i) to (iv) are based on the theory that a 
suspension of the marriage justified dissolution of marriage, (ii) 
Sub-clauses (v) to (viii) are based on the theory that the 
continuance of marriage under such circumstances would be 
injurious to the wife. 
The Act is a remedial piece of legislation and as such it is 
entitled to receive liberal construction so as to suppress the 
mischief and advance the remedy, on the other hand, the Act is 
declaratory. It does not add to nor is designed to add to the ground 
of dissolution of Muslim marriage recognised by one or other 
12. A.I.R. 1951, Nag. 375. 
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schools of Muslim Law. Looked at from this point of view, the 
legislation is not innovative and must be construed keeping in mind 
the fundamental tenets and value system informing Islam. 
Grounds of decree for Dissolution of Marriage: 
Section2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, 
lays down the following grounds on which a Muslim woman can 
seek divorce. The Sec 2 of the Act 1939 reads as under: 
"A woman married under Muslim Law shall be entitled to 
obtain a decree for the Dissolution of her marriage on any one or 
more of the following grounds, namely: 
(i) That the whereabouts of the husband have not been known for 
a period of four years; 
(ii) That husband has neglected or has failed to provide for her 
maintenance for a period of two years; 
(iii) That the husband has been sentenced to imprisonment for a 
period of seven years or upwards; 
(iv) That the husband has failed to perform, without reasonable 
cause, his marital obligations for a period of three years; 
(v) That the husband was impotent at the time of marriage and 
continues to be so; 
13. Supra note-11, p.65. 
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(vi) That the husband has been insane for a period of two years or 
is suffering from leprosy or a virulent venereal disease. 
(vii) That she having been given in marriage by her father or other 
guardian before she attained the age of fifteen years, 
repudiated marriage before attaining the age of eighteen 
years. 
Provided that the marriage has not been consummated; 
(viii) That husband treats her with cruelty, that is to say -
(a) Habitually assaults her or makes her life miserable by cruelty 
of conduct even if such conduct does not amount to physical 
ill-treatment, or 
(b) Associates with the women of evil repute or leads an 
infamous life, or 
(c) Attempts to force her to lead an immoral life, or 
(d) Disposes of her property or prevents her exercising her legal 
rights over it, or 
(e) Obstructs her in observance of her religious profession or 
practice, or 
(f) If he has more wives than one, does not treat her equitably in 
accordance with the injunctions of Quran. 
(ix) On any other ground which is recognised as valid for the 
dissolution of marriages under Muslim law: 
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Provided that... 
(a) no decree shall be passed on ground (iii) until the sentence 
has become final; 
(b) a decree passed on the grounds under clause (i) shall not take 
effect for period of six months from the date of such decree, 
and if the husband appears either in person or through an 
authorized agent within that period and satisfies the court that 
he is prepared to perform his conjugal duties the court shall 
set aside the said decree; and 
(c) Before passing a decree on the ground under clause (v) the 
court shall, on the application by the husband, make an order 
requiring the husband to satisfy the court within a period of 
one year from the date of such order that he has ceased to be 
impotent and if the husband so satisfied the court within such 
period, no decree shall be passed on the said ground. 
The opening words used in the section are, a woman married 
under Muslim law and not a married woman. This protects women 
who have already abjured Islam in the hope of getting their 
marriages dissolved and are thus no longer Muslims. Had the words 
Muslim women been used, it would have been possible to argue that 
a woman who had apostatized could not get benefit from the 
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provisions of this Act as she was no longer a Muslim. But the use of 
expression "married under Muslim law", makes it possible for a 
woman who have given up Islam to get their marriage dissolved on 
any of the grounds given in the said Act. 
The grounds on which a decree for dissolution of marriage 
can be passed by the courts under the Act are proposed to be 
examined in brief in their order. 
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(Section 2, Clause (i)] 
Missing of Husband for Four Years: 
A wife whose husband has been missing for a long time is 
deprived of protection, companionship, and pleasure of life and 
financial support. She is naturally put to great hardship on that 
account. It, therefore, becomes necessary for her under such 
conditions to marry another person of her choice. But she cannot do 
so, because her first marriage still subsists. It, therefore, becomes 
necessary not only for her but also in the interest of society at large 
to release her from the marital tie if she so whishes.*'' 
Practically every nation offers some kind of statutory relief to 
a wife the whereabouts of whose husband has not been known for a 
long period. In India prior to the passing of Dissolution of Muslim 
Marriage Act, 1939, a Hanafi Muslim wife was not allowed to seek 
the dissolution of her marriage from the law court on the ground of 
disappearance of her husband for a long period. However, under the 
said Act, at present, in India a woman married under the Muslim 
law is entitled to seek the dissolution of her marriage on the ground 
that the whereabouts of her husband has not been known for a 
period of four years. She can then on such order having been passed 
14 K.N. Ahmad: The Mushm Law of Divorce; p.501, (1984), Kitab Bhawan New 
Delhi. 
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legally contract a second marriage. The court shall effect the 
dissolution of marriage between the person whose whereabouts has 
not been known and his wife on the expiry of a statutory period of 
six months from the date of passing a decree dissolving the 
marriage under section 2 clause (i) of the Dissolution of Muslim 
marriage Act 1939.*^ 
Section 2 clause (i) of the Dissolution of Muslim marriage 
Act, 1939 is reproduced as under: 
"A woman married under the Muslim law shall be 
entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of 
her marriage on the ground: 
That the whereabouts of the husband have not 
been known for a period of four years provided 
that... 
"A decree passed on the ground (i) shall not take 
effect for a period of six months from the date of 
such decree, and if the husband appears either in 
person or through an authorized agent within 
that period and satisfies the court that he is 
prepared to perform his conjugal duties the court 
shall set aside the said decree}^ 
15 Tahir Mahmood; The Muslim law of India; p.99, (1980) Law Book col. Allahabad. 
16. Section 2 clause (i) read with proviso (b) of Dissolution of Muslim marriage Act 
1939. 
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The clause based on the Maliki Law is an improvement on it 
because according to Maliki law, the wife of a person whose 
whereabouts is not known shall have the right of contracting 
another marriage after waiting for four years from the time when 
the Qazi passes a decree for the dissolution of her marriage. But 
according to clause (i) of section 2 of the Act, 1939, the waiting 
period of four years does not commence from the time of the Qazi's 
or judge's order but begins from the time when the husband is 
proved to have disappeared. A wife can file a suit under the 
provision of clause (i) of the Act at any time on the expiry of four 
years from the time of disappearance. Moreover, the court shall not 
ask her to wait any longer but shall decree her suit if other requisite 
conditions are satisfied. The wife shall have to produce evidence to 
the effect that the people who should have known the whereabouts 
of her husband have not been aware of him for a period of four 
years.'^ 
However, when the wife seeks dissolution of her marriage on 
the ground of missing of her husband, the court shall before 
decreeing the suit, give notice of her suit to all the heirs of the 
husband and to his brothers and his paternal uncle. Each of these 
persons will have the right to be heard. If the court passes a decree 
17. Supra note 15, p. 100. 
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of faskh (Dissolution of marriage), it shall remain in abeyance for 
six months. During this period if the husband comes back and court 
is satisfied of his willingness to perform his conjugal duties, the 
decree shall be set aside. If the husband is not traceable or is 
traceable but has failed to satisfy the court of his willingness to 
perform his conjugal duties. Until the expiry of six months from the 
date of decree, the marriage will stand dissolved with effect from 
date of decree.** 
Religious basis of Law: 
The Shariah law about the missing of a person is based on the 
following tradition in which the Holy Prophet (PBUH) is reported 
to have said with respect to the wife of a person whose whereabouts 
is not known. 
"Suwar Ibn Musab narrates from Mughira Ibn 
Shabah through Siurabhil Hamdani that Mughira 
stated that Holy Prophet (PBUH) said" the wife 
of a person of unknown whereabouts shall 
remain his wife till a statement about him is 
available" ^ ^ 
18. Ibid, p. 101. 
19. Muwatta Imam Malik: Translated with exhaustive notes by Prof. Mohammad 
Rahimuddin: p.527 (1981) Kitab Bhawan, New Delhi. 
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Following this tradition there has been considerable 
difference of opinion among the religious scholars as to the waiting 
period which entitles the wife to seek the dissolution of her 
marriage. Among the companion of Holy Prophet (PBUH), Hazrat 
Umar, Hazrat Uthman, Hazrat Ibn Umar, Hazrat Ibn Abbas and 
Hazrat Hasan Basri have ruled that the wife, the whereabouts of 
whose husband has not been know, should be ordered to wait for a 
period of four years. Hazrat Ali, Hazrat Ibn Masud, on the other 
hand hold the opinion that the wife of a person whose whereabouts 
is unknown should wait until the husband returns or the fact of his 
death is ascertained.^" 
According to Imam Abu Hanifa, the wife of a person whose 
whereabouts are not known can not be considered to have been 
released from the marriage till her husband's death is know with 
certainty. Imam Shafai'i at first agreed with Imam Malik and held 
that a missing husband would be presumed dead on the expiry of 
four years but subsequently he changed his opinion and adopted 
same view as expressed by Hanafi Jurists. Shafai'i law, therefore, is 
same as Hanafi law.^' 
20. M. Mazheruddin Siddiqui: Women In Islam: p.73, 1st ed. (1980) Adam Publishers 
Delhi. 
21. Ibid. 
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Imam Malik has taken a more realistic view of the matter. 
According to him, a wife can apply to the Qazi for the dissolution 
of her marriage when her husband has been missing. The Qazi shall 
thereupon himself make a search or cause to be made for the 
missing husband and if he can not be traced, the wife shall have to 
wait for four further years. The husband shall then be presumed to 
be dead and the wife shall have to observe iddat period prescribed 
for husband's death which is normally four months and ten days. 
She can then contract a second marriage. 
Imam Malik has fixed the period of four years on the basis of 
an order passed by Hazrat Umar, the second caliph who fixed such 
period at four years. The order of Hazrat Umar in this regard has 
been reported by Imam Malik in his noted book "Muwatta" as 
under: 
"Said Ibn al-Musayyab reported that Hazrat 
Umar bin Al-Khattab said: If a woman's husband 
is missing and his whereabouts are not known to 
her, the wife should wait for four years, 
beginning from the date when news about him 
stopped and after completion on four years shw 
should sit in iddat for four months and ten days. 
After that period she is free to remarry"}^ 
22. Supranotel9,p. 528. 
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The jurists of all the schools have adopted the rules laid down 
by Imam Malik with regard to the waiting period which are more 
liberal and involves less hard ship to the wives of missing 
husbands. The waiting period of four years, thus, contained in 
section 2 clause (i) of dissolution of Muslim marriage act have been 
taken from Maliki law. 
It would appear that even the Maliki law, which is followed 
now by all the schools, leaves room for hardship to the women of 
missing husband. It is said that while Hazrat Umar was carrying out 
his nocturnal vigil, he heard a woman singing erotic verses in which 
she gave expression to the unbearable pain of separation from her 
husband and added; "if there were no God, this bed would not have 
been empty of a male partner". Hazrat Umar found on inquiry that 
her husband was fighting on the war front. He came back home and 
asked her widowed daughter how long a woman could bear the pang 
of sexual abstinence. She told that him that six-months was the 
maximum period. This incident bears the testimony that six month 
is reasonable maximum period for which a wife can wait. If it is 
recognised that a woman cannot forgo sexual enjoyment for a 
period of more than six months, why should it not be applied to the 
cases of missing husband. How can the wife be forced to wait for 
four years if such compulsion is likely to drive her in to the 
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quagmire of sin and who is going to provide for her maintenance 
during all this period. 
Return of the husband on the expiry of four years: 
A very pertinent question arises as to what order shall be 
passed if the husband whose whereabouts have been unknown, turns 
up on the expiry of four years and after the decree of the court has 
been passed and what shall happen if the wife, after observing her 
term of probation consequent to the dissolution of marriage, in 
meantime contracts marriage with another person. 
So far as the first question is concerned, if the husband 
returns at the time when the wife is observing her term of probation 
he may have recourse to her as the marriage has not been 
terminated absolutely. If, however, wife after observing her term of 
probation has contracted marriage with another person what shall 
then happen. According to caliph Umar if the husband returns 
before the wife contracts another marriage, he shall have her as his 
wife whatever time may have passed. If the wife has already 
contracted her marriage with another person the right of her former 
husband lapses and he cannot have that woman as his wife. 
23. See: Supra note 20, p. 74. 
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although she may not have had valid retirement with the second 
husband. Imam Malik has adopted the same opinion. 
The decision of Caliph Ali is at variance with the aforesaid 
decision of Hazrat Umar. According to Hazrat Ali, the wife in all 
the events shall be made over to the former husband inspite of her 
having children from the second husband. 
The ruling of Caliph Hazrat Uthman in this respect is stated 
to be that if the wife has contracted her marriage with another 
person and her former husband thereafter appears he shall be asked 
whether he wanted the return of his wife or the reimbursement of 
his paid dower. Action shall be then taken according to his choice. 
If he wanted the dower back the same shall be made to be returned 
to him. If he wanted his wife back she shall be made to get herself 
separated from her second husband and after completing her term of 
probation she shall be made to return to her former husband by 
contracting the marriage a new. If the second husband had 
cohabitation with her, he shall be made to pay her unpaid dower.^^ 
In India and Pakistan the decree of dissolution of marriage 
shall not take effect for a period of six months from the date of 
24. Dr. Tanzil-Ur-Rahman; A code of Muslim Personal Lew; Vol. I, p. 627, (1978) 
Karachi-Pakistan. 
25. Ibid. 
26. Ibid. 
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decree. But there is no ruling in the Books of fiqh in support of 
keeping a decree of court under suspension for a period of six 
months. The period of six months that has been fixed for putting the 
decree into effect apparently means that if the missing husband 
does not return within the period of six months after the decree of 
dissolution is passed or returns but is not prepared to fulfil the 
marital obligations of a husband within such period, the decree 
shall become effective i.e. separation shall take effect and the wife 
shall start observing her term of probation. The question arises what 
shall happen if the husband returns after six months but within the 
period of observation of term of probation. Under the Dissolution of 
Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 there is no answer of it. It is also not 
clear whether the decree of separation shall have force of a 
revocable divorce or an irrevocable divorce. 
There are appreciable differences in the laws in Islamic 
countries relating to this subject. In Iraq the period of absence of 
the husband is at least two years whereas in Egypt, Morocco and 
Jordan the period of one year is held sufficient for right of 
demanding a decree of separation. 
The second kind of difference in this connection is that in 
Tunisia in the event of the husband's whereabouts becoming 
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unknown the right of demanding separation accrues only when the 
husband neither leaves sufficient property nor makes arrangement 
for the maintenance of the wife during his absence. Contrary to this 
in several other Muslim countries, the existence or non-existence of 
property for meeting maintenance expenses cannot impede the right 
of wife of demanding separation. 
The third difference pertains to the effect and result of such 
separation. Under the Syrian law, it has been made clear that on 
demand of separation, in the event of husband's absence or his 
being imprisoned such separation shall be affective and will be 
equivalent to the effecting of a revocable divorce. Where as in other 
Muslim countries such separation has been made equivalent to 
effecting of an irrevocable divorce^'. 
27. Tahir Mahmood; Personal Law in Islamic Countries, p. 41, 1st ed. (1987), 
Academy Law and Religion, New Delhi. 
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(Section 2 Clause (ii)) 
Husband's failure or Negligence to Provide for maintenance: 
The obligation of a Muslim husband to maintain his wife is a 
matter of status, not of contract, and if comes within the ambit of the 
general principle of union of persons as husband and wife upon 
which depends almost all the religious, moral and legal rights and 
duties that either of spouse may acquire by marriage. The marriage 
covenant gives rise to certain reciprocal spousal rights and 
obligations and if either the spouse fails or neglects to perform his or 
her poet of obligations, he or she shall no longer be entitled to enjoy 
the rights vested in him or her. It is one of the divinely ordained 
matrimonial obligations of the husband that he must provide for 
maintenance to his wife during the subsistence of the marriage 
according to his financial means and resources.^* 
The Almighty Allah describing the nature of this obligation 
enjoins in His Holy Book: 
"Let the man of means spend according to his 
means: And the man whose resources are 
restricted, Let him spend according what Allah 
has given him, Allah puts no burden on any 
person beyond what he has given him "^' 
28. Supra note 11, p. 34. 
29. Holy Qur'an; LXV:7 
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No doubt, the instant Holy Verse cast upon the husband the 
obligation to provide for maintenance to his wife according to his 
available resources but this obligation is not absolute but subject to 
the fulfillment of corresponding duty cast upon the wife. The wife, in 
order to be entitled to it, must faithfully perform the duties devolving 
on her by her marriage contract. It is the duty of the wife to afford 
her husband happy conjugal companionship and if she fails to give it 
and turns to be refractory (Nashizah) or unsubmissive, she shall not 
be entitled to any maintenance from her husband.^" 
Description of Maintenance: 
The term maintenance i.e. 'Nafqah' signifies all those things 
which are necessary to the support of life such as, food, clothes and 
lodging and also includes such thing as are necessary according to 
the custom of a country and a particular class of people, such as, 
cosmetics, cleaning soaps, hair oil and articles of domestic use.^' 
Author of The Durr-Ul-Mukhtar describes that term Nafaqa 
literally means that which a man spends over his children; in law it 
means feeding clothing and lodging and in common use it signifies 
food." 
30. The Durr-ul-Mukhtar. Translated bv B.M. Daval; p.318, (1992), Kitab Bhawan 
New Delhi. 
31. The Hadaya. Translated by Charles Hamilton Vol. II, p. 140, (1985), Kitab 
Bhawan, New Delhi. 
32. Supranote30, P. 316. 
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Thus, in most of books on Muslim Fiqh, food, clothes and 
residence have been described as the articles to be given for the 
maintenance. This gives impression that maintenance is restricted to 
only these three items. But such is not the case and it would be 
wrong to hold that maintenance consists only these items. The word 
maintenance in its broader sense means and includes all those things 
which are essential for the dignified survival of a wife having regard 
to his living standard. What constitutes essential for the dignified 
survival of a woman depends upon the financial condition of husband 
and social status of wife and it differs from place to place and way of 
life of different people and would also change with the change of 
time and place. Imam Abu Hanifa and Imam Malik have made 
position more clear by ruling that no amount of maintenance has 
been fixed by Holy Qur'an or sunna and it depends on the financial 
condition of husband and wife and social condition of the country 
and it changes under different conditions and standard of life in a 
particular country. 
Effect of failure or negligence to provide for maintenance: 
All the schools of Muslim law, except the Hanafi school, 
recognise that a marriage may be dissolved by a decree of court if 
the husband fails or neglects to provide for maintenance his wife. 
The three Imams, Shafai'i Malik and Ahmad Ibn Hanabal hold that a 
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Qazi may order the dissolution of marriage only at the instance of 
wife because maintenance is her divine right and if she does not 
make any such demand, marriage shall continue. The juristic opinion 
of the great Imams is based on the Holy verse of the Qur'an which 
says," Keep them (wives) in kindness or separate from them with 
humanity"^^. 
Imam Malik argue in the light of instant Holy verse that a 
husband who does not or cannot provide maintenance allowance to 
his wife, he cannot provide maintenance allowance to his wife, he 
can not be said to be keeping his wife with humanity. He must, 
therefore, in view of the Holy verse separate himself from his wife 
i.e. he must divorce her. On his refusal to do so, he must be 
separated by an order of the Qazi. Imam Shafai'i says that once Abu 
Hurayra (May Allah please with him) asked Holy Prophet (PBUH) 
about a person who can not maintain his wife. He was told that two 
should get separated "'*. 
Imam Abu Hanifa is of the opinion that the Qazi shall not 
effect dissolution of marriage between the couple merely on the 
ground of husband's failure to provide maintenance to his wife. In 
such a case the Qazi shall direct the wife to arrange for maintenance 
33. Supra note 24, p. 643. 
34. Ibid. 
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either from her own resources or by borrowing in the name of her 
husband till her husband has easier time. Under the Hanafi law, the 
Qazi shall not dissolve the marriage even if the husband is incapable 
of providing maintenance due to his poverty or otherwise. Thus, the 
failure or negligence of the husband cannot be made the basis of 
dissolution of marriage in any case. The Hanafi jurists in support of 
their argument refer to Surah Al-Talaq verse seven (LXV:7) which 
lays down, let the man of me one spend according to his me one and 
the man whose resources are restricted let him spend according to 
what Allah has given him. They also argue that there were many 
companions of Holy Prophet (PBUH) who were too poor even then 
there is no example of any marriage having been dissolved on this 
ground."*^ 
The opinion of Hanifi Jurists that marriage cannot be dissolved 
on the husband's inability or negligence to maintain the wife seems 
to be too technical and do not appear to take the realities of life into 
consideration. The opinion of Imam Malik, Shafai'i and Ahmad Ibn 
Hanabal seem to be sound and practical. Hence, it is necessary in 
such hard cases to adopt the law of other sunni sect and release the 
neglected wife from marriage bond by a decree of faskh ^^ . 
35. Ibid, p.644. 
36. Ibid. 
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Statutory Recognition: 
The law laid down by the 'Maliki,' Hanabali and Shafai'i 
Jurists regarding a wife whose husband has either failed or neglected 
to provide maintenance allowance to his wife has been given 
statutory recognition in India by enacting section 2 clause (ii) of 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939. The relevant portion of 
the said Act is reproduced here for references which reads as: 
A woman married under Muslim law shall be entitled to obtain 
a decree for the dissolution of her marriage on the grounds namely; 
"that husband has neglected or failed to provide for her 
maintenance for a period of two years". 
The expression "has neglected or failed to provide for her 
maintenance" means willful negligence or failure on the part of the 
husband to provide for maintenance to his wife. A wife would not be 
entitled to decree of dissolution of her marriage on mere negligence 
or failure of the husband to provide for her maintenance for a period 
of two years where there is reasonable cause of such negligence or 
failure. The failure or negligence to provide maintenance on the part 
of husband must be proved to have been continuously for two years 
before the institution of suit in order to invoke the provision of 
section 2 clause (ii) of the Act. 1939. 
37. See: for detail: Section 2 Clause (ii) of Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939. 
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Judicial Trend: 
In the application of Section 2 clause (ii) of the Dissolution of 
Muslim Marriage Act, 1939, the courts in India have adopted two 
divergent opinions, one is textual and the other is normative. In one 
line of cases, the courts have emphasised upon the text of the section 
2 clause (ii) of the Act and hold that a wife would be entitled to a 
decree for a dissolution of marriage if it is proved that the husband 
has failed to provide maintenance for a period of two years. In these 
cases the courts have not considered the circumstances or reasons for 
which the husband failed to provide maintenance. They have also 
refused to take into account the conduct of the wife. The leading 
judicial authorit>' on the point is Manak Khan v/s Mst. Malka Bano 
where the husband had been in Jail for several years and had 
consequently failed to maintain his wife without any willful 
intention. The husband's defence of non-willful neglect was 
disallowed. The court observed: 
"Section 2(ii) of the Act, merely provides that woman 
married under Muslim law shall be entitled to obtain 
a decree for the dissolution of marriage on the 
ground that the husband has failed to provide 
maintenance for a period of two years. There is 
nothing in the wordings of this clause to suggest that 
38. A.I.R.; 1941; Lah. 167. 
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the failure must be willful. It is absolutely 
immaterial whether failure to maintain was due to 
poverty, ill-health or any other causes whatsoever". 
In Yusufv/s Sowramma^^ a girl of 17 years was married to the 
appellant who was twice of her age. After having lived for a month 
in her husband's house, she went back to her parents and lived 
separately for over two years. During this period the appellant 
admitted his failure to maintain his wife but alleged that he was 
willing to keep her with him. The court rejected husband's plea and 
upheld the decree for the dissolution of marriage. The court held that 
see for dissolution on the ground that she has not infact been 
maintained even if there is a cause for it. In the opinion of court, the 
reason why the husband has not maintained the wife for statutory 
period of two years is immaterial. 
In the second line of the cases the courts taking into 
consideration the conduct of the wives have held that maintenance 
mentioned in clause (ii) of section 2 of Dissolution of Muslim 
Marriages Act, 1939 is the maintenance to which a Muslim wife is 
entitled under Muslim law. The Muslim law does not confer upon a 
wife an absolute and unconditional right to maintenance. A wife is 
39. A.I.R. 1971, Kr. 261. 
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not entitled to dissolution of her marriage when the husband has not 
been paying her maintenance on account of her own faulty conduct. 
In Mst. Khatijan v/s Abdullah*^ the chief court of Sindh laid 
down that Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act was not intended to 
abrogate the general principle of Mohammedan law applicable to 
Muslim, and the husband cannot be said to have neglected or failed 
to provide maintenance for his wife unless under general 
Mohammedan Law, he was under an obligation to maintain her. The 
court further pointed out that the right of the wife to obtain 
maintenance from the husband is subject to her living with him and 
if she refuses to live with him without reasonable cause then she is 
not entitled to maintenance and failure of the husband to provide her 
with maintenance would not entitle wife to seek dissolution of her 
marital tie. 
In Amir Mohd. V/s Mst. Bushra^^ a division bench of Rajasthan 
High Court held that failure or negligence to provide maintenance in 
order to give rise to a claim for dissolution must be without any 
justification. For, if there is justification there cannot be said to be 
negligence. Negligence or failure, implies non-performance of a 
duty. But if the husband is released from duty on account of the 
conduct of the wife herself, or failed to provide maintenance. 
40. A.I.R., 19 43Sind, 65. 
41. A.I.R.1956Raj., 102 
332 
The attitude of the courts in first line of cases about the 
dissolution of marriage for want of maintenance on the part of the 
husband reflect that in order to succeed in a suit for dissolution of 
marriage all that a woman is required to do is to establish that for 
two years immediately preceding the suit, her husband has not 
provided her maintenance, and once that is established she will be 
entitled to a decree as a matter of course and the courts have not to 
go into question whether the woman herself has contributed towards 
the failure of her husband to provide maintenance for her and her 
refusal to stay with her husband or to refuse conjugal rights to him is 
no ground for refusing her claim for dissolution. This judicial 
craftsmanship is no more good law and cannot be justified in the 
light of general and specific injunctions of Islamic law which are of 
undoubted practical validit>' in as much as it permits the wife to 
enjoy the fruits of her wrong doing. The righteous conduct is a 
condition precedent for claiming the rights under Islamic law and 
any interpretation which contravenes this basic norm is not 
permissible by any stretch of imagination either by logic or law. 
In the second line of cases, the courts have asserted that the 
wrongful conduct of wife ascertained or proved by the facts of 
particular case shall be a relevant consideration in the determination 
of her right to obtain dissolution on the ground of want of 
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maintenance for two years during the subsistence of marriage. In 
short this right of wife does not enjoy absolute or unqualified status 
and depends upon, beside other things, on the righteous behaviour of 
the wife. This point of view of court according to Shariah law is 
correct. 
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{Section 2 Clause (iii)] 
Dissolution of marriage on the ground of husband's 
imprisonment: 
If the husband is sentenced to imprisonment for a period of 
seven years or more, the wife shall have the right, from the date of 
order becoming final, of demanding dissolution of her marriage 
through a decree of court. 
There is a difference of opinion on the question whether the 
wife has the right of demanding separation from the husband on 
account of his being sentenced to imprisonment. Infact, the basis of 
this right is the right of demanding separation by the wife on the 
ground of her husband's long absence. The Hanafi and Shafai Jurists 
are not convinced of right of separation of the wife on the ground of 
her husband's absence whose whereabouts is not known.^^ 
According to Imam Malik and Ahmad bin Hanbal, however, 
the wife has such right. Shia Ulma also agree with the view points 
of Maliki and Hanbali Jurists and hold that the wife in such a 
situation has the right of demanding separation."*^ 
42. Al-Shafai'i, Kitab al-Umm, Vol. V; p.239; quoted by Dr. Tanzil Ur-Rahman: A 
code of Muslim Personal Law; Vol. I, p.639 (1978), Karachi, Pakistan 
43. Ibid. 
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The purpose of right of demanding separation on the ground 
of her husband's absence is to save her from every kind of 
anticipated matrimonial injury which may prove detrimental to the 
foundation of marriage. In this connection, the question of fixing 
the period of husband's remaining absent due to imprisonment is 
based on Ijtihad. The period in this regard may be fixed in 
accordance with the changing conditions of the society. According 
to Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal the wife has the right of demanding 
separation in the event of her husband remaining absent without any 
cause for the period of three years and according to some assertions 
the period of one year has been fixed.^^ 
Legislative Development in India and abroad: 
The statutory laws for the dissolution of marriage on the 
ground of husband's imprisonment have been enacted in India and 
in different Islamic countries. In India the wife has been given the 
right of demanding separation under section 2(iii) of the 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 in the event of her 
husband having been sentenced to imprisonment for seven years or 
more. The legislative position in neighboring country Pakistan is 
same. Section 2(iii) of the Act, 1939, reads: 
44. Ibid., p.640. 
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"A woman married under Muslim Law shall be 
entitled to obtain a decree for the Dissolution of 
her marriage on the grounds, namely: 
(i) That the husband has been sentenced to imprisonment for a 
period of seven years or upwards; 
The punishment prescribed for offences under I.P.C. are 
relevant and helpful for wife to obtain a decree for dissolution of 
her marriage. The imprisonment in other circumstances, for 
example, under the Preventive Detention Act, or as a prisoner of 
war, would not give a right to dissolve the marriage. The offence, 
alleged, to have been committed by the husband must have been 
tried by a court having a competent Jurisdiction to try the case and 
pass the sentence which must be for seven years or up wards'*^. 
However, a decree dissolving the marriage in the exercise of 
power vested in the court under Section 2(iii) of the Act 1939, be 
passed only after the sentence of imprisonment has become final 
i.e. it is no longer open to challenge in appeal or revision. 
Section 14 of Egyptian Law on personal status 1985, lays 
down that if the husband is sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 
three years or more his wife on the lapse of one year of his 
45. Anwar Ahmad Qadri; Islamic Jurisprudence in Modem World, p.24, 1" ed. (1981), 
Lahore-Pakistan. 
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imprisonment shall, on the ground of injury caused to her, have the 
right of filing an application before the Qazi praying for a decree of 
irrevocable divorce inspite of the fact that enough property of the 
husband is there with her for her maintenance/^ 
Section 109 of the code of Personal Status 1977 of Syria 
provides that if the husband has gone away without any reasonable 
cause or is sentenced to imprisonment for more than three years, his 
wife can, after the expiry or one year from the date of absence or 
imprisonment, seek dissolution of marriage even if there is property 
from which she can get maintenance. The dissolution so effected 
shall be equivalent to a revocable divorce. If the absent husband 
returns or is released from the imprisonment while the wife is 
observing Iddat, he shall have the right of revocation.*' 
Section 93 of the code of personal status of Jordon provides 
that where the husband is sentenced to imprisonment for three years 
or more, the marriage may be dissolved after the wife has suffered 
at least one year of separation on that account.*" 
Section 94 of the code further provides that where a divorce 
is granted in accordance with the foregoing sections and woman 
46. Supra note 27, p. 41. 
47. Ibid. p. 146. 
48. Tahir Mahmood; Family Law Reform in Muslim World, p.83; (1972), New Delhi. 
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marries third person, subsequent appearance of the former husband 
shall have no effect on second marriage/*' 
Effect of separation due to imprisonment: 
The decree of dissolution of marriage granted to the wife by 
the court under section 2(iii) of Dissolution of Muslim Marriage 
Act, 1939 on the ground of her husband's imprisonment for seven 
years or more shall be deemed to be a revocable divorce. The 
husband shall have the right of having recourse to his wife if he is 
released within the period of her probation (Iddat). The same is rule 
under the laws in Islamic countries. From the above stated law in 
India under Sec.2 (iii) of Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 
1939, as well as law in abroad it appears that right of demanding 
dissolution accrues to the wife with the sentenced passed for seven 
years or upward final of imprisonment of the husband. The wife 
need not wait for any more period for making demand for 
dissolution through court of law under said provision of Law^". 
It shall be appropriate, in the changing condition of the 
society and its fast degrading moral values, that provision relating 
to the period of seven years or more imprisonment contained in 
49. Ibid. 
50. Tahir Mahmood: The Muslim Law in India, p. 102, (1980), Law Book Co. 
Allahabad. 
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section 2(iii) of the Act, 1939 be amended and reduced to two years 
to avoid hardship to the waiting woman, It may be pointed out that 
the term of two years has been prescribed under section 2(iii) of the 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 in case the husband has 
neglected or has failed to provide her maintenance. The period of 
imprisonment fixed in the statutes of other Muslim countries ranges 
from one to five years. 
It shall be appropriate, in the changing condition of the society 
and its fast degrading moral values, that provision relating to the 
period of seven years or more imprisonment contained in section 
2(iii) of the Act, 1939 be amended and reduced to two years to avoid 
hardship to the waiting woman. It may be pointed out that the term 
of two years has been prescribed under section 2 (iv) of the 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 in case the husband has 
neglected or has failed to provide her maintenance. The period of 
imprisonment fixed in the statutes of other Muslim Countries ranges 
from one to five years. 
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Section 2 Clause (IV) 
Husband's failure to perform marital obligation: 
Marriage vests some rights in the spouse and devolves some 
obligation on them. Under the Islamic matrimonial law, husband and wife 
have reciprocal rights and obligations towards each other. The division of 
social family responsibility between the couple is the necessity of a happy 
spousal life because each spouse specialise in his or her own sphere of life. 
It has been pointed out in the Holy Qur'an: 
"The men are protectors 
And maintainers of women, 
Because God has given 
The more strength 
Than the other, and because 
They support them from their means... ".^ ' 
The failure of the husband to perform the marital obligations which 
devolves on him may in some cases constitute grounds for the dissolution 
of marriage. Some of them have not been dealt with and discussed by 
Muslim jurists as main grounds for divorce but they may be as effective for 
dissolution of marriage as the other grounds and so attention is drawn to 
them hereunder. 
51. Holy Qur'an rV : 34 
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The guiding principle in the matter of husband's duty towards his 
wife is provided by the verse of Holy Qur'an wherein it is laid down: 
"When ye divorce 
Women, and they fulfil 
Their Term oflddat 
Either take them back on equitable terms, 
Or set them free on equitable terms 
But do not take them back, 
To injure them or to take undueadvantage 
If any one does that 
He wrongs his onn soul"^^. 
It is stated at another place in the Holy Qur'an: 
"And women shall ha\'e rights 
Similar to the rights 
Against them, according 
To what is equitable, 
But man ha\'e a degree 
(of advantage) over them. 
And God is Exalted in power wise "^^. 
As stated, one of the important objects of marriage is a happy 
companionship of the parties and with this object in view the husband has 
to perform certain marital obligations. But failure to perform marital 
obligations by a husband does not necessarily constimte a cause for 
dissolution of marriage. In some cases it may amount to a moral offence 
52. HolyQur'anII:231. 
53. Holy Qur'an, II: 228. 
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only but incase of the breach of some important obligation the wife gets a 
right to the dissolution of her marriage. 
This right of the wife has been given legislative status in India and 
Pakistan by enacting Dissolution of Muslim marriages Act, 1939. In India 
and Pakistan a muslim wife can get her marriage dissolved under the 
provisions of the Act, VIII of 1939 on the ground of her husband is failure 
to perform marital obligations for a specified period. Section 2 clause (IV) 
of the Act, making the provision for it reads as under: 
A Woman married under Muslim law shall be entitled to obtain a 
decree for the dissolution of her marriage on any one or more of the 
following grounds, namely; 
that the husband has failed to perform, without reasonable 
cause, his marital obligations for a period of three years. 
The Section has not described or mentioned the marital obligations 
of the husband and so we have to rely on Muslim law to find them. A 
husband has four main obligations towards his wife under Muslim law: 
(i) To maintain his wife in manner suitable for his wealth, 
(ii) To observe equalit>' between his wives if he has more than one. 
(iii) To make available to her a personal apartment and 
(iv) To allow her to visit and be visited by her parents and blood 
relations. 
343 
The first two grounds have been covered by clauses (ii) and (VIII) of 
Section 2 of the Act, 1939. The breach of last two obligations has been 
made specific grounds for the dissolution of marriage by invoking clause 
(IV) of Section! of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. 
In case of Ila the husband declares that he would not have carnal 
connection with his wife for four months or more upon which he is said to 
have given her Ua. Here, under clause (iv), when the husband has infact 
abstained from his wife's sexual company without reasonable cause for a 
period of three years or more, the wife is afforded a ground to sue for the 
dissolution of the marriage and the clause goes beyond that and it covers 
the desertion by the husband which means total repudiation of obligations 
of marriage. However, if the husband fails to perform his marital 
obligations due to misconduct of wife herself or due to some cause over 
which he has no control or a cause in which she had consented, the wife can 
not get the marriage dissolved by invoking clause (iv) of the section 2 of 
the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939. Thus, if the husband goes 
away to a foreign country for further studies or for business purpose with 
the consent and at the instance of wife, she will not be entitled to have her 
marriage dissolved on that ground. Similarly when he is compelled by 
circumstances, such as ilhiess or imprisonment for three or more years but 
less than seven years, she will not get remedy under this clause.^ '* 
54. Syed Khalid Rashid; Muslim Law; p. 112, 3"" ed. (1996) Eastern Book Co. 
Lucknow. 
344 
If the husband is too poor to provide his wife a separate residence for 
herself, this will probably be a reasonable cause for the husband not to 
perform the marital obligation enjoined by Muslim law. But under Shafai'i 
law it is not so. A gross failure to perform marriage obligations i.e. not 
caring to the call of the wife and not consummating the marriage may be 
good ground for refusing a decree for conjugal rights. 
Where the wife refuses to live with the husband and does not allow 
sexual intercourse or is otherwise disobedient unless refusal or 
disobedience is justified by non-payment of prompt dower or any other 
cause, she cannot have her marriage dissolved under clause (iv) of section 2 
ofthe Act, 1939.^ * 
The Islamic matrimonial law ordains explicitly the spouses to 
perform their reciprocal obligations so that they may lead a happy and 
prosperous life. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that tfiey should treat 
each other with kindness and affection. It is negation of this obligation, 
namely, unkindness towards the wife that may in extreme cases entitles a 
wife to separation. Unkindness when reaches to such a degree as to amount 
cruelty is a ground for divorce under Muslim law, as in many other systems 
of law. The Muslim law gives the notion of kindness a wide and realistic 
meaning. Thus, it includes the husband's implied permission to the wife to 
55. Ibid. 
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visit or receive her parents once a week. According to one report the 
parents and her children by a former husband can visit her at any time 56 
If a wife's father is a cripple or ill and there is no one to attend on 
him, the wife can go to look after him even against the wishes of her 
husband and she will not be considered to refractory in such a case. It is 
obvious that she will feel ver>' miserable on account of her anxiet>' for her 
helpless father and kindness demands that in such circumstances she should 
be allowed to attend on him. 
The wife can see her relations within the prohibited degree as a 
matter of right. According to one report she can do so once a month. 
According to another report she can do so only once a year and this is 
considered to be the more approved report. This later opinion may perhaps 
be based on the difficulties that were experienced formerly in travelling. 
But in modem times travelling has become easy and safe and there is no 
reason to deny the right to the wife to see her brother or sister more often 
than once a year. In any case period of one year is unreasonably long euid it 
seems equitable to adopt other \iew. 
56 Ibid. 
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(Section 2 Clause (v)) 
Impotency of Husband as a ground of dissolution of Marriage: 
It has been made clear in the foregoing chapters that the 
objects of the Islamic matrimonial law is not confined to the 
procreation of children and lawful enjoyment of sexual passions but 
the real divine motive behind it is to secure and establish a happy 
and cordial companionship between two members of the opposite 
sexes. If this sole object seems to be failing beyond reconciliation, 
for whatsoever reasons, separation is recommended in the interest of 
parties as well as society. Therefore, when the husband is unfit of 
effectively consummating the marriage due to his impotency, the 
companionship can not remain happy. It becomes extremely difficult 
and miserable for a wife to continue with such a non-functional 
husband by remaining within the limits of Shariah. Islam lays stress 
on the husband to satisfy the natural sexual desire of wife and not to 
neglect this important obligation without reasonable cause. 
Therefore, if a husband passes his nights in offering prayers and days 
in fasting so that he may not intimate with his wife and satisfy her 
natural desire, then on the complaint of wife, Shariah law authorizes 
the Qazi or court to order the husband to be intimate with the wife 
even at the cost of his worship. On this line of reasoning Muslim 
347 
Jurists allow the wife of a impotent person to seek dissolution of her 
marriage through a decree of court. 
The dissolution of a marriage on account of Ae husband's 
impotency also finds root in the following verse of Holy Qur'an 
which enjoins: 
"The parlies should either hold; 
Together on equitable terms or, 
Separate with kindness ". 
Explaining the instant Holy verse of Qur'an, Muslim Jurists 
have stated that when a person is incapable of satisfying the natural 
desire of his wife due to the existence of impotency in him, he 
cannot be said to be holding his wife with kindness because 
impotency of the husband is a continuous injury and misfortune to 
the wife. Therefore, such a marriage is liable to be dissolved on the 
petition of wife. 
Statutory Recognition of Right: 
The wife's right to seek dissolution of her marriage on the 
ground of her husband impotency as provided under Shariah, has 
been given statutory recognition under Dissolution of Muslim Marriage 
Act, 1939. The relevant provision of the said act is as under. 
57. FatoMa-I-Qazi Khan. Translated and edited by Maulvi Mohammad Yusuf Khan 
Vol. U, 41, (1986) Kitab Bhavvan Hew Delhi. 
58 Holy Qur'an; n229. 
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Clause (V) of Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act; 1939: 
A woman married under Muslim law shall be entitled to obtain 
a decree for the dissolution of her marriage on any one or more of 
the following ground; namely, That the husband was impotent at the 
time of marriage and continues to be so; provided that; 
Before passing a decree on ground (V) the court 
shall, on application by the husband, make an 
order requiring the husband to satisfy the court 
within a period of one year from the date of such 
order that he has ceased to be impotent and if the 
husband so satisfies the court within such period, 
no decree shall be passed on the said ground}^ 
The Husband was impotent at the time of Marriage: 
A women married under Muslim law can seek the dissolution 
of her marriage on the ground of her husband's impotency under 
section 2 clause (V) of dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939, 
when it is proved by her to the satisfaction of court that her husband 
was impotent at the time of marriage and continues to be so till the 
date of moving petition in the court. 
The term impotency in ordinary sense means the inability of a 
man to perform effectively the act of Coition and in juristic 
59. Section 2 clause (V) pro\iso (C) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939. 
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terminology that man is impotent who inspite of having his organ is 
not capable of having sexual intercourse with his wife. The word 
impotency may also be defined as the incapacity of the husband or 
wife to be sexually intimate with the other or to allow or grant sexual 
gratification.*"" 
The term impotency has been understood by the Judges in 
England in matrimonial cases as meaning incapacity to consummate 
the marriage, that is to say, incapacity to have sexual intercourse, 
which undeniably is one of the objects of marriage. The question is 
what does 'sexual intercourse means". Dr. Lusington states to this 
effect." 
"Sexual intercourse, in the proper meaning of the 
term, is ordinary and complete intercourse. It 
does not mean partial and imperfect intercourse: 
Yet, I cannot go to the length of saying that every 
degree of imperfection would deprive it of its 
essential character. There must be degrees 
difficult to deal with; but if so imperfect as 
scarcely to be natural, I should not hesitate to say 
that legally speaking, it is no intercourse at all". 
A full bench of Andhra Pradesh High court in Kola Emmanuel 
60. Supranote30, p. 273. 
61. Dr. Lusington; Quoted in Ram Natrajan v/s Alexander Xavier Nathan A I R 1999 
Mad. 238. 
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V/.S Nallipogu Sunanda held: 
"The word impolency is not related to a particular 
gender like male only. It relates to either gender. 
The criterion is the practical impossibility of 
consummation of marriage on account of 
impotency of either the husband or wife. 
Incapability of copulation on the part of either of 
spouses either due to structural defects in organs 
of generation or due to some other cause resulting 
in non-consummation of marriage is impotence". 
Their lordship of Supreme Court in YuvraJ Digvijay Singh v/s 
Yuvrani Pratap Kumari^^ 
"A party is impotent if his or her mental or 
physical condition makes consummation of 
marriage a practical impossibility. The condition 
must be one, according to statute, which existed 
at the time of marriage and continued to be so 
until institution of proceeding". 
From these decisions, it is clear that impotency, with reference 
to section 2 clause (v) of Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939, 
means incapacity to consummate the marriage. Sexual intercourse 
means an ordinary and complete intercourse and it does not mean 
partial or imperfect intercourse. The incapacity to consummate the 
marriage may be due to mental or physical condition of either spouse 
62. 1998. A.I.C.H. 2297. 
63. A.1.R.1970S.C.138. 
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and as required under the statute, such condition existed at the time 
of marriage and continued to be so until the institution of 
proceeding. 
According to classical Muslim law, a wife may bring a suit for 
the dissolution of her marriage on the ground of her husband's 
impotency when it is proved that she was ignorant, prior to the 
marriage, of the impotence of her prospective husband. But under 
clause (V) of section 2 of Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939, 
it will be sufficient for the wife to prove that husband was impotent 
at the time of her marriage and continue to be so till the date of 
institution of proceeding.*"* 
Proviso (C) to clause (V) of Sec. 2 of the Act, 1939 says that 
prior to the passing of a decree on the ground of the husband's 
impotency, the court shall, on the application of the husband grant him 
a time for a period of one year to get himself treated. If the husband 
within the specified period of one year satisfies the court that he is no 
longer impotent, the court shall set aside the suit of wife. Granting one 
year of time to an impotent person is a settled rule of Sharia law. The 
current law in India by addition of words," on the application of 
husband" has been brought closer to real spirit of Shariah law. 
64. Supra note 20, p. 72. 
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Under the Muslim law, a wife is not bound to exercise her 
right immediately on becoming aware of impotence of her husband 
She can seek the dissolution of her marriage at anytime she likes 
provided her right has not been lost in the meantime. Thus, if the 
husband has in the meantime, managed to have consummation of 
marriage though only once, the wife shall lose her right. 
Burden of Proof: 
The general law of evidence regarding burden of proof is that 
it lies on the person who assert that certain thing exist.^^ Therefore, 
inorder to seek relief under section 2 clause (V) of Dissolution of 
Muslim Marriage Act, 1939, the wife is required to establish that her 
husband was impotent at the time of marriage and continue to be so 
until the institution of proceeding. A division bench of Delhi High 
court in Rita Nijhawan v s Bal Kishna Nijhawan^^ observed: 
"It has to be positively proved that the respondent 
uas impotent at all the material times i.e. right 
from the time of marriage till the institution of 
suit. The requirement is so strict that even if it 
could he showu thai marriage Mas consummated 
just once during this period, a divorce of nullity 
can not be granted. The burden of proving that 
the respondent was impotent at all the material 
times is on petitioner". 
65. See for detail. Sections 101 to 103 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 
66. A I.R. 1973 Delhi. 200. 
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According to Muslim law the wife has also to prove that her 
husband has not been cured of his impotency within the time granted 
to him by court for this purpose. But this aspect of Muslim law, 
namely, burden of proving that the husband has not been cured 
within the time given to him, has been changed in India by passing 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939. Under the said. Act, it is 
the husband who has to prove that he has been cured of impotence 
within the time given to him 
Thus, wife's right to seek dissolution of her marriage on the 
ground of her husband's impotency given by the Shariah and its 
recognition by the state law is quite reasonable and humanitarian as 
it seek to secure happiness for the parties by releasing them from a 
unhappy and torturous bond. 
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Section 2 Clause (VI) 
Insanity, Leprosy and Venereal Disease as a Ground of 
Dissolution of Marriage 
The important objects of marriage are happy companionship 
between the spouses and lawful satisfaction of passions. If either of 
the spouse suffers from such a disease, physical or mental that his or 
her condition becomes repulsive or revolting to such extent that the 
other cannot tolerate his or her company or the condition of one of 
them is such that the other can not live with safety with him or her, 
the first object shall be lost and as a natural consequence the other 
object may also be lost. Again, the physical or mental condition of 
one of them may be such that he or she may be unable to perform the 
various obligations arising out of contract of marriage when the 
other spouse may feel very unhappy of this aspect of his or her 
marriage life and in such cases it will be very hard to bind that 
spouse to pass his or her whole life in misery and unhappiness. It is 
considered desirable under Muslim Law in such circumstances to 
dissolve the marriage and free the aggrieved spouse from the 
marriage tie^'. 
This rule is based on the Verse of the Holy Qur'an in which it 
is stated: 
67. Supra note 14, p. 384. 
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"They (the women) have rights similar to those 
(of men) over them in kindness and men are a 
degree above them' 
This very clearly shows that the spouses have reciprocal rights 
and obligations against each other. If one of them is unable to 
perform his or her parts of the obligations cast on him or her by 
express or implied conditions of marriage contracts, he or she shall 
be deemed to be at fault and the other will become entitled to a relief 
on his account. The couple have been enjoined by the Holy Qur'an: 
"The parties should either hold 
Together on equitable terms, 
Or separate with kindness^^" 
In the view of this Holy Verse, it is not just and fair for a 
husband to keep his wife tied to a marriage when she desires a 
separation from him on account of mental or physical disease in him. 
When a husband or wife is suffering from disease which makes a 
happy companionship between them impossible, it becomes 
necessary for a Qazi or court to give the aggrieved spouse relief in 
the matter by dissolving the marriage. Muslim law tries its best not 
to make marriage insecure but it refuses to sacrifice the happiness of 
a spouse to the rigidity of law. Once it is established that a wife or a 
68. Holy Qur'an; II : 228. 
69. Holy Qur'an : U : 229, 
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husband can not live in peace and harmony with other, then it does 
not scruple to help the aggrieved spouse by dissolving the marriage 
because under such circumstances the marriage becomes a farce and 
its continuation undesirable . 
The Muslim Jurists are unanimous on the idea to dissolve the 
marriage when one of the spouses is suffering from specified disease 
or defect. The basis of the rule is traceable in the Hadith which 
narrates: 
"Let a marriage be dissolved when it is 
prejudicial to the interest of wife" 
However, there is a difference of opinion amongst the Jurists 
on two points. The first point of difference is as to whether a 
husband has right to get his marriage dissolved through Qazi on the 
basis of a defect or disease in the wife. The second point on which 
the jurists differ relates to the defects or disease on the basis of 
which marriage can be dissolved. 
As regard the first point, the Hanafi Jurists do not allow the 
husband the right to the dissolution of marriage through the Qazi on 
the ground of disease in wife. This is due to the fact that husband 
70. Supra note 31, p. 402. 
71 Sahih al-Bukhari; Translated by Prof Muhammad Muhsin Khan; voI.VII. p. 16, 
(1954), Kitab Bhawan, New Delhi. 
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enjoys wide power of divorce and can exercise it when he is not 
happy with his wife. They deny this right to the husband also 
because they do not want to deprive the wife of any portion of her 
dower. They seem to consider that for better or for worse, she is your 
wife, and you must tolerate her condition. If you are not prepared to 
do so, you can divorce her and pay her dower. 
As regard to the second point, the jurists have mentioned 
different disease at various places in relation to some context but 
have not enumerated all of them at one place when laying down 
general rules for dissolution of a marriage on account of them. 
However, Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Malik, Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal 
and Imam Shafi'i are unanimous on the point that if the wife finds 
that her husband has been suffering from insanity for a period of two 
years or is suffering from leprosy or a virulent venereal disease that 
hinders him in having sexual intercourse with her, she is entitled to 
seek separation from him through court.'^ 
Dissolution on Account of Insanity: 
lnsanit>' means a state of mind in which one or more of the 
functions of feeling, knowing, emotion and willing is performed in 
an abnormal manner or is not performed at all by reasons of some 
72. Supra note 70, p.403. 
73. Ibid, 
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disease of brain or the nervous system and it includes lunacy, mental 
derangement, mental disorder, madness and so on. 
The Muslim Jurists have not differentiated these various 
classes of mental derangement and have used the word "Janun" in an 
exhaustive sense to include a lunatic, an idiot, an imbecile, an insane 
person or a person of unsound mind. By the word "Majnun", means a 
person who is suffering from all types of mental derangement. But in 
a technical sense and medical language they do not differ from each 
other. They only differentiate between a violent lunatic or a insane 
person and one who is peaceful. 
Juristic Opinion: 
There is a difference of opinion among the Jurists of all the 
four sunni schools about the presence of Janun (insanity) in one 
spouse forming ground for the dissolution of a Muslim marriage. 
Imam Abu Hanifa and Imam Yusuf do not consider Janun 
(insanity) to be a ground for the dissolution of marriage. According 
to Imam Muhammad, however, the wife is entitled to demand 
separation by applying to a court and thus obtain a separation from 
her insane husband, provided, the madness of husband be of such a 
degree that her living with him is impossible.'* 
74. See, Stepen; History of Criminal Law. vol.11, P. 130. 
75. Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi; Al-Hilalat alNijiza; quoted by K.N. Ahmad: The 
Muslim law of Divorce: P.356 (1984) Kitab Bhawan, New Delhi. 
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According to Imam Malik if one of the parries is affected with 
insanity before the marriage, the other part>' is entitled to the 
dissolution of marriage. This is however, subject of the condition 
that the insane spouse should be violent or cause financial loss. If he 
or she is harmless, the other party has no cause for dissolution of 
marriage.'^ 
Imam Shafi'i and Ahmad bin Hanabal are unanimous on the 
point that a spouse shall have right to the dissolution of his or her 
marriage when the other suffers from insanity or from similar serious 
disease irrespective of the fact whether disease was already present 
before the marriage or appeared subsequently and irrespective of the 
fact as to whether marriage has or has not been consummated.^' 
Thus, according to the three Imams, namely. Imam Malik, 
Imam Shafai'i and Ahmad bin Hanabal, the wife is entitled to the 
dissolution of her marriage from her husband on the ground of his 
being insane. The opinion of Imams correspond to the rule of law 
laid down by Imam Ibn Qayyim namely, "if a marriage is prejudicial 
to the interest of wife so that she can not remain with her husband 
without risk to herself let it be dissolved" 
76. Ibid. 
77. Ibid. 
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The Supreme Court of India in Ram Narain v/s Ramesh Wari 
held that the context in which the ideas of unsoundness of mind and 
mental disorder occur in the section as ground for dissolution of 
marriage requires the assessment of degree of mental disorder. The 
degree must be such as that the spouse seeking relief can not 
reasonably be expected to live with each other. All mental 
abnormalities are not recognised as ground for grant of decree. If 
mere existence of any degree of mental abnormality could Justify 
dissolution of a marriage, few marriages would indeed survive in 
law. 
Dissolution on the ground of Leprosy: 
Leprosy is a chronic disease varying in manifestations as skin, 
nervous, or other tissues are affected. It is infectious as well as 
contagious and a person can become infected with it either by 
infection through the breath of the sufferer or by contract. The 
affected part of the body becomes senseless. If a husband or wife 
becomes affected by it, it becomes necessary for the other spouses to 
keep apart from the sufferer and so is deprived of satisfaction of 
married life. Under the Maliki, Shafai'i and Hanbali law, the 
marriage of the sufferer can be dissolved at the instance of the other 
78. A.I.R., 1988 S C 2264. 
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Spouse. Imam Muhammad holds same view as held by these jurists 
when it is the husband who is sufferer.'^ 
The opinion of Imam Maliki, Imam Shafai'i and Ahmad bin 
Hanbal find full support in this matter from a tradition of Holy 
Prophet (PBUH) that he has said: 
"Flee from a leper as you would from a loin" 
In view of this tradition, a marriage must be dissolved 
irrespective of the fact whether it is the husband or wife who suffers 
from it. In any case, it is open to a court in such a case to apply 
Maliki Shafai'i or Hanbali Law to a Hanafi woman on the basis of 
Justice, equity and good conscience. 
Dissolution on the Ground of Virulent Venereal Disease: 
As pointed out the diseases specified by the jurists do not form 
an exhaustive list of the same. On the analogy of the tradition about 
leprosy, other diseases have been added by the jurists which form a 
ground for the dissolution of marriage. The Muslim Jurists have not 
mentioned venereal disease amongst those that form a basis for the 
dissolution of marriage. But such disease have to be avoided at all 
costs and a husband or wife should not be allowed to communicate 
them to other. 
79. Supra note 61, p. 79. 
80. Supra note 71, p. 36. 
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The rules of law laid down by Imam Muhammad and Imam Ibn 
Qayyim to the effect that "'if a marriage is prejudicial to the interest 
of wife so that she cannot remain with her husband without risk to 
herself let it be dissolved", shall also apply in such case. Imam 
Malik and Shafai'i have laid down a general rule of law that every 
defect of genitals whether in the husband or wife which stands in the 
way of sexual intimacy is a ground for dissolution of marriage. 
However, the dissolution can be claimed only when the husband is 
suffering from virulent venereal disease and not when he is suffering 
from venereal disease, which is not at a stage where it can be 
communicated to the wife. 
Legislative Recognition: 
The law laid down by the Imam, Malik Shafai'i and Ahmad 
bin Hanbal regarding insanity, leprosy and virulent venereal disease 
forming as the ground for the dissolution of a marriage have also 
been given legislative recognition in India by passing Dissolution of 
Muslim Marriage Act, 1939. The relevant provision of the said Act is 
as under: 
A Woman married under Muslim law shall be entitled to 
obtain a decree for the dissolution of her marriage on any one or 
more of the following grounds; namely. 
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that the husband has been insane for a period of two years or is 
suffering from leprosy or a virulent venereal disease. 
The supreme court of India in Mr 'X' v/s Hospital 'Z' held 
that mental and physical health is of prime importance, as one of the 
objects of the marriage is the procreation of equally healthy children. 
That is why in every system of matrimonial law, it has been provided 
that if a person was found to be suffering from any, including, 
Venereal disease in a communicable form, it will be open to the 
other partner in the marriage to seek divorce. 
The emphasis therefore, practically in all systems of marriage 
is on healthy body with moral ethics. Once the law provides the 
venereal disease as a ground for divorce to either husband or wife, 
such a person who was suffering from that disease, even prior to the 
marriage cannot be said to have any right to marry so long as not 
fully cured. 
81. See: Section 2 clause (vi) of Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act 1939 
82. AIR 1999 SC 502. 
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Section 2 Clause (VII)) 
Repudiation of marriage on attaining puberty: 
A minor can not legally enter into a binding contract nor is a 
contract entered into by a guardian on his or her behalf always 
binding on minor. The minor can, on attaining majority, ratify such a 
contract if he or she so chooses. A Muslim marriage is normally 
governed by the same principle of law as applies to contracts entered 
into on behalf of minors. Hence, when a marriage is contracted for a 
minor by a guardian he, or she, on attaining, majority, has a right 
under certain conditions to choose whether he or she wishes to 
submit to marriage or wants it to be dissolved. This right of 
dissolution of marriage on attaining majority is called Khyar-ul-
Bulugh or Option of Puberty. 
In Muslim law an adult husband is considered to have an 
absolute legal right to dissolve his marriage, hence, it is the wife 
who stands mostly in need of help for the dissolution of marriage and 
the doctrine of option of pubert>' comes to her help. Therefore, the 
basic idea underlying the doctrine of option of puberty is to protect a 
minor from an unscrupulous or undesirable exercise of authority by 
83. Syed Ameer Ali; Muhatnmadan law: vol. II, P.331, (1986) Kitab Bha\\'an New 
Delhi. 
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his or her guardian for marriage. The right has been given to the 
minors to dissolve a marriage on attaining majority where guardian 
showed a want of affection and discretion by contracting the minor 
in an undesirable marriage. 
Religious basis of Right of Option of Puberty: 
The Holy Prophet (PBUH) with the tacit approval of Allah, 
exercising his superior intellect decided the controversy which go to 
constitute the basis of the principle of the option of puberty. A 
tradition states 
"Ibn Abbas (May Allah be pleased with him) 
reported that a virgin girl came to the Holy 
Prophet (PBUH) and said that her father had 
given her in marriage which was not of her liking. 
The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) then gave her 
option to repudiate it. 
Abu Dawud reports from Khansa bint Khidhan that she was 
married by her father with a man whom she did not like. On hearing 
her complaint the Holy Prophet (PBUH) gave her option to retain or 
repudiate the marriage.'"' 
84. Ibid. 
85 . Miskat-ul-Masabih, Translated by Al-Haj Maulana Fazlul Karim; P.271, 3"* ed. 
(1994) Islamic Book ser\ice New Delhi. 
86 . Sunan Abu Dawud: Translated by Prof. Ahmad Hasan; Vol. II, P.286. (1985) Kitab 
Bhawan New Delhi. 
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Nasai reports from Hazrat Ayesha stating that a girl was 
married by her father against her will, where upon she complained to 
the Holy Prophet (PBUH). The Holy Prophet gave her liberty to 
repudiate the marriage. On hearing this, the girl declared; O'Prophet, 
I accept the decision of my father. I wanted only to show to other 
Women that their father's decision is not final.*' 
On the face of these traditions, it becomes clear that a minor 
girl married by their guardians or parents during her minority is free 
to repudiate her marriage on attaining puberty. 
Juristic View: 
According to Hanafi School of law, barring Imam Abu Yusuf, 
there is consensus of opinion that the marriage of minor boys or 
girls, got contracted during their minority by their guardians, other 
than their fathers or grand fathers, may, on their attainment of 
majority, be repudiated by them. But if the marriage has been 
arranged by the father or grand father during the minority of girl, 
they maintain the girl is not at libert>' to repudiate the marriage, 
except when it is proved that the father or grand father is a man of 
loose character or that he is reputed to be a man of careless 
disposition. Imam Abu Yusuf is of the view that a minor girl has not 
87 Nasai; quoted by M. Mazherruddin Siddiqui in Women in Islam; P.68 1st ed.(1980) 
Adam Publishers. New Delhi. 
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got the option of puberty whether the marriage has been contracted 
by her father or grand father or any other guardian. If, however, the 
marriage has been contracted with an unequal man or the dower that 
has been settled upon is less than proper dower then, according to 
Abu Yusuf and Imam Muhammad the minor girl, on attaining her age 
of majority can exercise her right of option of puberty. 
The distinction observed by sunni jurists no the right to 
exercise the option of puberty when a marriage is contracted for the 
minor by the father or the grand father on the one hand and a 
marriage contracted by any other guardian on the other hand is based 
on the presumption that a father has perfect affection for his 
children; his guardianship, therefore, is also perfect. He is better 
suited to guard and take care of the rights and interest of his children 
than are the children themselves or any one else. As a father 
understands the interest and benefits of his children better than 
children themselves because of his abundant natural love and 
therefore, he cannot be expected to act against the interest of minor 
and contract a marriage for his minor that may not be desirable. But 
if it is established that he had ignored the interest of minor, then 
88 Fatawa-I-Qazi Khan: Translated and edited \}\ Moulvi Mohammad Yusuf Khan; 
Vol. 1, P.166, (1986) Kitab Bhawan New Delhi. 
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minor is entitled to exercise this option. 
In fact, the arguments of the Jurists that father or grand father 
have greater love than the other guardians for the minor and his 
guardianship is perfect, hence, the minor can not be given option of 
puberty, has no religious basis. Their opinion is based on pure 
rationalization, presumption and human experience that father, being 
well-wisher of family can not act against real interest of minor. The 
presumption for which no authority has ever been quoted from the 
Holy Qur'an or the tradition of Prophet (PBUH) is open to the 
following grave objections. 
Firstly, a very authentic tradition of Holy Prophet (PBUH) 
states that he gave away the daughter of Hazrat Hamzah in marriage 
to Umar bin Abi Salamah while she was still a minor and declared 
that after she reaches puberty, she was at liberty to repudiate the 
marriage. Here Holy Prophet (PBUH) did not make any exception in 
favour of any guardian, nor did he specify it as a reason that because 
he was not the father or grandfather of the girl, therefore, she had the 
option of puberty. He made a general statement covering all the 
cases. This shows that even a minor girl married by her father or 
grandfather has option of puberty. 
89 Ibid. 
Secondly, the presumption itself has a very frail basis. There 
are innumerable cases where a father or a grandfather has not 
consulted descendent in deciding their future for their best interest. 
Thirdly, even if the presumption be valid, it is quite possible 
that the husband of the minor girl may prove unworthy after he has 
grown up or he may develop habits ruinous to the health and 
happiness of his wife. For all these reasons arguments given by the 
Sunni jurists appear untenable and since Muslims are not bound by 
the decisions of any person except of Holy Prophet (PBUH), there is 
no reason why a Muslim girl who has been married by her father or 
grandfather before she attained age of puberty should not be given 
option of puberty '". 
Modification of Principle: 
Thus, law propounded by the Sunni jurists do not give right to 
a minor girl to dissolve her marriage by the exercise of option of 
puberty when same has been contracted for her by her father or grand 
father unless their integrity is doubtful. The distinction made by 
Muslim jurists did not suit the present time. Under the Dissolution of 
Muslim Marriage Act, 1939, the provisions of Muslim law relating to 
suit for dissolution of marriages by women married under Muslim 
90 . M. Mazharuddin Siddiqi; Women in Islam, p. 70 1" ed., (1980) Adam Publishers 
Delhi. 
370 
law were consolidate and clarified. The wives got contracted into 
marriages by their fathers and grandfathers were treated at per and 
declared entitled under section 2 clause (VII) of the Act, to obtain 
decrees for dissolution of marriages from court in the exercise of 
option of puberty. As a result, whatever distinction in connection 
with the right of "option of puberty" in marriages got contracted by 
father and other guardians has been recognised has now been 
removed by virtue of this Act (Vlll of 1939). Section 2 clause (Vll) 
of the Act, reads as under: 
That she having been given in marriage by her father or other 
guardian before she attained the age of fifteen years, repudiate the 
marriage before attaining the age of eighteen years; provided that 
marriage has not been consummated; 
Time of Exercise: 
Clause (VII) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939, 
authorises a Muslim girl to get her marriage dissolved in the exercise 
of right of option of puberty at anytime before attaining the age of 
eighteen years if she was married while she was minor, that is, 
before attaining age of fifteen years, it is, therefore, no longer 
necessary that she must exercise the option of puberty immediately 
on attaining puberty. Her right to exercise this option shall extend 
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upto the time when she attains the age of eighteen years, provided in 
the meantime the marriage has not been consummated on attaining 
age of puberty. 
Therefore, consummation of marriage during period of 
minority with or without the consent of girl does not destroy her 
right because a minor is not capable of giving her consent to any act 
as long as she is minor and secondly,; because the right to exercise 
the option arises only after she has become a major and so is not lost 
by anything done or happening before that period of time. The option 
of puberty shall be considered to have been waived by allowing 
marriage to be consummated only if it is done after the girl has 
attained majority and she consented to it of her free will '*. 
Necessity of Court Decree: 
The most important question with regard to the option of 
puberty is whether the marriage stand dissolved by mere exercise of 
option of puberty by minor girl on attaining puberty, or it gets 
dissolved by obtaining a proper decree from a court of law. 
Classical View : 
The classical Muslim Jurists are unanimous on the point that 
the marriage is not affected by the exercise of option of puberty 
91. Supranotel4,p. 143. 
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alone. A decree dissolving the marriage from a competent court has 
to be obtained. In other words, by mere exercise option of puberty by 
the wife, the marriage is not dissolved. It subsists till a proper court 
passes a decree dissolving the marriage. It follows, therefore, that if 
the wife even after exercising option of puberty, allows 
consummation, it would not constitute adultery. The cohabitation 
would be perfectly legal, in as mush as the marriage subsisted '^. 
According to Fatawa-I-Qazi Khan the de-jure separation 
between the couple is not effected by the exercise of option of 
puberty and the marriage is not dissolved until their marriage 
contract is annulled by a competent court. If the dissolution is 
effected before cohabitation , the entire dower will lapse, whether 
the dissolution is effected at the instance of husband or wife: if 
however, the dissolution is effected after cohabitation the dower 
shall not lapse '"*. 
Damad Afandi, the author of Majma al-An-hur is of the 
opinion that the decision of the court is a condition precedent to the 
dissolution of marriage through the exercise of option of puberty. 
The marriage is not annulled until a Qazi gives his decision thereon '"*. 
92 . Supra note 24, p. 476. 
93. Supra note 72, p. 168. 
94. Ibid. 
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Ibn Al-Humam, the author of Path al-Qadir, a most renounced 
and authentic commentary on Hedaya, is also of the opinion that if 
one of the couple dies after repudiating the marriage but without 
obtaining Qazi's decree, thereon surviving shall inherit from the 
deceased " . 
Therefore, at the strength of the above authorities it can be 
safely held that the marriage is not dissolved by the exercise of the 
opinion of puberty by the wife but it continues to subsist till it is 
terminated by an order of the Qazi. Syed Ameer Ali is also of the 
view that Qazi's order is essential condition for the repudiation of 
marriage in the exercise of right of opinion of puberty. The civil 
courts in India now have taken the place of the Qazi and so it can be 
assumed that a decree for the dissolution of marriage by the court is 
an essential condition. The opening clause of section 2 (VIII) of 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act 1939, makes the position clear. 
It reads as under; 
A woman married under Muslim law shall be entitled to obtain 
a decree for the dissolution of her marriage on any one or more of 
the following grounds; namely; 
that she, having been given in marriage by her father or other 
95. Ibid. 
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guardian before she attained age of fifteen years, repudiates the 
marriage before attaining age of eighteen years: 
Provided that marriage has not been consummated; 
It is thus, clear from the provision contained in section 2 
clause (VII) of the Act, that a woman married under Muslim law is 
given a right to obtain a decree for the dissolution of her marriage. It 
does not entitle her to dissolve the marriage by herself. This leads to 
the obvious conclusion that it shall be only the decree of the court 
which shall dissolve the marriage under the said provision. 
Judicial Trend: 
So far as the view courts of India and Pakistan are concern 
there are different rulings regarding the annulment of marriage 
contract by exercise of option of puberty. A study of these rulings 
will be of interest. 
Courtis decree not essential: 
In case of Mafizuddin v/s Rahima Bibi '^ court held that no 
decree was required under Muhammadan law to confirm the 
dissolution of marriage that has been effected by exercise of option 
of puberty, but to impress a judicial imprimatur on that Act, an order 
of judge is necessary. 
96. AIR. 1934 Cal. 104 
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There is another case, Shafiullah v/s Emperor^'' of Allahabad 
High Court. The fact of the case were that a minor girl named 
Majidan was got contracted into marriage by her uncle with a person 
named Tufail Ahmad. The girl on attaining puberty contracted her 
second marriage with another person. The lower court held Mst. 
Majidan guilty of bigamy under Indian Penal Code. The High Court 
in its revisional jurisdiction discussing the validly of the first 
marriage of the Mst. Majidan on its annulment by her exercise of the 
right of option of puberty stated that even if it is accepted that 
marriage of Mst. Majidan with Tufail Ahmad was valid when she 
contracted another marriage on her attaining puberty with another 
person, there could be no surer repudiation than the girl of her own 
accord on attaining puberty, married someone other than the one that 
she was married when she was minor. 
Decree of Court essential : 
In respect of annulment of marriage by exercise of option of 
puberty there is a case of Osman v/s. Budhu^*. In this case the 
accused was charged with bigamy. It was, inter alia, argued on 
behalf of applicant that there was no valid subsisting marriage in 
case because the woman who had been given in marriage by her 
97. AIR, 1934, All. 589. 
98.AIR,1942,smd. 92 
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father before she had attained the age of puberty, had since 
repudiated this marriage, firstly by a written notice and secondly by 
the second marriage which was the subject of alleged offence. The 
learned judges, dismissing the Revision Application of the accused 
held that it would appear that until she has obtained decree that the 
marriage has been dissolved, the marriage is subsisting. 
In case of Pir Mohd. vs. state of Madhya Pradesh^^ the High 
Court held that mere exercise of the option of repudiation does not 
operate as a dissolution of a marriage. The repudiation is required to 
be confirmed by a decree of court. 
On examining the conflicting views of Muslim Jurists and of 
the Indian Courts, it is apparent that according to Muslim Jurists a 
minor girl on attaining puberty through the exercise of her right of 
option of puberty is entitled to express her disapproval and to 
repudiate the said marriage. A court's decree is, however, essential 
to make dissolution of marriage binding on her husband. The 
marriage therefore, does not appear to stand dissolved by mere 
repudiation through girl's exercise of option of puberty. The 
dissolution does not take effect until a court of law confirms the 
repudiation. The option of puberty is a right granted to a minor on 
attaining puberty. The exercise of this right by one party to marriage 
99. AIR I960, M.P. 24 
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affect the right of the other party concerned. The necessity of court's 
intervention, thus, becomes obvious; and the question as to why the 
repudiation of marriage by one has been dependent on its being 
confirmed by the decree of court is thus answered. In this context it 
is to be borne in the mind that the effect of repudiation is not limited 
to the repudiator alone it extents to the other party of marriage as 
well. The decree of court is essential to make the effect of 
repudiation marriage binding on the other party too. 
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Section 2 Clause (VIII) 
Dissolution of Marriage on the Ground of Cruelty: 
One of the primary ends of marriage is a happy companionship 
of a husband and wife. The only security of marriage is the reality of 
marriage. There can be no happiness when the husband makes wife's 
life miserable and intolerable by his cruel conduct. It involves great 
hardship to a wife if she is tied for her life to a marriage that has 
proved a failure. The spirit of Muslim Law does not approve of a 
marriage where instead of love and affection, which are necessary 
objects of marriage, there is hatred and ill-feeling. Islam allows the 
severance of the relationship of husband and wife in such cases. The 
wife can apply for, and obtain a judicial decree when her husband 
treats her with cruelty. If a husband habitually assault his wife, 
making her life miserable by cruelty of conduct she can apply for a 
decree even when such conduct does not amount to physical ill-
treatment. 
The Holy Qur'an strongly condemns injury or harm being 
caused to the wife laying great emphasis on the kind treatment of a 
wife. The guiding principle in respect of treating a wife with mercy 
and kindness is laid down in following verses of Holy Qur'an. 
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"Either take them back 
On equitable terms or set them free 
On equitable terms, 
But do not take them back 
To injure them or to take undue advantage "*" 
Another Verse of Holy Qur'an states: 
"O, ye who belive; 
Ye are forbidden to inherit 
Women against their will 
Nor ye should treat them with harshness, they ye may 
On the country live with them 
On a footing of kindness and equity}^^ 
A tradition recorded in the Fatawa-i Qazi Khan says that the 
Holy Prophet (PBUH) emphasized on kind treatment towards wives. 
Thus, he exhorted the people in his serman of the last pilgrimage and 
said:" you have taken them (your wives) only as a trust from God, 
and you have the enjoyment of their persons by words of God. So be 
fearful of Allah in regard to woman and enjoin that they be treat 
well.*"^ 
It is clear from the verses and the traditions quoted above that 
Islam lays great emphasis on kind treatment of wives and strongly 
condemns a husband's keeping his wife for injury or harming her. If 
100. Holy Qur'an; 11:231. 
101. Holy Qur'an; rV: 19. 
102. Supranote57, p. 23 
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the husband does not comply with the injunction of Holy Qur'an, it 
is obvious that he shall be guilty of transgressing the sacred text. It 
shall, therefore, be duty of Qazi, when he is satisfied with the merit 
of case, to order the husband in the interest of justice to divorce the 
wife. If the husband fails or refuses to do so, the Qazi must himself 
dissolve the marriage to save wife from hardship.*"' 
Therefore, if a husband habitually insults the wife her parents 
or her relations or leads an infamous life, or associates with a woman 
of evil repute or attempts to force her to lead an immoral life, or 
makes her life miserable by cruelty of conduct, even when it does not 
amount to physical ill-treatment, the wife shall have a right to apply 
for and obtain a decree of divorce. 
However, under Hanafi law, there is no provision to dissolve a 
marriage on the basis of the wife's ill-treatment by the husband. This 
resulted in great hardship to the wives in many cases and it was 
found necessary in many cases to give them adequate relief. The 
Hanafi jurists have formulated rule to adopt law of another Imam of 
the Sunni sect when circumstances so required. The Maliki law 
provides that when a husband is guilty of ill-treating his wife, she 
can complain to the Qazi who shall investigate the matter. If the 
103. Ibid. 
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wife's complaint is found to be correct, the Qazi shall severely 
admonish the husband and may even order his chastisement. If the 
wife is still subjected to ill-treatment by the husband and she makes 
repeated complaints to the Qazi but has no proof in support of her 
allegations, the Qazi shall appoint two arbitrators one representing 
each party to look into and decide the case. If they deem it fit and 
proper to separate the parties they may make declaration to that 
effect. This declaration shall amount to a judicial decree for the 
dissolution of marriage. This dissolution, however, will be a 
revocable divorce. If the wife complains of cruelty of her husband to 
the Qazi and he is satisfied of the genuineness of her charge, he can 
dissolve the marriage even in cases where the husband's misconduct 
is not of long standing.'"'* 
According to Shafi'i and Hanbali law if the wife complains to 
the Qazi that her husband is of an irritable temperament or that he 
ill-treats her without a cause and the Qazi is satisfied about the 
genuineness of her charge, he will appoint two arbitrators with the 
consent of parities. The arbitrators will investigate the matter and 
will try to bring about reconciliation between the parties. If they find 
104. Dr. Zeenat Shaukat Ali; Marriage and Divorce in Islam; An jmpraisal P229 
(1987) Bombay. 
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that no compromise is possible, they can dissolve the marriage. Their 
decision shall be binding on both the parties. 105 
According to Shia law, if the husband is at fault and deprives 
the wife of any of her rights, she can complain to the judge for 
redress. The judge shall admonish the husband and ask him to fulfil 
his responsibilities, but he can not chastise the husband or dissolve 
the marriage. If the parties can not live together in peace and there is 
discord between them they can have recourse to the procedure 
adopted for discord (Shiqaq). The judge shall appoint two arbitrators 
representing each other. If they can bring about a reconciliation the 
matter ends there. But if they decide to separate the parties, a divorce 
shall not be valid unless the husband agrees to it. If they decide in 
favour of a khula, the same shall not be valid until and unless the 
wife is prepared for the same. This aspect of law resulted in great 
hardship to a Shia wife too.*"^ 
Therefore, in order to remove the hardship caused to the 
Hanafi and Shia wives, the principles laid down by Maliki and 
Hanabali schools in this regard was allowed to be adopted when 
absolutely necessary. The law laid down by Maliki schools regarding 
ill-treatment of wife by her husband was given legislative 
105 Ibid. 
106 Supra note 14, p. 773. 
383 
recognition in India as well as Pakistan by enacting clause VIII of 
Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act 1939. The said 
clause reads:^"' 
A woman married under Muslim law shall be entitled to obtain 
a decree for the dissolution of her marriage on any or more of the 
following grounds, namely 
(VIII) That the husband treats her with cruelty, that is to say: 
(a) Habitually assaults her or makes her life miserable by cruelty 
of conduct even when such conduct does not amount to 
physical ill treatment or, 
(b) Associates with women of evil repute or leads an infamous 
life, 
(c) Attempts to force her to lead an immoral life, 
(d) Disposes of her property, or prevents her exercising her legal 
rights over it, 
(e) Obstructs her in performance of her religious profession or 
practice, etc. 
(f) If he has more wives than one, does not treat her equitably in 
accordance with the injunctions of Qur'an. 
The cruelty has, always been recognised as ground for the 
dissolution of marriage under the traditional Muslim law. The 
107. Section 2 clause (VIII) of Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939. 
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Muslim law as derived from Holy Qur'an and sunna throws 
considerable light on the concept of cruelty by prescribing various 
norms of behaviour for both the husband and wife. The injunctions 
of Holy Qur'an, the traditions of Holy Prophet (PBUH) and the 
deliberations of Muslim Jurists provide a clear view of what 
constitutes "cruelty" in Islamic sense.^ *** Broadly speaking: 
1. What is not based on justice is cruelly. 
2. What is not based on principle of equity is cruelty. 
Thus, any transgression of divine law or deviation from sunna 
and established traditions in matrimonial relation may be called 
cruelty to the other party. The cruelty has not been defined in 
absolute terms. The concept has to be understood in relation to status 
and grooming of the pair, the social conceptions of time, victim's 
capacity to endure effect on body and mind, etc. The court does not 
view it in the frame of an ideal couple, but in context of expectations 
from a normal couple. Beating, bodily assaults, physical violence, 
ill-treatment false accusations about her character, civil or criminal 
suits against her to harass or coerce to part with property, neglect, 
cessation of marital intercourse, are some of examples of legal 
cruelty. 
108. Dr. Mohammad Ashraf; Cruelty to Married Women: An Islamic View; Civil and 
Military Law Journal: Vol. 32, P. 136, April-June(1996) New Delhi. 
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The leading English case on the point is Russel v/s Russel^^^ 
wherein the whole concept of matrimonial cruelty was discussed. 
The view was summed up by the court in following words: 
"The legal concept of cruelty which is not defined by statute, 
is generally described as conduct of such character as to have caused 
danger to life, limb or health (bodily or mental) or as to give rise to a 
reasonable apprehension of such danger. The general rule in all 
questions of cruelty is that the whole matrimonial relations must be 
considered, that rule is of special value when the cruelty consists not 
of violent acts but of injurious reproaches, complaints, accusations 
or taunts. It may be mental, such as, indifference and rigidity 
towards wife, denial of company to her, hatred and abhorrence for 
wife, or physical acts of violence and abstinence, from sexual 
intercourse without reasonable cause." 
It is significant to note that in English law no statute has ever 
defined the term cruelty and the comprehensive ruling laid down by 
court in Russel v/s Russel have consistently been followed and still is 
followed as leading case for the test and definition of matrimonial 
cruelty. 
109. IR (1897) AC 395. 
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In case of Muslim parties, judiciary applied the English 
principle of cruelty. In Ghoas Ali v/s Firoz a Khatoon^^^ it has been 
held that the conduct on the part of the husband which renders her 
(the wife's) life miserable is sufficient to attract the provision of 
section 2(VIII) of Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 and it is 
not necessary that the treatment has to be accompanied by some 
physical assault on her. The entire bundle of circumstances and the 
background of such occurrences as well as the effect on the life and the 
mental well-being of the wife has to be considered in arriving at a 
finding whether the wife's life was rendered miserable thereby or not. 
In Moonshee Buzloor Rahman v/s Shamsoonissa ' " explaining 
the concept of cruelty in Muslim law, the court observed. 
"The Muhammadan law on question of what is legal cruelty 
between man and wife, would probably not differ materially from 
our own concept of which one of the most recent exposition is the 
following. There must be an actual violence of such character as to 
endanger personal health or safety or there must be a reasonable 
apprehension of it. 
In Zubaida Begum v/s Sardar Shah "^ it has held that disposal 
of property which would attract the provision of clause (VIII) (d) of 
110. P.L.D. (1969) Dacca, 548 
111. 11 MIA, 551. 
112. (1943) 210, I.e. 587. 
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Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 is 
disposal by a husband, without the wife's consent of a substantial 
portion of her property not for her benefit but for his own selfish 
ends and in a wasteful manner, with the intention of depriving her of 
her property. It is mere disposal without any intention that makes the 
conduct actionable. If the disposal is with her consent, then the 
matter should be pursued to the full implications of that consent. If, 
for instance, the plaintiff allowed her husband to sell her property or 
even requested him to do so with the object of depositing the sale 
proceeds in bank and the husband after complying with the first part 
of the request appropriated the money to his won use, it will 
constitute disposal under clause VIII (d) of Section 2 of dissolution 
of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939. 
Where the wife began to live separately because of ill-
treatment of the husband, and the latter did not make any effort to 
treat her at all, much less to treat her equitably, in accordance with 
the injunction of Qur'an, the case falls within section 2(V111) (f) of 
the Act. 
In Begum Subanu v/s A.M. Abdul Gafoor^^^ , the supreme court 
has held that sharing the matrimonial bed with the second wife of the 
113. AIR. 1987, S.C, 536. 
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husband constituted matrimonial injury affording her a ground to live 
separately from the husband. 
The court as a rule did not before the passing of the 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939, take into consideration 
the infliction of mental or legal cruelty by the husband on the wife. 
However, the clause VIII of section 2 of Dissolution of Muslim 
Marriage Act, 1939 has provided a much needed clarification of the 
attitude of Muslim law towards a husband's cruelty to his wife. A 
Muslim wife can now sue for the dissolution of her marriage even 
when the husband's conduct does not amount to physical cruelty but 
constitute only mental cruelty. 
It will be seen from the above discussion that Muslim law has 
laid some general but important principles of law dealing with 
husband's cruelty. Although actual examples have not been 
discussed, we can deduce rule for our guidance from those general 
principles to meet particular cases. A further difficulty is the absence 
of case law on the subject in India due to the fact that Muslim 
women were tough to consider it their duty to bear patiently all kind 
of cruelty at the hands of their husbands without seeking assistance 
from a court law. Under Muslim law there is no stigma attached to a 
wife seeking or obtaining a divorce but in Indian Muslims were 
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greatly influenced by the thoughts and practice of their neighbours, 
Hindus. Hindu law did not at one time allow divorce or dissolution 
of marriage to wife and Muslim wives, belonging to respectable 
families, likewise, started considering it abhorrent to seek a divorce. 
They preferred to bear all sorts of hardship rather than bear what 
they considered the shame and disgrace of a divorce. 
The attitude of courts was also responsible to some extent for 
this hesitation to seek dissolution because they generally applied 
Hanafi law to the Hanafis even when it involved unnecessary 
hardship. It seems their attention was not drawn to the practice of 
Hanafi jurists who allow the adoption of law of another sect of 
Sunnis whenever necessary or desirable in the interest of justice. The 
dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 has solved the difficulty 
in India and Pakistan. Many other Muslim countries have also made 
the husband's cruelty to the wife a ground on the basis of which a 
marriage can now be dissolved by the court on the basis of ill-
treatment of wife by the husband. 
390 
Section 2 Clause (ix) 
Grounds of Dissolution Recognised by Muslim Law: 
Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 after 
specifying in clause (I) to (Vlll) the eight specific grounds on which a 
Muslim wife shall be entitled to obtain a decree in a suit for dissolution of 
her marriage, proceeds to provide in clause (IX) that the wife shall also be 
entitled to obtain such a decree "on any ground which is recognised as valid 
for dissolution of marriage under Muslim Law". 
This is a residuary clause covering other grounds which are 
recognise as valid under Muslim law, such as Khula, Mubara'at, Tafwid, 
Ila, Zihar and Lian. The imputation of unchastity, a false charge of adultery 
and incompatibility of minds between the spouse have been recognised as 
valid grounds for a decree of dissolution of marriage under clause (IX) of 
the Act. The grounds of dissolution of marriage as recognise under classical 
Muslim law find detail discussion in the scheme of thesis in the shape of 
separate chapters. However, it is to be pointed out that giving legislative 
recognition to the Khula, Mubara'at and Talaq-e-Tafwid as a valid ground 
for a decree of dissolution of marriage under the Act, merely broadens the 
scope of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939, otherwise the right 
of a Muslim wife to dissolve her marriage by way of Khula, Mubara'at and 
Tafwid is very much available under the shariah law and can be exercised 
even after the commencement of the Act, 1939 without the intervention of 
court. 
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CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
The institution of divorce, as provided under Islam, has been 
the subject of repeated controversy and is still a live issue capable of 
generating much heat and passion due to the changing concept of 
gender equality and emancipation in the western civilization and its 
impact on the woman in general. The present study constitutes an 
academic venture into the dynamics of Muslim Personal law relating 
to the Dissolution of a Muslim Marriage at the instance of a wife. A 
ceaseless effort has been made to establish, after making an 
exhaustive study of relevant verses of the Holy Qur'an, Hadith 
literature and the juristic works, that as the Muslim Husband has 
been given the right to divorce his wife with whom he can no longer 
pull on for the just and reasonable cause, likewise, a Muslim wife 
also enjoys the privilege of being able to discard her husband with 
whom it has become impossible for her to continue marital life with 
observance of limits set by Allah and His Holy Prophet (PBUH). The 
wife's right to dissolve the marriage under the classical Muslim law, 
such as Khula, Mubara'at and Talaq-e-Tafwid are in no sense 
inferior to the right of divorce given to her counterpart. The rights 
empowering the wife to seek dissolution of her marriage under the 
classical Islamic jurisprudence and their recognition by modem 
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legislation and judicial pronouncements have been dealt with at 
length in different chapters given in order. However, the 
dispassionate study of the thesis as a whole invariably leads to the 
following conclusion followed by brief suggestions which may go a 
long way to clarify the misgivings and misunderstandings conceived 
by many as to this aspect of Shariah. 
As it has already been seen and discussed that all the human 
civilizations except Hinduism had adopted the institution of divorce 
in marital relation because it is considered a necessary corollary to 
the contractual form of the marriage. The Hebraic law, the 
Athenians, the Romans, the Shammities and others upheld this 
doctrine in various forms. But in all these systems the husband had 
predominant authority with no efficient check on his capricious 
power of divorce. The Christian as well as Jewish also recognized 
this institution. In pre-Islamic Arabia divorce was resorted to as an 
instrument and a means to torture the disliked and discarded wife. 
The husband could divorce his wife out of sudden caprice or whim 
while she was in the state of menstruation or even when she was 
pregnant or nursing a newly born child without undertaking any 
obligation towards her. 
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The social and the moral ills and gender injustices being 
perpetrated by the Arabs immediately before the advent of Islam 
engaged the attention of Holy Prophet of Islam. Fully conscious of 
the evils the flowing from divorce he under the Divine guidance and 
inspiration framed the laws of marriage and divorce to remove these 
evils. The laws so framed by him fully ensured, full dignity and 
honourable status of women without impairing individual freedom of 
seeking separation under the human necessity for just and reasonable 
cause. Therefore, a survey of brief historical evolution of the 
institution of divorce prove adequately beyond any shadow of doubt 
that Islam is not the originator of the institution of divorce. It simply 
tolerated it in the larger interest of society but only after effecting 
necessary reforms and gave it the most complete, satisfactory and 
humanistic form. It also gave the woman the right of dissolving 
marriage which was almost unthinkable until recently for any 
civilized nation. 
It is an acknowledged and Quranically established fact that 
Islam recognises the necessity of divorce but only in case when 
marital relationship have been so poisoned to such a degree which 
makes a peaceful home life impossible. But Islam does not believe in 
unlimited opportunities for divorce on frivolous and flimsy grounds. 
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because, any undue increase in the facility of divorce would destroy 
the stability of family life. Therefore, while allowing divorce even 
on genuine grounds Islam has laid down procedures of divorce 
elaborately in order to check hasty actions and laws the door open 
for reconciliation at many stages. 
The right method of pronouncing divorce as provided in the 
Holy Quran and the authentic traditions is that if and when it 
becomes inevitable, it should be pronounced only when she is not in 
her menses and even if a dispute arises during the monthly period it 
is not right to pronounce divorce during that period, rather he should 
wait for her to cleanse herself and then he may pronounce a single 
divorce, if he so likes. Then he should wait for her next monthly 
course and pronounce the second divorce after she is cleansed, if he 
so wishes. Then he should wait for the next monthly course to 
pronounce the third and the final divorce after she is cleansed. It is 
however, better to wait and reconsider the matter after the first and 
the second pronouncements because in the case of first and second 
divorce the husband retains the right to take her back as his wife 
after their expiry. But if divorce is pronounced for the third time, the 
husband forfeits the right to take her back, and the couples cannot 
remarry with each other. 
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Thus, the procedure of divorce spoken of in the Holy Qur'an 
and by the Holy Prophet (PBUH) is aimed at to enhance the chances 
of reconciliation and thereby reducing the cases of dissolution of 
marriage by offering enough time for cool thinking, reconsideration, 
persuasion and reassessment of consequences of the termination of 
marriage. 
Talaq-e-Sunnat definitely and clearly aims at to eliminate the 
pre-lslamic abuses of marital relations and seeks to limit the 
arbitrary and unfettered right of the husband to terminate marriage. 
In the face of discouraging attitude of Holy Qur'an and Sunnah of 
Holy Prophet (PBUH) and the over emphasis on reconciliation and 
resumption of marital tie, the Islamic law of divorce is more like 
doctrine of reconciliation rather than rule of separation. 
As for those ignorant people who pronounce divorce thrice at 
the one and the same sitting, they commit a heinous sin against the 
Divine law. The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) has severely denounced 
this practice for the reason that in this mode of divorce, there is no 
time which is necessary to provide an opportunity of repentance, 
reconsideration, reconciliation and rapprochement of strained 
relations; also under this formula there is no chance for the husband 
to recall the wife. 
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A deep and dispassionate study of the chapter "Triple divorce" 
bring out clearly that divorcing a woman instantaneously by the 
simultaneous pronouncements of three divorces is not only a sinful 
act but a flagrant violation of Quranic mandates contained in verses 
19; 34; 35; 128; 228; 229 of Sura Al-Baqar as well as verses 1;2;5;7; 
of Sura Al Talaq and the well known and clear approach of Holy 
Prophet (PBUH) of Islam. 
The Holy Prophet (PBUH) and his most of the companions, 
regarded triple form of divorce morally reprehensible and held the 
person responsible as a sinner. Hazrat Umar, the Second Caliph used 
to punish irresponsible and unscrupulous husbands resorting to this 
formula of divorce. 
In fact he introduced this principle as a punitive deterrent 
administrative measure to discipline the careless and irresponsible 
husband and to protect the interests of women who were being 
subjected to suspensory divorce. What Hazrat Umar had considered 
disciplinary and reformative measures against the unscrupulous 
husband of that time turned out with the change of time and 
conditions to be more harmful to innocent women. 
Later Muslim scholars, like Imam Ibn Taymiah, Ibn Hazm and 
Ibn Qayyim had also held triple divorce in one sitting invalid and 
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had tried by their forceful arguments to redress this situation by 
advocating to go back to the early practice of the days of Holy 
Prophet (PBUH) by treating it as one revocable divorce. 
At present time triple divorce under the stress of an emotion 
has become a widely-spread practice, especially, in non-Islamic 
countries. As emotion subsides, shame and regret grips the guilty 
conscious of a man and a vain search starts for some excuse to undo 
what has been done. Some take shelter behind false oaths to deny 
having divorced; others arrange a spurious second marriage of the 
wife followed by remarriage with themselves. To put an end to these 
evil practices, preventive legislative measures of various kinds have 
been taken by the various Muslim countries of the world which 
represent to some extent the spirit of Islamic law of divorce. In 
India, recently a Fatwa issued by three Muftis of Ahl-e-Hadith 
declared the pronouncement of triple divorce at one sitting invalid 
illegal and ineffective. Even the progressive Muslim intellectuals 
like Maulana Wahiduddin Khan and Engineer Ashgar Ali have also 
upheld the Fatwa. They argue that if Shariah is truly based on Quran 
and sunna then there is no place for pronouncement of triple divorce 
in one sitting. The arguments built up by them definitely fit in the 
frame of shariah. 
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Despite the clear-cut warning and strong disapproval of the 
Talaq-e-Biddat by the Holy Quran, the Holy Prophet (PBUH), 
classical and modem Islamic jurists, the Indian courts have 
recognised the pronouncement of the triple divorce as lawful, 
effective and valid. The common phrase used by the court is that 
Talaq-e-Biddat or triple pronouncement of divorce is good in law 
though bad in theology. But as we have seen that in majority of cases 
the courts have either regretted its action or found themselves 
helpless to pronounce verdict in opposition to the earlier rulings. In 
some cases courts attempted to deliver a verdict against the 
established law on triple divorce but contended by repeating old 
dictum. However, in Ziauddin's case. Justice Baharul Islam gave a 
revolutionary judgement which was in consonance with true Islamic 
law but it has not been reported. Justice H.N. Tilhari in 
Rahmatullah's case held that the triple divorce is against the 
injunction of Holy Qur'an and is a sin. Therefore, if a person has 
pronounced triple divorce it means that he has adopted an un-Islamic 
procedure of divorce. It is a high time for the court to discourage it 
by following the Islamic principle of divorce and the triple divorce 
should be treated as a single revocable divorce within the period of 
iddat. 
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An in-depth study of chapter on Khula and Mubara'at have 
made it clear that Islamic matrimonial law maintains a balance 
between the rights of man and woman by treating them on equal 
footing from cradle to grave. As the husband has been given right for 
securing release from an unhappy and disharmonious marriage, 
similar rights have been given by Islam to a wife to get rid from a 
unwanted and torturous companionship. 
There are two ways in which a woman is allowed to seek 
separation from her husband. First through mutual agreement 
between the husband and wife which includes Khula, Mubara'at and 
Talaq-e-Tafwid. Secondly, through a judicial decree by filing a suit 
against the husband in a law-court. It has been seen that the wife is 
not at liberty, like the husband, to get herself released by an outright 
declaration of divorce under Khula or Mubara'at. In such situation if 
the husband refuses to release her from the marriage bond, she has to 
knock the door of court and may obtain a decree of dissolution of her 
marriage. This may seem to place her at a disadvantage in compa-
rison to her husband and it is asserted that this implies in-equality of 
rights as between husband and wife. Actually, the intervention of the 
state in the matter is a device for the fuller protection of her rights. 
Conditions all over the world, including western countries, are such 
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that a woman is not altogether free to exercise her legal rights. The 
husband can, if he so desires, place many impediments in her way. If 
the state does not come to her help in order to safeguard her rights, 
the woman may find herself handicapped in many ways despite big 
talks and preachings of sea equality. It is therefore, in her own 
interest to seek support of authority in defending and exercising her 
rights. 
There is no dispute about a woman's legal right to seek the 
dissolution of her marriage from her husband under khula. This she 
may do either by giving up a part or the whole of the dower given to 
her by the husband or by offering an agreed sum of money to her 
husband in return for his consent to release her from the marriage 
bond. In case the husband refuses to release his wife from the 
marriage tie even when it is established that he and his wife cannot 
keep together within the limits of Allah and the wife is prepared to 
pay a consideration for getting out of marriage tie, it shall be open to 
the wife to seek the help of law by filing a suit against the husband 
and the court, if otherwise satisfied, may grant a decree of 
dissolution. In Bilqees Fatima v/s. Najmul Ekram, it was held that if 
the court arrived at the conclusion that the couple could not be able 
to maintain the limits set by God, it could then get Khula effected 
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even against the consent of the husband by ordering the wife to pay 
reasonable compensation to the husband. 
The actual legal decisions by the Holy Prophet (PBUH) in the 
case of Jamila, the wife of Thabit bin Qays shows the spirit and 
principles which the law courts should apply to the cases of Khula 
brought about by women against their husbands. The cases decided 
by Holy Prophet (PBUH) and his companions also suggest that it is 
not proper for the court to inquire whether a wife seeking Khula is 
doing so because she is sexually erotic and desires a variety of 
sexual pleasure or aversion to her husband springs from genuine 
causes. The mere fact of a woman becoming disgusted with her 
husband is sufficient ground for legal separation between them. In 
case of Jamila, the Holy Prophet (PBUH) showed by his action that a 
woman's disapproval of her husband on physical ground may be a 
legitimate cause for a decree of dissolution in her favour. It is 
therefore, enough for the court to satisfy itself that one of the parties 
has developed sufficient antipathy against the other making the 
reconciliation impossible. The court need not inquire into detailed 
reasons of antipathy, because a woman may dislike her husband on 
many grounds some of which she may not like to disclose openly. 
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So far as the payment of compensation to the husband in lieu 
of wife's emancipation from marital bond is concerned, it is a settled 
principle of law that the husband can not claim more than he has 
already given his wife as dower. If the separation comes of as a 
result of mutual agreement without the intervention of court, the 
quantum of compensation has to be settled between the two partners. 
But it the husband does not agree to the Khula proposal of wife and 
dispute is brought to the court, then power vests in the court to fix 
the amount of compensation to be paid in lieu of her release. In this 
regard judicial trend in Pakistan has been to stipulate a sum which go 
only to the extent of return of benefits earlier derived by the wife 
from husband and not beyond that. Many jurists agree that if Khula 
takes place as a result of the ill-treatment of the husband or his 
excesses and such charges are proved during the process of legal 
inquiry, the court can totally exempt the wife from the payment of 
Khula compensation. 
The judicial opinion in Pakistan is divided on the issue as to 
whether the payment of compensation can be made a condition 
precedent for the operation of Khula. But the courts in Pakistan have 
overwhelmingly endorsed the viewpoint that payment of 
compensation by the wife to the husband cannot be made condition 
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precedent and its non-payment cannot nullify Khula. Additionally, 
the non payment of compensation does not affect other rights of 
wife, such as, maintenance during Iddat and unpaid dower. 
Under the law of Islam, like the husband, the wife too can put 
to an end to the marriage by her unilateral action. This she can do 
under what is called talaq-e-Tafwid. This enables, the married 
women to dissolve their marriages without the consent of their 
husbands or the intervention of a court or any other external agency. 
The basis of this power of wife is its Tafwid (delegation) to her by 
mutual agreement of parties incorporated in their contract of 
marriage. The only major difference between the position of the 
husband and the wife in this regard is that while the husband derives 
his power of unilateral talaq from the law itself, the wife may derive 
it from the husband under the marriage agreement entered into either 
at the time of marriage or at any time before or after the marriage. 
The delegation could either be absolute or accompanied by 
conditions which are reasonable and not opposed to policy of Islamic 
law. The contingencies specified in the agreement of Tafwid on the 
happening of which the wife can pronounce the talaq, can include 
non- payment of Mahr, cruelty or bigamous marriage by the husband 
or ex-communication of husband. The pronouncing of divorce by the 
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wife in the exercise of delegated authority of divorce is as good as 
husband's pronouncing it in the exercise of power of Talaq. The 
doctrine of freedom of marital stipulation is specifically recognised 
by legislation in Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Bangladesh and 
Pakistan. All lawful conditions mutually agreed upon at the time of 
marriage, and also an option reserved by the wife to dissolve the 
marriage if any such condition is violated, are judicially enforceable 
in these countries. In Morocco such a Talaq is irrevocable and in 
Bangladesh and Pakistan, like a Talaq by husband it is to be notified 
to a local official for constitution of an 'arbitration council' which 
will explore the possibilities of avoiding it. 
This form of delegated divorce is perhaps the most potent 
weapon in the hands of a Muslim wife to obtain her freedom without 
intervention of any court and is now beginning to be fairly common 
in India. 
The priv>' Council in Moonshee Buzul-ul'-Raheem v/s Lateefun 
Nissa discussing about extra judicial divorce under Muslim Law 
pointed out that under Mohommedan law , the divorce may be made 
in either of two forms i.e., Talaq or Khula. The Supreme court in 
Zohara Khatoon v/s Mohd. Ibrahim also did not mention Ila or zihar 
as a mode of divorce. The shariat Act, 1937, however, while 
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mandating application of Muslim Law in all question relating to 
dissolution of Muslim marriages, has specifically mentioned, Talaq, 
Ila, zihar ,Lian, Khula and Mubara'at as different modes of 
dissolution of marriage under Muslim law. 
However, Fyzee has observed that although Ila and zihar find 
mention under shariat Act, 1973 but they are very rare in India and 
of no practical importance and have become absolete in India, Fyzee 
has also referred to a division bench decision of Allahabad High 
court in Bibi Rehana Khatoon v/s Iqtedaruddin Hussain and has 
commented that a case of Ila was unsuccessfully raised in that case. 
But it must be noted that the ground of Ila failed in that case on the 
basis of its facts, and not that Ila as a legally effective mode of 
divorce was not available under the law though it was pointed out 
that this mode of divorce has become obsolete and is being exercised 
rarely. 
According to Tyabji' zihar has hardly any significance so far 
as the law courts in India are concerned. But after shariat Act 1937 
specifically recognizing these modes and section 2(IX) of 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 entitling a Muslim wife 
dissolution of marriage on any other ground which is recognised as 
valid under Muslim law, all these modes have acquired some 
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significance. Therefore, neither the privy council decision in the 
Munshee Buzul-ur-Raheem nor the supreme court decision in Zohara 
Khatoon case can be regarded to have made accurate statement about 
the different modes of dissolution of marriage as neither has 
mentioned Ila or Zihar. 
Therefore, when under Muslim law a husband can get rid of 
his wife unilaterally and literally at his whim or pleasure by talaq 
mode, there should have been usually no occasion to resort to his 
circuitous and round about of Ila or Zihar mode of divorce and that is 
also reason why these modes have been rarely used. Since a Muslim 
husband has an unfettered right to walk out of wedlock at his whim 
by short and straight route of Talaq, he would seldom, if at all, be 
expected to take a longer route. 
If the husband charges his wife with adultery, the court after 
giving certain oaths to the wife and husband will pass a decree for 
separation where the husband persists in levelling such unapproved 
charge. This procedure is called Lian. However, the allegation or 
charge does not dissolve the marriage, but that entitles the wife to 
sue for divorce and to a decree, if the charge is proved to be false, 
but of course not, if it proved to be true. The marriage continues 
until the decree is passed. Lian is therefore, a divorce by or at the 
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instance of wife though effected through judicial process. The 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939, which has entitled a 
woman married under Muslim law to obtain a decree, for divorce on 
certain grounds specified therein, does not mention false charge of 
adultery against the wife as a ground to sue for divorce. But since the 
Act in section 2 (IX) thereof entitles a wife to sue for divorce "on 
any ground which is recognized as valid for the dissolution of 
marriage under Muslim law", such a suit would be maintained under 
the said provision. 
Apart from cases of 11a, Zihar Lian, ill-treatment and genuine 
aversion of wife against the husband, Islam recognizes other grounds 
of divorce on the basis of which a Muslim wife may seek the 
dissolution of her marriage. These are the option of puberty; refusal 
to provide economic sustenance; change of religion; impotency; 
infectious . diseases in either partner, willful desertion and 
disappearance of husband. 
The rights given to the women by Islam for demanding 
separation from their husband command the sanction of Holy Quran, 
Sunna of Holy Prophet (PBUH) as well as the jurists of four Imams. 
The wife's right to dissolve the marriage on the grounds specified by 
the Holy Qur'an and sunna and the circumstances which occasion to 
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harsh step of dissolution have been given legislative recognition in 
India by passing the Dissolution of Muslim marriage Act, 1939. 
Consequently, a women married under Muslim law can repudiate her 
marriage on grounds specified in clause (I) to (IX) of dissolution of 
Muslim Marriage Act 1939. 
Thus, the reform effected in the institution of divorce by Holy 
Prophet (PBUH) under the Divine guidance marked a new departure 
in the history of Human civilization. He restrained the unlimited 
power of divorce of husband and gave the women, the right of 
obtaining the separation on reasonable ground, which is shiqaq 
disagreement to live together as husband and wife. 
It is therefore submitted that Islam has maintained more or less 
absolute equality between man and woman by granting the woman 
all the basic rights which are essential for her dignified survival and 
which are still denied to her by most of the societies. The rights, 
significantly, include the right to choose and change the life partner. 
The divinely revealed expression, " And if ye fear a breach (Shiqaq) 
between twain," would imply that either the husband or wife wants to 
break-off the marriage agreement and hence either may claim a 
divorce when parties can no longer pull on in agreement. There is no 
doubt that man enjoys a greater degree of freedom regarding mode of 
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effecting his unilateral action of divorce, because he has no need to 
resort to a court of law. But there is a reasonable justification for 
making this restriction necessary in the case of woman. Justice V.K. 
Khalid in K. C. Moyin v/s. Nafeesa giving justification held that "if 
without intervention of court, marriage can be dissolved by unilateral 
repudiation by the wife calamitous result will follow as this would be 
exploited by the unscrupulous father in-law or other near relatives of 
wife to get rid of recalcitrant or poor son in law but loving husband. 
It is, therefore, crystal clear from the foregoing discussion that 
as far as facilities for divorce is concerned Islam has given equal 
rights to the member of female sex. The right to dissolve the 
marriage conferred on women by the Holy Prophet (PBUH) of Islam 
fourteen hundred years ago have only partially and grudgingly been 
given to them in western and Eastern countries during the course of 
last two centuries. Similarly, with respect to sex equality, the 
essential human dignity and fundamental equality of woman, Islam is 
at one with the leaders of feminist movement. But as the application 
of an abstract principle is qualified and conditioned by social 
realities and concrete situations, Islam has modified its stand on sex 
equality in consonance with social, biological and sex realities. 
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Now we may proceed towards the suggestive part of the 
conclusion. It is a glaring fact and hard truth that Muslim law 
relating to matrimonial relation, as practiced today, has taken a 
course contrary to the letter and spirit of Shariah and therefore, 
causing hardships and miseries to the Muslim women contemporary 
generation. The sooner it is set right, the better will follow for the 
Muslim society. 
To my mind there are two possible solutions to the problem 
discussed in the thesis. One is perfect and permanent while the other 
is relative and temporary. One relates to the change of heart and 
mind of the Muslims, the other relates to the procedure and 
precaution to be adopted, one is for eradication and the other is for 
minimization of ills. 
The first and foremost is an all out effort by Muslims in 
general and Ulema in particular, to transform Muslims into a 
religiously conscious and God fearing community, in a society of 
true believers and practitioners. The proper functioning and perfect 
implementation of Shariah depends on the willingness of minds and 
receptibility of heart of the governed (Muslim) which can not be 
created or implemented by exterior measures. It can be achieved only 
through the purification of soul by an inner change. This solution 
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may appear to many as only an ideal and not practical but infact this 
is the only lasting solution of ills. But I concede that this solution is 
more difficult and more time consuming. Therefore, it may be 
submitted that the following suggestions to be adopted and may be 
given legislative shape to minimize abuse of Shariah regarding 
dissolution of marriage and restore the women their dignified place 
in the society. 
Both the practice of capricious unilateral divorce and Talaq-e-
Biddat must be condemned with utmost force and persuasion. It is 
still not too late for our right thinking Ulema and Muslim Jurists to 
come forward with firm and convincing arguments that the prevalent 
customs of triple divorce is wrong, sinful, un Islamic, arbitrary and 
capricious. They must sit down, deliberate and come out with a joint 
declaration that this form of divorce is sin and socio-moral crime and 
suggest proper remedies to root it out. 
It is therefore suggested that the right course is to go back to 
Quran and sunnah and seek direct inspiration and guidance from 
them. Under Shariah, so far as the permissible acts are concerned, 
the elimination of ill-effects and misuse gets priority over securing 
advantages. Divorce in Islam, is the most disapproved and detestable 
of all the permissible things (Ahghad-ul-Mubah). The divine stamp 
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of Qur'an and Sunnah is available to bridle the reckless exercise of 
male's right and to impose religiously and judiciously tested 
restraints for exercise thereof. But care must be taken that no right or 
obligation repugnant to the Qur'an or Sunna is created. 
Divorce to be legal and effective must strictly follow the 
specification of Shariah i.e., it must be in the form of Talaq-e-
Sunnah. Any other form of divorce, in conflict with the letter and 
spirit of Quran or Hadith, must be outlawed and be declared a crime 
punishable with stringent fine or imprisonment or both. 
The modern legislations enacted in many Muslim countries of 
Africa and Asia, under which no marriage could be dissolved without 
the intervention of a competent court or arbitrators of administrative 
body appointed for the purpose and the provision of compulsory 
reconciliatory proceeding in all cases of divorce have, to a great 
extent, enforced the spirit of Quran and sunna. 
The precautionary measures incorporated in these legislations 
may be taken by Ulema, Muslim Jurists and Muslim intellectuals too 
and a process of proper interpretation in right tune with the teaching 
of Islam must begin. It will be a positive step to bring the law in the 
line with the spirit of Shariah. These measures will go a long way to 
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provide a safeguard against the misuse and abuse of Islamic law of 
divorce and will go to protect women from male tyranny. 
The right to dissolve the marriage under the doctrine of Khula 
available to the wife under shariah, in a male dominated society 
seems to be difficult and expensive to exercise. The procedure and 
administrative mechanism must be evolved to make the exercise of 
this right easier and free of cost. 
In Pakistan, the problems pertaining to divorce are settled 
through judicial process in the light of law inherited from classical 
Muslim jurists. It is a high time that a legislation relating to Islamic 
matrimonial law, on the pattern of Muslim counties, be enacted in 
India too. With regard to the payment of compensation in Khula such 
legislation should be incorporated in a provision whereby courts 
should be authorised to determine the quantum of payable 
compensation keeping in view the circumstances of each case. 
Under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939, the 
Muslim wife may apply to the court seeking dissolution of her 
marriage on the ground of her husband's tyranny and cruelty to her 
and the court may, on such tyranny and cruelty being proved, 
dissolve the marriage. It is however, not the practice of the courts to 
appoint arbitrators in these proceedings, in the absence of any 
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provision providing for the appointment, power and functions of 
arbitrators. It is, therefore suggested that separate rules for the 
arbitration be made by introducing suitable amendments in the 
relevant provisions of Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939, for 
resolving marital dispute. 
Islam exhorts the spouses to sort out their marital dispute 
outside the court to avoid greater and far-reaching harm to their 
future life. Islam does not like the washing of one's dirty linen under 
the pretext of Shariah. But it is realistic enough to take recourse to 
law where persuation fails to save the pious purpose. To achieve this 
end and to set the things right the recourse even to legislation, 
properly and legally enacted, is not un-Islamic but recommended. 
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